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Preface
Beginning with James R. McGovern's case study of Claude Neal in Anatomy
of a Lynching (1982) and running through Stewart E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck's
comparative analysis often southern states in A Festival of Violence (1995),
the recent interest in lynch law has provided valuable insights that reach far
beyond the violence to tell much about black-white relations in changing
historical eras.1 The lynching of Cleo Wright extends this inquiry to Mis-
souri, a state possessing neither completely northern or southern nor even
distinctively border characteristics, but whose people and history have in-
fluenced important national issues.
First and foremost, this is the story of Cleo Wright, his victim Grace Stur-
geon, and their respective communities in the city of Sikeston. Wright was
not simply a socially pathological black youth and Sturgeon an isolated, help-
less white woman; rather, his criminal act and her heroic response sprang
from a past and a culture that explain much about all lynchings in the most
basic of human terms. So do the actions of the lynchers who took Wright's
life and the officials who failed to save it. Together, their acts reflect a con-
temporary society grown to expect senseless bloodshed of its own human-
ity and that of its forebears.
Moreover, Wright's killing influenced local, state, and national history
as have very few lynchings. It revealed the disruption of transition from tra-
ditional to modern society in an urban setting marked by several regional
and, more recently, southern influences. It happened in a state relatively
unknown for racial violence yet one whose lynching record both paralleled
and broke with patterns of the South, most notably in urban lynchings. It
occurred at a time of national crisis that required unprecedented federal in-
tervention, reinforced the reduction of extralegal public executions of blacks,
and revised legal strategies the better to protect later generations.
Presented primarily as a case study, this interpretation also compares
Wright's death with other lynchings in Missouri and throughout the South.
In the process, it builds on the spate of recent studies, particularly those of
Michael J. Pfeifer, W. Fitzhugh Brundage, and Tolnay and Beck.2 It reinforces
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many of their findings, posits some variations, and advances a few theses. It
analyzes the state's eighty-five lynchings from 1889 to 1942, aware of the
difficulty in accurately identifying every such ritualized murder.3 It provides
an in-depth study of Wright's killing and suggests a direction for more com-
prehensive work on similar deaths throughout the state. Much more may
be learned from these about race relations and racial violence at a time when
society is becoming more pluralistic and, some would argue, violence-prone.
An understanding of one death in one critical era can provide insights for
citizens struggling to enter a new age of demographic change, scarce re-
sources, and intergroup conflict. In that lesson lies the enduring significance
of Wright's life—and that of every other lynch victim.
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1 Sikeston
Within twelve hours on Sunday, January 25, 1942, racial violence erupted
three times in Sikeston, Missouri.1 It began in the dark, wintry morning on
the southeast edge of town and ended in the daylight of early afternoon on
the west side—in an area appropriately called Sunset Addition—where most
black citizens lived. According to Grace Sturgeon, an unknown black man
entered her home at 1:30 A.M., attacked her with a knife, and retreated into
the night.
Thirty minutes later and within a short distance of the Addition, Cleo
Wright stood before the headlights of a scout car. Covered in blood, he ap-
peared to have stepped out of a slaughterhouse rather than the nighttime
shadows. Arrested and placed in the vehicle, he soon rammed a hidden knife
through the lower jaw of Night Marshal Hess Perrigan and, in turn, spewed
forth his own blood as point-blank gunshots riddled his body, ending the
second violent outburst.
Wright, Perrigan, and Sturgeon all received treatment at the tiny Gen-
eral Hospital, soon the site of a death watch as droves of residents responded
to widely circulated stories of the assaults. Already anxious over the recent
bombing of Pearl Harbor and U.S. entry into World War II, they grasped
for resolution to the black brutalities that rubbed raw their white nerves.
Some believed that it lay in still more bloodletting. How could public order
be restored abroad, if not first at home?
Hence Wright's ordeal ended as it had begun, in cold blood. As he was
shuttled from the hospital to his home and back to City Hall by policemen,
instigators organized a lynch mob. As he lay semiconscious in a cell, having
twice confessed to the crimes, knots of curiosity-seekers became crowds of
spectators and, by noon, would-be lynchers. Dragged to the street and into
Sunset Addition, he met death as a sacrilegious Sabbath blaze within view
of black church services.
This final act of bloodletting ended Wright's rage. Occurring in the up-
per reaches of the Mississippi Delta, it bore the characteristics of a New South
lynching. Yet coming early in World War II, it sparked international atten-
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tion, federal investigation, and varying responses from citizens and officials,
many of whom were feeling the impact of modernization—a centralized,
depersonal, unpredictable world—which had begun during the New Deal
and become accelerated by war exigencies. Similar to traditional lynchings
yet unique in itself, Wright's execution revealed much about the evolution
of black-white relations in changing southeast Missouri and even more about
the roles of local, state, and federal authorities in stemming future racial vio-
lence. Thus it bears greater significance than most lynchings.
Until then, Sikeston had evolved as an ordinary community, though
hardly one without historical meaning.2 Founded in 1860 by John Sikes, it
sits in Scott County, one of seven counties that form the Bootheel of south-
eastern Missouri and, save for western Butler County, mark the northern
edge of the Mississippi Delta: lowlands of rich soil, sweltering temperatures,
and ample rainfall where, in time, cotton would become king. The city sur-
vived the guerrilla terrorism of area Confederates, who provoked hatreds
that carried beyond the Civil War, and grew slowly as terminus of the Cairo
and Fulton Railway (later the Missouri Pacific). Increasingly, it served as a
major emporium for the upper Bootheel, which changed dramatically in the
wake of turn-of-the century timber barons who cut over the entire area and
stimulated the drainage of what had been known as "Swampeast." By 1910
Sikeston and its sister towns were catering to midwestern farmers entering
their last "agricultural frontier" and southern laborers seeking work on the
drainage projects.3
During and after World War I, townsfolk witnessed even greater eco-
nomic change as the region evolved from a small-scale corn and wheat belt
of predominantly white farmers profiting from wartime demand for food-
stuffs to a larger-scale cotton kingdom of more racially diverse planters, gin-
ners, moneylenders, and pickers chased north by advancing boll weevils.4
"Our farms," exclaimed one former corn grower, "became plantations . . .
peppered over with sharecropper shacks." Indeed, between the close of the
war and the mid- 1920s, established grain growers joined newly arrived plant-
ers to increase cotton plantings from 104,004 to 445,933 acres, producing
95 percent of the crop in Missouri.5
City dwellers in Sikeston and elsewhere profiting from this economic
transformation must have noted its social impact as southern blacks entered
the Bootheel in such numbers that by the end of the 1920s their race ac-
counted for 24,877 persons or 12.7 percent of the population. Providing the
largest increases in the three riverfront counties of Mississippi, New Madrid,
and Pemiscot, blacks found themselves in a feudalistic sharecropping and
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wage-rate system akin to that of the New South, though tempered by ab-
sentee proprietors because high development costs benefited well-heeled
landlords and speculators.6 They entered a white-dominated caste system
that included a "Tobacco Road," complete with poor whites, drafty shacks,
slave diets, endemic diseases, and widespread illiteracy.7
Townspeople doubtless sensed that this hodgepodge of lowland
people—the fastest-growing population anywhere in the state—accentuated
traditional class and race conflict. In short, between 1890 and 1930, older
families from the East, the upper South, and the border states combined
with newly arrived hill people from Kentucky and Tennessee, farmers from
Illinois and Indiana, and southerners from Arkansas and Mississippi to form
a have-have not society that sparked competition. The transition from fron-
tier to civilization merged Yankee and southern prejudice in the Bootheel,
which became, in author Fannie Cook's phrase, "a sixth finger on the hand
of the South."8 Landlords imposed master-servant relationships, and white
laborers, themselves exploited, sought to drive blacks from the region. Ter-
ror, rioting, and lynching burst forth during the first quarter of the twenti-
eth century. This bloodshed stemmed from the interplay of a volatile
population, frontier culture, pell-mell economic development, and occa-
sional political party rivalries. But it also drew on racist beliefs and a his-
torical context shaped long before 1890.9
Against this backdrop, Sikestonians and their lowland neighbors expe-
rienced further economic and social upheaval in the Great Depression.
Throughout the 1930s both races—whether in city or country—encoun-
tered even greater poverty, though blacks suffered more, and some pro-
tested.10 In 1934, Bootheel blacks, including some from Sikeston and its
environs, heard St. Louis messengers from rival organizations promote im-
perial Japan and spread anti-white doctrines of "the most vicious type."11
They abandoned the Japanese-sponsored activities within the year, however,
as whites in the eastern- and southernmost counties retaliated with violence
and arrests, effectively chasing organizers back to the big city they had come
from. As significantly, large segments of the black population in southeast
Missouri had found little of ideological or cultural value in the pro-Japan
organizations.12 Preachers and "reputable Negroes" spoke out against them,
revealing class distinctions, religious beliefs, and leadership rivalries within
the black community.13
One year later the Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU) began or-
ganizing in the Bootheel, and under the leadership of Rev. Owen H.
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Whitfield, a black itinerant preacher from Mississippi County, launched a
highly publicized roadside demonstration in 1939. More successful than the
Japanese propagandists in connecting with a black heritage and an economic
oppression shared by all farm workers, Whitfield mobilized nearly a thou-
sand black and more than a hundred white sharecroppers in "a long, long
showcase of human devastation" along U.S. 61 and U.S. 60 (which intersect
at Sikeston). He protested the New Deal agricultural program that reduced
cotton cultivation and permitted planters to release sharecroppers, thus si-
multaneously upturning the agricultural system and cheating laborers of
their federal payment. Despite short-term gains, including Farm Security
Administration (FSA) grants and construction of the Delmo Labor Homes
for area croppers, Whitfield failed to convince politically minded officials
that only a change in the law would force planters to treat farm workers more
fairly.14
Nonetheless, Whitfield's protest accentuated the fifty-year march toward
modernization that finally pressed in on southeast Missouri. Whereas the
New Deal had recognized the area's hierarchy and outfitted planters in "new
legal clothing," it stirred sharecroppers to action; whereas the New Deal had
enlarged its role in the lives of landlords, it threatened federal intervention
in their labor relations.15 Beneficial government programs, in short, signi-
fied greater political centralization and challenges to the racial order.
On the eve of World War II, then, Bootheel residents confronted a whirl-
wind of change. Sikestonians experienced the clash of old and new most
dramatically, for they serviced large segments of the region, interacted with
the outside world regularly, and felt its pressures first. From a handful of
settlers in I860, they had grown to 7,944 in 1940—including 1,003 blacks—
constituting one-fourth of Scott County's population.16 They incorporated
the town in 1874, established a mayor-aldermen government in 1891, and
developed an infrastructure of telephone lines, waterworks, and some paved
streets early in the twentieth century to emerge as the county's largest mu-
nicipality thirty years later.17 Following the influx of blacks in the 1920s and
1930s, townspeople lived, worked, and played along separate racial lines in
a southern caste and class system.18
Most blacks—including many homeowners—resided in the Sunset Ad-
dition (see Sikeston map).19 Their community of shacks and small houses
lay approximately one-quarter mile west of downtown, across the Frisco
Railroad tracks and immediately north of the Missouri Pacific tracks, which
ran parallel to Highway 60 (also known as Malone Avenue).20 Other blacks
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lived in cabins behind the northeast homes of wealthy whites, or in alleys
back of some central and many southeast residences of working-class whites.
Race aside, those in alley quarters experienced overpriced, unsanitary, and
crowded conditions "unfit for human habitation."21
Members of both races worked in jobs that supported the surrounding
farm community, though whites dominated the better-paying and supervi-
sory positions. Most blacks hired out as field hands, performed common
labor for large operations such as the Sikeston Cotton Oil Mill, and personal
services for small white businesses and well-to-do families.22 They received
low wages in often dead-end jobs connoting master-servant relationships,
while white men drew rank-and-file pay at Scott County Milling Company
and, along with white women, the International Shoe Factory. Whites also
dominated the professions and sales positions, as well as the businesses that
provided all laborers with everything from groceries and clothes to restau-
rant meals and moving pictures.23
Neither race constituted a monolithic class. White discrimination still
provided enterprising and educated blacks with economic openings and
social standing. Carpenter John Dander built many of the homes in Sun-
set, where George W. Scott operated a small grocery and Heavy Hunt ran a
pool hall. And, given white aversion to pruning or burying supposedly infe-
rior people, black barbers, beauticians, and morticians enjoyed virtual mo-
nopolies in the westside community.24 So did the black pastors who led
several denominations, Rev. Kater E. Crump of the First Baptist Church min-
istering to the hundred members of the largest congregation.25 And since
1923 black teachers had instructed area students in kindergarten through
eighth grade at Lincoln School. It boasted an active Parent-Teacher Asso-
ciation, an achieving student body, and a competitive athletic team.26
In addition to the impact of Jim Crow on socioeconomic status, blacks
recognized their own diversity in terms of residency. Original founders, long-
term proprietors, homeowners, and those who worked for wealthy whites
made up Sunset's core, while less prosperous yet equally longstanding in-
habitants and alley occupants who moved into the Addition were consid-
ered among its members. Class-conscious blacks, albeit in different terms,
thought very much like those whites who distinguished homeowning "col-
ored people" and hard-working "darkies" from shiftless "niggers."27 Similarly,
they looked down on "floaters"—seasonal workers who came in and out of
the area to chop and pick cotton—and permanent cotton workers living on
farmland beyond the city limits; thus they tended to ignore the Rev.
Whitfield's roadside demonstration.28
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To the majority of black townsfolk, Sunset was their turf and Sikeston
their city. They had built the Addition from an informal immigrant com-
munity in the mid-1920s to an organized, ethnic community by the early
1940s, featuring religious and educational institutions and a wide range of
recreational activities—from church fish fries to less wholesome nightclub
drinking and gambling. They created a community within a city, embraced
their families, maintained ties with relatives and friends living elsewhere in
Sikeston and in the South, and preserved much of their folk culture and
southern heritage.29
Whites, too—numbering 6,939 in 1940—comprised several classes and
lived in well-established though mostly older neighborhoods throughout the
city: wealthy and prominent in large northeast homes; business and work-
ing-class in smaller residences below Malone Avenue and some newly built
houses west and east of South Kingshighway; common labor in rented
houses and alley cabins of these southern quadrants or in downtown area
roominghouses. Their accommodations varied more widely than did those
of blacks; several neighborhoods still lacked streets and indoor plumbing.30
As much as class and residency, religion defined many, though hardly a
majority, of white Sikestonians. Protestants predominated, establishing the
earliest and largest churches, led by the First United Methodist (1867) and
the First Baptist (1868), each with nearly a thousand members in the early
1940s. The First Presbyterian (1870) and several other denominations
founded after World War I, in turn, claimed very few congregants.31 The
Catholics of St. Francis Xavier dated their presence in the city from 1885
and numbered one hundred families on the eve of World War II.32 The Jews
who inhabited the city at this time, perhaps fewer than fifty, journeyed to
the B'nai Israel Temple in Cape Girardeau for worship.33
Congregants of each faith envisioned themselves a religious family and
their place of worship a social community, but they related to one another
in various other settings as well.34 Thus Protestants, Catholics, and Jews all
lived throughout the city rather than in religious neighborhoods; they pa-
tronized one another's stores, worked in similar jobs, and sent their chil-
dren—save for St. Xavier's elementary-age students—to public schools.
Some Protestants and Catholics also socialized together; some Methodists
and Presbyterians even married members of St. Francis Xavier. That very
few Baptists and even fewer Jews entered such unions indicated the opposi-
tion to interfaith marriages among more fundamentalist Christians and
religious outsiders.35 Clearly, like many nonchurchgoing whites, some Prot-
estants expressed religious and cultural prejudice, referring to "Catlickers"
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and Jewish stereotypes; even more blatant bigotry existed beyond the city
limits.36
For the most part, however, Catholic and Jewish residents were inte-
grated in the public life of Sikeston. St. Xavier's parishioners viewed them-
selves as part of the larger white community and, accordingly, honored the
color line; they employed blacks in menial jobs and held them at social bay.37
So did Jewish residents, themselves much less assimilated into the gentile
society. Their behavior toward blacks manifested an East European shtetl
heritage, exemplified by Judaic dietary laws and celebrations, and the sur-
vival technique of a historically persecuted people aware of the region's po-
tential for virulent anti-Semitism: tolerance in Sikeston could transmogrify
into the kind of southern violence evidenced by the 1913 lynching of Leo
Frank in Georgia.38 Neither they nor white Catholics and Protestants played
up their ethnicity, perhaps seeing it as an obstacle to living an "American
life."39
Hence, most white townspeople, while understanding that the social and
economic order favored sons and daughters "born here, raised here," con-
sidered themselves advocates of home, church, and school, of local autonomy,
individual liberties, and hard work.40 Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and non-
churchgoers all embraced the "spiritual values" of democracy—for white
people only—that had originated as a defense of slavery in the Old South.41
This Herrenvolk egalitarianism ensured racial consensus regardless of reli-
gious or other divisions among white Sikestonians, who combined it with
various aspects of southern tradition to create their own cultural heritage.
Specifically, they practiced the "polite racism"—forged by diverse regional
origins—found in border state cities.42 They softened the oppressive nature
of segregation and gave the appearance of racial harmony through "face-
to-face relations" that advanced "a certain fulfillment of personality."43 In-
deed, "just about every" member of each race knew one another, whites
seeming to love individual blacks while hating the race. Black city dwellers,
like their forebears, understood and exploited this southern "personalism"
as they did the paternalism that also carried over from the antebellum era.44
Whereas planters and entrepreneurs had protected and patronized slaves
and urban blacks, twentieth-century white elites introduced a quasi-feudal
system of "mutual obligations" to Sikeston. They imposed discipline and
moral justification on their cotton-producing operations, providing black
farm laborers and city dwellers with work, shelter, and protection in return
for deference and loyalty.45 In "a hangover from slavery," powerful whites
Sikeston 9
"took care" of their black employees: first aid treatment for Sikeston Com-
press and Warehouse Company workers; easy credit; even gifts of property
to favorite servants.46
So long as both races kept in their places of race and class, paternalists
greatly influenced the social order. They succeeded by obligating themselves
to individual blacks, thereby creating a dependency that discouraged racial
solidarity and reduced collective resistance—when it did occur—to self-de-
fense. As in the case of white personalism, however, blacks availed themselves
of every benefit proffered, simultaneously accommodating and, however
indirectly or individually, resisting the system.47
In fact, paternalism and personalism often interacted and shaped the
lives of black city dwellers. Walter Griffen became well known as Dr. T.C.
McClure's handyman. His reputation for honesty and his relationship to one
of the community's most prominent elites brought him social status and
economic leverage.48 Called Walter "McClure" by clerks, he received respectful
treatment in every downtown store. He benefited in other ways as a mem-
ber of the doctor's family, perhaps one reason why landowner E.P. Coleman
lent him the money to purchase a lot and build a home in Sunset. Griffen,
in turn, hired John Dander to construct the house, thus advancing the for-
tune of a fellow black man. Griffen represented those who assisted them-
selves and others to survive, while belying the notion that blacks were
incapable of acquiring, constructing, or maintaining homes.49
Likewise personalism and, less directly, paternalism affected black po-
litical life. Perhaps several hundred Sunset residents cast ballots in the late
1930s and early 1940s, voting like other black workers in the region for New
Deal Democrats. They lived in Ward 2 and followed the lead of party work-
ers loyal to Grover C. Baker, a Democratic Party organizer, and undertook
their assignments as much for money as for political belief. Their contact
with Baker, a white operative, represented a form of clientage politics wherein
a community member and a party notable collaborate for mutual benefit
but voters receive little for their collective support.50
Certainly personal contact and paternal treatment blurred lines of ac-
ceptable behavior for blacks and whites, yet certain taboos were understood
by all in the postslavery era of segregation and racial etiquette. Although
blacks puzzled over being denied the use of restrooms in the Malone the-
ater but permitted to share those across the street at the Frisco train depot
with white travelers, they understood the "invisible line" that no one of ei-
ther race dared cross no matter how inconsistent it seemed.51 No transgres-
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sion sparked a more violent reaction than real or imagined interracial sexual
contact, savagely exemplified by the lynching of Roosevelt Grigsby in nearby
Charleston during the mid-1920s for allegedly attempting to rape a sixteen-
year-old white girl. Small wonder that black Sikestonians concealed their
"more active feelings" from whites—until they were brought forth by a cri-
sis.52
Meanwhile, individuals of both races stirred the social order in annoy-
ing if not cataclysmic ways. Blacks and whites were arrested for drunken-
ness, fighting, disturbing the peace, shooting craps, and, usually in the case
of whites, prostitution.53 In these activities, however, save for a handful of
whites who gambled with Sunset and alley residents, they rarely crossed the
color line. Given this fact and the supposed "petty" nature of the crimes,
Police Judge Brown Jewell meted out evenhanded justice for like violations
regardless of race.54
More disquieting was the violence that occurred in Sikeston and its vi-
cinity. Some dice games ended in arguments, fights, and even killings, re-
minders of southern and hill culture influences that had taught individuals
to resolve disputes through the use of force.55 Aggressors and their victims
tended to be of the same race, as were those who assaulted lawmen in sur-
rounding towns and farms, including Illinois youths who killed a Bootheel
state trooper in 1941. Both blacks and whites were also lost in highway deaths,
among the highest in the state—graphic reminders of the impact of mod-
ernization.56
Labor strife too pushed at traditional society. In 1941 Sikestonians chose
sides as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men, and Helpers of America (AFL) shut down Scott County Milling Com-
pany in their city, Dexter, and Oran. The impasse was settled in favor of
unionists by federal officials who considered wheat "a necessity for national
defense."57 Simultaneously, workers of the International Shoe Company were
approached by organizers of the United Shoeworkers of America (CIO), but
the sizable female work force generally identified with the local factory, which
townsfolk had contributed to building eighteen years earlier. Neither inci-
dent sparked violence in the nearly all-white shops; mill managers refrained
from employing black strikebreakers, and shoeworker leaders understood
the area's anti-union heritage. Yet no one in town could have missed the in-
trusion of government and outsiders on the local economy and power struc-
ture.58 "We will continue to oppose 'changes' we do not believe desirable,"
wrote the Sikeston Standard editor, criticizing the shoe factory campaign
directly and, one suspects, similar assaults on traditional society.59
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Ironically some changes were brought about by bumper crops and world
war. Prosperity returned with bountiful cotton harvests that provided work,
raised wages, and reduced relief rolls throughout the area.60 Blacks shared
in the good fortune, paying off mortgages, laying away staples, and joining
in the spending sprees that characterized Saturdays in Sikeston and Charles-
ton.61 Some instances appeared haughty and sparked white resentment.
When a store clerk referred one shopper to the store basement for a dress,
she insisted, "No, sah, I want a regular teaser." Scenes such as this recurred
from September through the Christmas shopping season and, though likely
overlooked by many in the holiday spirit, ruffled some whites.62
During this same period Sikestonians witnessed the physical transfor-
mation of their community, which had begun the previous year. They built
numerous homes and businesses: a Sikeston Compress and Warehouse Com-
pany storage facility expanded the locale's cotton economy; a Kroger super-
market, one of the largest "self-service" stores in the region, boosted its
consumerism.63 City councilmen considered widening Front Street to facili-
tate the growing business of downtown retailers. And before the new year,
local investors took the first step toward establishing a commercial radio sta-
tion.64
Townsfolk also sensed the abrupt shift to military preparedness. They
expanded severalfold the Missouri Institute of Aeronautics, which trained
cadets from every state for the U.S. Army Air Corps and required establish-
ment of the Sikeston General Hospital—"a district infirmary"—the previ-
ous year.65 In late August and in early October 1941 they observed 6,000
members of the U.S. Army's Fifth Division of Fort Custer, Michigan, pass
through Sikeston to and from maneuvers in southern camps. They realized
that the city served as a permanent link in the state defense council's com-
munication plan, and experienced the scarcity of materials that soon led to
systematic rationing.66
Essentially, then, Sikeston denizens found themselves in transition be-
tween traditional and modern ways. They possessed much of the politically
provincial, economically uniform, and socially hierarchial order established
by early settlers and later migrants, particularly those from southern, moun-
tain, and delta regions. In fact, despite modernizing modes of communica-
tion and transportation, and commercial links beyond the locale, their racial
world turned on rigid communal mores. The "traditional personality" of
white residents, including those from northern areas, required—however
personal or paternal—segregation and social control. Townspeople of both
races felt the impact of the Depression and, more immediately, the war: in-
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trusions that fostered increasing political centralization, economic diversi-
fication, and social egalitarianism. Simultaneously, they operated in "differ-
ent spheres" and moved in "contrary directions," a dichotomy shattered by
the bombing of Pearl Harbor and, following swiftly on its heels, bloodshed
of a more local kind.67
2 Bloodshed
Despite the economic boom and the festive preparations for Christmas that
characterized early December 1941, Sikeston residents experienced anxious
moments amid glad tidings. They knew of draft calls over the past year and
of area youths already stationed in "danger zones": the Hawaiian and Phil-
ippine Islands.1 Little did they realize, however, how soon blood would be
shed there—and elsewhere.
Indeed, townspeople reeled with the reports of Japan's "unprovoked and
dastardly" attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7. "Congress Declares War
on Japan" screamed local headlines, which soon included Germany and Italy
as enemies; "severe damage to American naval and military forces" and
"many American lives . . . lost" confirmed President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
who outlined the Japanese surprise offensive throughout the Pacific and
along the East Asian coast.2
Against the slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor!" Sikestonians declared
their patriotism and shared the anger of their newspaper editors. "At last the
brown bellied Japs have struck," snarled the Standard's C.L. Blanton, while
his counterpart at the Herald, Clint H. Denman, prophesied defeat for those
"who would destroy the freedom... [God] has willed His people."3 Towns-
people prepared for war and experienced tension as young men "assumed
that they were going to have to go," and everyone realized that the war might
be closer to home than first thought.4
For white residents, Company K best exemplified past glories and
present anxieties. Formed as a National Guard unit in Sikeston on August
25, 1917, it had become part of the 140th Infantry, Seventieth Brigade,
Thirty-fifth Division; it had fought valiantly in the Meuse-Argonne offen-
sive and served as part of the occupation force in Europe. Disbanded dur-
ing the spring of 1919, only to be reorganized within a year, Company K
secured rail centers during the railroad workers' strike of 1922, Poplar Bluff
streets after the tornado of 1927, and Mississippi River levees in the floods
of 1927 and 1937. Its numbers surged during 1940 as conflagration spread
worldwide and Roosevelt pledged all aid short of war to the Allies. By presi-
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dential decree, guardsmen mobilized on December 23 for a year of train-
ing, a mobilization that in fact lasted for the duration of World War II.5
Shortly into the new year of 1941, the 140th Infantry arrived at Camp
Joseph T. Robinson, near Little Rock, Arkansas, where Company K and other
guardsmen drilled for eight months, returning to Sikeston periodically for
a parade or furloughs.6 Then, in August and September, they participated
in the massive Louisiana Maneuvers of the Sabine Valley, which transformed
them into soldiers. Back at Camp Robinson, they marched in the Armistice
Day celebration at Springfield, Missouri, and came home on leave as often
as possible.7
With the bombing of Pearl Harbor, however, the men of Company K
called mothers, wives, and sweethearts, clogging telephone wires with word
of their departure to an unknown destination—many thought the Philip-
pines. "Like a fighter on a fine edge," in the words of Sgt. James D. Sturgeon,
Company K wanted "a chance at those Japs." Guardsmen departed "smil-
ing," perhaps in anticipation of dealing out "plenty" to the enemy or in an
effort to mask their own or their loved ones' anxiety.8
As city residents bundled up in the face of cold temperatures and snow
flurries early in 1942, they knew that Company K had been assigned to the
Western Defense Command in California and that "winning the war" meant
home-front sacrifices such as tire rationing, "less frivolity, fewer luxuries,"
"uncertain business conditions," and longer work hours.9 Some of them also
knew that in southernmost Pemiscot County, planters had broken up a meet-
ing sponsored by the Southern Tenant Farmers Union on January 16 and,
after cursing and striking its organizer, had run him out of Caruthersville.10
Surrounded by modern warfare and traditional race conflict, Sikes-
tonians entered the last weekend of January enjoying uncharacteristically
warm weather and anticipating a Saturday night of entertainment—and
escape—possibly at the Malone theater, where West of the Cimmaron, star-
ring Tim Tyler and Bob Steele, played for less than two bits.11 Expecting at-
tacks overseas or even on the West Coast, where Company K was securing
beaches, fuel dumps, and transportation systems, they hardly imagined the
acts of violence about to erupt among themselves.
The bloodshed began early Sunday morning, January 25, at 847 East
Kathleen Avenue in the so-called shoe factory district of southeast Sikeston.
There, Grace Sturgeon resided with her eight-year-old son Jimmy and her
sister-in-law Laverne Sturgeon, sharing the house while their husbands—
brothers James and John—served in the armed forces. Grace Sturgeon awoke
twice, first hearing noise in the kitchen around 1:00 A.M., where someone
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attempted to open the back door by cutting its glass and reaching in to undo
its lock. Thirty minutes later she heard the bedroom window being raised
and warned the intruder to come no farther.12 She sat up as a man entered
the room, cursing her and waking Laverne, who thought that Grace had had
a nightmare until she saw the stranger and heard him say, "Shut your mouth
or I'll kill you."13
Both women jumped from bed and bolted for safety. Laverne, scream-
ing as she passed through the living room and the dining room (where
Jimmy slept), tried to exit through the kitchen door. Unable to open it be-
cause—as the prowler had discovered earlier—the key was missing from its
lock, she backtracked to the living room, phoned for assistance, and then
ran out the front entrance. Meanwhile, Grace also entered the living room
but did not get far; the man caught her from behind.14
Grace Sturgeon turned to face her attacker, who reacted to her defiance
like a "mad bee." Spat upon and threatened, she blocked his six-inch folding
knife from cutting her throat, nearly losing three fingers on the hand that
saved her life and surprising him with her strength. Staggering under a
barehanded blow to the head, she fought on, a "stout S.O.B.," he uttered in
amazement before slicing her lower abdomen as easily as one could make
"a deep pin scratch." She "burned like fire" as her intestines "just unfolded"
and fell from her body, and she wondered if her heart would follow.'5 As she
grasped her dangling insides with one hand and the front door with the
other, an approaching auto frightened the assailant away. She was standing
on the porch in her own blood when H.D. Davenport, her step-grandfather,
arrived moments later, still in nightclothes and armed with a corn knife.16
Suddenly, help appeared from every direction. Nearby neighbor Jesse
Whittley came running and Sikeston lawmen drove up, one responding to
Laverne's screams and the others to her frantic phone call (which the op-
erator had relayed by police signal).17 Whittley joined Night Marshal Hess
Perrigan and searched the grounds, while Officer Roy Beck entered the house,
called an ambulance, and alerted other local and state officers.18
A terrified Grace Sturgeon reentered the premises only after Beck's
probe. Inside, her son lay petrified on a cot in a corner of the dining room.19
Awakened by Laverne's screams, Grace's directions to her, and the intruder's
"low, muffled voice," Jimmy moved only after his mother returned, flicked
on the lights, and called to him. He advanced to behold her blood-splattered
body: a towel-filled left hand cupping intestines, a truncated right hand dis-
playing laid-back fingers! Obeying her instructions, he crossed the street to
stay with his maternal grandmother.20
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Grace Sturgeon, accompanied by Beck, was soon taken by ambulance
to the General Hospital, where she underwent emergency surgery. Dr. M.G.
Anderson sewed her three fingers and closed a six-inch abdominal slash that
had punctured her large bowel. More critical than these wounds or the loss
of one and a half quarts of blood, however, was the life-threatening infec-
tion that followed.21 Conscious throughout most of her ordeal, Sturgeon
survived the first act of violence.
Meanwhile, the hunt began for her assailant, who retreated the way he
had come, through the east bedroom window, leaving bloodstains on the
sill and dragging a curtain several feet. Perrigan and Whittley followed his
tracks around the house and west behind Kathleen Avenue before they pe-
tered out.22 Believing that the culprit had fled through the rear alley or along
the adjacent street, they jumped into the police car and first cruised the
neighborhood, then extended their dragnet to skirt the city limits and Sun-
set Addition's eastern edge. Crossing Malone Avenue into southwest Sikeston,
they came upon a black figure walking calmly with hands in the pockets of
blood-splattered pants. They stopped Cleo Wright in front of the Jefferson
Hotel on the corner of Prosperity Street, due east of the Frisco railroad de-
pot and within seventy-five feet of the tracks themselves. Thirty minutes into
the search and approximately a mile and a quarter from the Sturgeon home,
Perrigan and Whittley believed that the twenty-six-year-old oil mill worker
was their man.23
Perrigan searched Wright and found a "long keen bladed knife" banded
in red and white, which he claimed had become bloodstained in a fight with
other blacks. Within moments, as Whittley slid into the driver's seat, he heard
a blow and turned to see Perrigan strike Wright a second time with his pis-
tol, apparently for resisting arrest. He entered the fray, as policeman and sus-
pect struggled for the Smith and Wesson, hitting Wright over the head two
more times with a flashlight and clinching him around the neck. Whittley
incurred an arm bite before he and Perrigan forced Wright into the back
seat of the car, then Perrigan piled in behind him with drawn firearm.24
Whittley was chauffeuring them onto Malone Avenue, back toward City
Hall, when their prisoner lashed out again. Perrigan fought for his life as
Wright plunged a previously hidden scout knife through his upper lip and
jaw, smashing some teeth, puncturing the tongue and cutting an artery be-
neath it. Additional blows slashed his face and left ear. In desperation,
Perrigan fired four times, his bullets slamming through Wright with .45 cali-
ber force. He collapsed under Wright who continued to battle until Whittley
Bloodshed 17
Hess Perrigan and Jesse Whittley in 1942. Courtesy of Michael L.
Jensen.
hit the brakes, opened the door, grabbed the prisoner, and beat him about
the skull with the revolver until he fell out of the car. Perrigan owed his life
to Whittley, who alone escaped serious injury.
Amazingly, both combatants remained conscious as Whittley drove a
few more blocks along Malone Avenue to the Dunn Hotel. "I got the son-
of-a-bitch and he almost got me," Perrigan boasted to Beck, who arrived from
the hospital and took charge of the prisoner.25 As Beck, Whittley, and Wright
proceeded to City Hall, the night marshal sought medical attention. He
walked into the General Hospital and stoically comforted Grace Sturgeon
as they both awaited the arrival of Dr. Anderson, he assuring her of Wright's
capture and she calming herself by "talking ninety-miles-a-minute."
Perrigan's grave condition required immediate treatment, and on the oper-
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ating table the blood gushing up from under his tongue "like a fountain"
proved difficult to stop. He lived through the ordeal, though he was unable
to talk for several days and lacked teeth for the rest of his life.26
Wright endured even more pain, and greater misfortune. Taken to the
jail in City Hall by Beck and Whittley, he got very sick, and Beck, who dis-
covered his gunshot wounds for the first time, called Dr. E.J. Nienstedt and
an ambulance. Accompanied by his captors to the hospital, where Whittley
had his arm treated before leaving for home, Wright waited a short time in
the emergency room for the physician.27 In the basement facility, his
wounds—eight bullet holes—were dressed and his broken arm set. Wright,
though still conscious, received no narcotics, for Dr. Nienstedt feared that
an anesthetic might prove fatal. He had withstood six blows to the head, four
bullets passing completely through the midsection, right chest, and right
arm, and enormous loss of blood.28 When visited after surgery by his in-
laws, Richard and Minnie Gay, he was unconscious. Nor did he recognize
his wife, Ardella, shortly before daylight, when full hospital rooms and emer-
gency-only treatment for blacks required his removal by ambulance to his
home in Sunset Addition, escorted by Policeman Grover H. Lewis.29
Visited by Beck and Lewis, just before they went off duty, and Assistant
Police Chief Harold Wallace, Wright appeared to be dying at 6:30 A.M.30 His
pregnant wife and worried in-laws soon feared for his safety and consid-
ered themselves incapable of either caring for him or incurring his burial
expenses.31 At their pleading Wright was moved back to Sikeston by ambu-
lance, this time under the direction of Wallace, and placed on a cot in the
women's detention room of the j ail shortly before 9:30 A.M.—left to die alone
as the second act of violence played itself out.32
By now, much of Sikeston knew of the dying prisoner's attacks on Stur-
geon and Perrigan. From 1:30 until 6:00 A.M., when she went off duty, the
operator who received Laverne Sturgeon's "Mayday" and directed police to
the crime scene handled 666 calls, five and a half times more than the nor-
mal number. That a cab driver informed Maxine Croder of the assault al-
most immediately suggested the content of most phone conversations. Word
that "a white woman had been slashed . . . by a negro"—first reported by
lawmen requesting an ambulance for Grace Sturgeon—spread so rapidly that
townsfolk converged on the hospital and could not be "pushed out" of its
small confines.33 Patrons of Lambert's Cafe, for example, received phone calls
from friends and passed the story along in private conversation, so that
youths heard of it while driving about town. Some residents arrived even
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before Sturgeon; others came already aware that Perrigan had had "his
tongue about hacked in two." Few individuals laid eyes on Sturgeon or
Perrigan at the hospital, but several witnessed Wright's entry and surgery in
the much more accessible emergency room.34
Significantly, the rapid transmission of information by phone and the
easy mobilization of residents on a Saturday night combined modern tech-
nology and traditional mores to transpose a criminal act into a communal
affair. Unnamed whites were in Sunset inquiring about Wright's condition
shortly after officers took him there. By daybreak at least two black residents
sensed the possibility of mob violence and wanted Wright moved out of the
Addition, their fears later reiterated by his mother-in-law who "knew trouble
was coming."35 At about 7:30 A.M. groups of two and three white males cir-
culated among downtown garages and cafes, enlisting recruits to mob "the
negro."36 Hence, when Richard Gay walked into town to call Wright's mother
at 9:00 A.M., "he saw what was going to happen"; recognizing that "righteous
look" of whites that time and again announced "the faggot, the whip, the
fist," he retreated back to the black community.37
Comprising both would-be lynchers and mere curiosity seekers, the
crowd gathering outside City Hall "kept growing." Excited individuals called
friends and fellow workers, urging them downtown to take part in the an-
ticipated action. Churchgoers returning from services and Sunday visitors
from outlying communities filled Center Street.38 Several flight school ca-
dets stood across from the historic building, erected in 1908; handfuls of
spectators looked down from second-story decks on the opposite side of the
thoroughfare; and a few women sat in parked cars beyond the mob.39 All
knew about the vicious knifings and the grave condition of Sturgeon and
Perrigan.
Doubtless, word of Wright's confession also enlarged the mob. Some
heard that he had admitted twice to attacking the woman, slashing her with
"the long keen knife"—he told Beck in the hospital—and blamed his ac-
tions on "bad whiskey."40 Several hours later in City Hall he acknowledged
to Wallace, Coca Cola Bottling Company manager Milburn Arbaugh, and
former service station employer Milem Limbaugh that having been drink-
ing, he wandered "down there," broke into the home, and cut Sturgeon.41 The
mob might have learned of Wright's guilty pleas through police officers
(though no evidence suggests this), or one of its own ringleaders may have
overheard his conversation to the businessmen (themselves innocent of
spreading its contents).42 In any case, even before Wallace, Arbaugh, and
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City Hall, Sikeston, Missouri, erected in 1908. Courtesy of Michael L. Jensen.
Limbaugh left Wright at 10:00 A.M., his executioners said that "something
ought to be done."43
State Trooper Melvin Dace, approaching City Hall one-half hour later,
found it bereft of police protection and overrun by "an unusually large
crowd": seventy-five people were inside trying to break into Wright's cham-
ber with an iron bar. Dace ordered them out without much opposition—
though some threatened to get their guns and "burn nigger town"—and
called for help: fellow troopers in Sikeston, reinforcements from Troop E
headquarters in Poplar Bluff, lawmen from the sheriff's office in Benton; he
also notified Mayor George W. Presnell and County Prosecutor David L.
Blanton. Almost immediately, Sergeant Dace was joined by Troopers Vincent
P. Boisaubin and John Tandy and Police Chief Walter Kendall, who appeared
from the street where the horde numbered 700 persons. For nearly an hour
they "discouraged" several attempts by the mob to enter the building.44
At 11:35 A.M. the crowd began to buzz like "a hornet's nest slowly
stirred."45 At this moment County Prosecutor Blanton arrived from the coun-
try, where Dace's message had caught up with him. He conferred with the
trooper and, in an effort to defuse the situation, addressed mob members
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from the building's entrance. He ordered them to vacate the premises, only
to hear—from all directions—boos and shouts: "What are we waiting for?"
"Let's go get the black S.O.B." Turning to one of the mob's leaders, Blanton
threatened prosecution "if you have murder on your mind and do anything."
Suddenly someone slipped under one of the trooper's arms, enabling oth-
ers to surge through three sets of glass-paneled double doors and push by
the prosecutor, who sustained a broken rib.46
With the lawmen, Blanton rushed down the corridor, unsuccessfully
trying to beat the mob to the women's detention room. He climbed on a
stool to address the throng once more but found himself forced off and the
troopers roughed up. As the crowd smashed the upper panel of the wooden
door shielding Wright, Blanton watched helplessly. One of the mob tossed
the battered prisoner into the hallway, then climbed atop the broken door,
jumped down on his chest, and kicked him several times. Blanton saw no
more, but four others dragged their prey back down the corridor and
through the entrance, enveloped by the multitude and spurred on by shouts:
"Let's take him to Sunset and burn him."47
Under the portico of City Hall, with its graceful white columns fram-
ing their brutality, ringleaders paused while others kicked Wright.48 They
quickly pulled him feet first, arms overhead and skull bouncing down seven
concrete steps amid the kind of cheering that follows "a ninety-nine yard
touchdown" run.49 Once beyond the sidewalk, members of the mob first
jammed him into the trunk of a Ford idling in Center Street, then changed
their minds and pulled him out, hooked his legs behind the car bumper, and
drove off to the blasts of honking horns.50
Packed into the maroon sedan-turned-deathmobile and standing on its
runningboards, lynchers headed for Sunset Addition. They moved west on
Center, turned south on Stoddard, stopping for traffic signals—obeying the
law, said one wag; avoiding a traffic ticket, recalled another51—west again
on U.S. 60 and, leading a cavalcade of fifty vehicles, raced toward the black
community.52 Shortly beyond the Frisco railroad tracks, they entered the Ad-
dition at Fair Street, circled via Maude, Thompson, Osage, and Lincoln, and
returned to Maude, Sunset's southernmost street, separated from U.S. 60 by
Missouri Pacific tracks.53
Meanwhile, Blanton, Dace, and Tandy, among the last to emerge from
the recesses of City Hall, rushed to Sunset, while Boisaubin, at the pros-
ecutor's request, retrieved his camera to photograph the culprits. Blanton
and four other citizens—including Standard newsman Paul Bumbarger and
photographer Roy Wilcox—rode in Dace's patrol car; Tandy accompanied
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Trooper John N. Greim, who arrived at that very moment from Dexter (one
of the officers mobilized by Troop E headquarters in response to Dace's
call).54 Since their vehicles faced east on Center Street, they headed in that
direction one block, turned north on Kingshighway, and then west on North
Street, which fed into the Addition. Entering the community by "an entirely
different route" from that taken by the car dragging Wright, they divided at
the first intersection and, fearing "a massacre" should the mob encounter
any blacks, chased them off the streets before converging on the lynching
site.55
Horror-stricken blacks believed themselves under siege as state troop-
ers and white residents poured into Sunset, some in vehicles, others afoot,
everyone turbulent and—it appeared to many blacks—crazed.56 Some whites
even got to the execution site ahead of Wright's mangled body. As the "lynch
parade" swung onto Osage, blacks attending the Church of God in Christ at
the far end of the street received word that "a terrible thing" was happening
and crowded at the door to see.57 Meanwhile, on nearby Luther Street a
neighbor's child informed Minnie Gay of her son-in-law's fate. She rushed
to her daughter's home, where Ardella collapsed upon hearing the news amid
car horns squalling and people yelling.58
Within moments, George W. Scott, standing on the front porch of his
Osage Street grocery store, watched the cavalcade speed by him, while eight-
year-old Arthur Renfro froze in his steps as it passed Felker Street. Witness-
ing a near-naked body being hauled behind the lead car and armed men
riding the running boards of several vehicles that followed it, he ran up Felker
and into his home; with eyes as big as saucers he kept repeating: "I seen 'em!
I seen 'em! I seen 'em!"59 Alberta Gardner of Lincoln Street came to the front
door of her home thinking that the noisy entourage turning off Osage must
be a parade. Instead, she reeled at the sight of Wright in tow, "bobbing up
and down," and police, men, and women—some even in housecoats and slip-
pers—all "rejoicing" as if on a picnic.60
The mob halted on Maude, near the schoolhouse and within view of
both Smith Chapel and the First Baptist Church.61 As lynchers placed Wright
on the Missouri Pacific Railroad easement, just north of the tracks and U.S.
60, authorities closed in from each end of the street. Blanton worked his way
through the crowd of three to four hundred; while Dace and Tandy stayed
with their vehicles, trapped in traffic and buffered by humanity two hun-
dred yards deep. Blanton alone entered "the inner rim" of the men, women,
and children who formed a circle around Wright, just in time to see a middle-
aged man in coveralls douse the victim with five gallons of gasoline brought
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Lynching spectators view the charred body of Cleo Wright, January 25,1942.
Courtesy of Michael L. Jensen.
from a nearby service station and a younger, inebriated man unsuccessfully
try to set him ablaze. From behind the county prosecutor someone flipped
a lighted match onto the saturated ground, which sent flames racing up
Wright's naked body and caused him to cry out once. Blanton became nau-
seated as fire and smoke engulfed the victim, whose arms contracted in the
heat and reached skyward as if pleading for a mercy that did not come. Cleo
Wright perished in the third and final act of violence.62
Across the way, Rev. J.B. Ross considered the commotion outside Smith
Chapel a typical distraction from his sermon. He looked through a window,
mistook Wright's funeral pyre for a burning car, calmed his congregation,
and continued to preach.63 As the "terrible sounds" persisted, someone en-
tered the church and informed him of the killing just a few hundred feet
away. Children soon followed with similar messages, and churchgoers filled
the windows, frightened by the sight of "black smoke" and screaming
whites.64
Others in that noonday crowd seemed gleeful, irritated, or unmoved,
and throughout the Sabbath many more whites came from church services
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and family dinners to view what became a charred sphinx: human face, dis-
torted torso.65 Witnesses to the burning—which for several minutes threw
off so much fire that few could recognize what was ablaze—described a piece
of flesh "blistered up" and distinguished by lattice-like designs.66 Later viewers
came upon what more nearly resembled "a roast pig": body naked, charred,
and drawn up; human features mocked by a cigarette inserted between the
lips and a match placed in the nose.67 Like Blanton, who left the barbaric
scene quickly, some became ill, and few ever forgot the sight and smell of
Wright's burnt carcass.
Still, until late in the afternoon whites entered Sunset Addition to look
at Wright's body and, inadvertently, to see blacks fleeing their community.
Several dashed across fields; many more trekked along U.S. 60 and adjacent
railroad tracks laden with bundles and suitcases, reminding one witness of
Exodus; still others, carrying whatever they could in cotton sacks, boarded
buses and trains, hopped railroad cars, piled into farm trucks, or offered car
owners like Fred Smith "any kind of price" to drive them out of town.68 Their
numbers mushroomed, ultimately exceeding one hundred persons.69
Numerous seasonal workers headed east to Charleston, north to St.
Louis, and south to Dixie. Some white employers sent their servants to tem-
porary refuge or offered haven in their homes—mirroring acts of southern
paternalism during periods of racial violence.70 Other blacks survived the
crisis, as their forebears had done, by drawing on religious associations, fam-
ily bonds, and personal courage. Milton Brown, his family, and members of
their congregation also "got the hell out of Dodge" and, through their affili-
ation with the Church of God in Christ, stayed in New Madrid with Rev.
B.B. Gillispie.71 Some led their wives and children to the homes of relatives
in nearby communities such as Morley and left the women to watch over
the family while they returned to Sunset Addition, revealing anew the his-
toric role of females as protectors during periods of male absence and the
significance of return journeys to home fronts, however close by, during
periods of crisis.72
Women left alone in Sunset Addition, by choice or circumstance, pro-
tected themselves and their children in other ways. Single parent Julia Renfro
walked her two sons downtown, passing whites "on every side," and headed
north to her mother's alley cabin on Kingshighway, where they spent the
night. Her promenade, which could never have been contemplated by most
black males, especially those without contacts among powerful white fami-
lies, indicated the gender distinctions—in this case established by white
males—within the color line. Her bravery, daughter-mother relationship, and
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guardianship of her children bespoke a self-reliant life and a female slave
heritage.73
More directly in line with traditional "mamas"—those outspoken,
elder women who enjoyed respect within the community and whose
successors would play a major role in the next generation's civil rights
struggle74—Mattie D. Smith reacted more demonstratively. She witnessed
Wright's burning from Smith Chapel and returned home immediately. When
the mob stayed at the site, she called city officials and, receiving an unsatis-
factory response, went downtown. In the company of her thirty-eight-year-
old son, she demanded that Mayor Presnell and Police Chief Kendall take
measures to protect all of Sunset's residents from further violence. "For her
own protection," Mattie D. Smith stayed that night at the home of a mem-
ber of the prominent Matthews family.75 One of the founders of the chapel
and the funeral business that bore her name, and one of the black com-
munity's largest property owners, she benefited from white southern per-
sonalism and class concepts.
Black men, particularly those with roots and property in Sunset Addi-
tion, also drew from their heritage and readied for combat. Immediately af-
ter Wright's burning, some assembled on the streets and others gathered in
George Scott's grocery. They seemed "badly scared" yet incensed that lynchers
hauled Wright through their streets—an affront they would have challenged
with Winchester rifles had they known of it in advance, and women would
have stayed and fought alongside their men in a "double war."76
Several homeowners—including Fred Smith, the son of Mattie—armed
themselves and, as individual sentries, guarded family homesteads.77 Those
who met at Scott's store organized to collect weapons from house to house
and place loved ones beyond harm's way. They regrouped that evening—
perhaps seventy-five strong—in the First Baptist Church, aware of subse-
quent white threats: "We will be back tonight." Called together by Scott, Ross,
and Walter Griffen, they inventoried munitions, divided into squads, and
guarded the Addition's five entrances: no white person would pass save law-
men. "If whites came," recalled Griffen, who bore a weapon loaded with car-
tridges taken from his white employer's gun case, "a lot of folks would have
died."78 For reasons of duty, survival, and cultural beliefs that deemed their
homes "a state of mind," the source of their sense of community, and a link
between generations, Sunset's men mobilized and risked race war, prepared
to defend themselves as individuals and as a people: "No one," said Alberta
Gardner, "had the right to run them out."79
The threatened attack did not occur, mainly because authorities stepped
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between the races. Almost immediately after the lynching, Governor Forrest
C. Donnell learned of the incident from a state trooper in the Cape Girardeau
area and phoned Mayor Presnell, whom he told to await further instructions.
Throughout the afternoon he spoke with several officials, specifying that
Colonel M. Stanley Ginn, superintendent of the Missouri State Highway
Patrol, and Sheriff John Hobbs assign additional men to the lynch scene.
Meanwhile. Presnell called city councilmen into special session and ap-
pointed extra policemen to prevent further "acts of violence." Then he vis-
ited Sunset Addition and tried unsuccessfully to reason with frightened
residents intent on fleeing the community.80
Presnell's deputies joined several troopers that night and sealed off the
Addition. Six everyday citizens—including Jesse Whittley, who had assisted
in Wright's capture and saved Perrigan's life—and a handful of American
Legion members received instructions "to keep the peace" by keeping the
races apart.81 Their numbers were augmented significantly by nineteen
troopers under the supervision of Sergeant Dace. In truth, Dace, Tandy,
Boisaubin, and Greim remained in the community after Wright's killing, as
did John Morris and Morley G. Swingle from Troop B (Cape Girardeau),
who arrived shortly thereafter. Fully sixteen of southeast Missouri's twenty-
two-man unit, including its commanding officer, secured Sunset. Local depu-
ties and state troopers ordered residents inside and turned back whites
seeking to enter the black community, while other troopers cruised its streets
in a safety truck and official cars. They also patrolled downtown, and one
trooper manned the Sikeston office, ready to call in reinforcements.82
Learning that blacks had armed themselves and fearing that whites
might consider it a challenge to be answered, Dace spoke to Sunset home-
owners about disarming. His efforts failed, largely because blacks questioned
whether "they could depend on the officers for protection."83 They believed
that Dace had led the very procession responsible for Wright's death. More-
over, having failed to protect one person, how could he possibly shield many
more from a mob?84
Consequently, while the "showing of strength" by lawmen imposed or-
der through the night, Sunset residents carried their worst fear—of a racial
pogrom—into Monday. The Reverend Ross called Governor Donnell early
that morning, concerned about the role that state troopers had supposedly
played in Wright's killing and the immediate rumor that Sgt. J.D. Sturgeon
had arrived in town saying "a new crew" would attack the Addition that day.85
Throughout the afternoon, Ross and three others insisted that blacks lacked
"adequate protection" and, according to state troopers who questioned his
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motives, kept that entire population in "an uproar." Contacted by the mayor,
Ross reminded Presnell of his own Sunday remark that there would not be
"enough laws or guns to keep a mob from coming to the colored section" if
Grace Sturgeon or Hess Perrigan died.86 He also knew that several blacks
received anonymous phone calls throughout Monday, indicating that they
would be harmed and their property destroyed should the woman pass
away.87
No doubt it was because of Ross's concerns that most lawmen stayed
on duty until Tuesday afternoon. Only two troopers left the area the previ-
ous day and returned to their home station in Cape Girardeau, which re-
quired their services in court and on patrol.88 In fact, from Sunday evening
on, Dace believed that the crisis had passed and Presnell reported Monday
morning that things were "more apprehensive" than dangerous; but the
mayor's belief that quiet could quickly change to tumult should the woman
die "in the next day or two" gave weight to black fears and the governor's
decision to guard Sunset another day.89
Although little was said to Donnell, many whites also expressed un-
abashed fear at the prospects of black revenge for the lynching and, ironi-
cally, dreaded the thought of a race war.90 And well they should have, for
weapons were abundant among Sunset blacks raised in a southern tradition
of hunting and self-protection. Unknown to white residents, younger blacks
between the ages of seventeen and twenty had to be talked out of retalia-
tory violence by Scott, Ross, and Griffen, who supervised them in the com-
munity patrols that lasted through Wednesday night.91 For good reason, then,
troopers who knew better played down the rumor that blacks were heavily
armed.92
In reality, the brutal slaying of Wright had ended the violence. At 4:00
P.M. on Sunday, as Sturgeon and Perrigan lay hospitalized with wounds that
would take weeks to heal and thoughts that would never pass, Wright's
scorched remains were gathered up unceremoniously and hauled away in a
city dump truck to sit overnight in the City Hall, where street department
workers built Wright's coffin out of twelve-inch pine boards. Claimed by
neither his family nor frightened black or affronted white morticians—
though all were contacted by municipal officials—what remained of Wright
was loaded back on the truck, driven north to McMullin, and interred in
the "potters field" of Carpenter Cemetery at the City of Sikeston's expense.93
Presnell made all these arrangements, Coroner Clyde Poe deeming an in-
quest into Wright's death unnecessary.94
The carnage was finally over, but its impact on black and white Sikeston
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had just begun. Blacks who happened upon Wright's dragging and burning
never forgot, and youthful witnesses experienced nightmares for some time
afterward.95 Others too endured indelible anguish. Griffen, for one, stood
vigil in Sunset for three nights, while his wife, Mattie Lee, a half mile away
in their cabin on Dr. T.C. McClure's property, clutched a .38 Colt pistol. They
talked periodically by phone, but Alberta Gardner knew much less about the
fate of her husband, who also patrolled the Addition. From Morley, she lis-
tened to the radio and looked for daily messengers. She prayed often—alone,
with her family, and sometimes with several families—seeking consolation
and deliverance as had slaves in a perilous South.96
Little is known about the nearly one hundred residents who fled but
never returned to the community. Many were seasonal workers or individuals
without property, who like many earlier and later black migrants controlled
their lives and protested their treatment by leaving areas of bloodshed.97
Swept up in the "mass hysteria," they abandoned the locality rather than re-
main even more servile to whites. The "colored boy" who washed dishes at
Gilbert's Cafe, for instance, and was whisked to the safety of his country kin
by a concerned employer as the lynchers organized, never set foot back in
town.98
In contrast, those refugees with greater stakes in Sunset Addition re-
turned within a matter of days or weeks. They had waited out the period of
uncertainty in nearby Charleston, Cairo, and elsewhere, reappearing in
Sikeston once the threat of further violence had passed.99 Even those who
remained in the community throughout the ordeal talked about finding new
homes elsewhere, but "financial conditions" prevented them from doing so.100
Perhaps most significantly, blacks who patrolled under Ross, Scott, and
Griffen quickly organized a local chapter of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). They met on Monday, electing
Rev. S.V. Wolfe president and carpenter John Dander secretary. More than
redress for Wright's murder, they sought protection from further mob vio-
lence.101 Gradually, they transformed themselves from a paramilitary unit
to a paralegal organization, trading weapons for monthly dues and the
chance of race war for the prospects of racial peace, organizing in modern
society for self-preservation and social order.102
During the last week of January, after the most immediate threat of white
invasion had passed, most black Sikestonians sought to move beyond the
killing and reestablish peaceful, if strained, coexistence with whites. By Tues-
day, influential blacks informed local newsmen that "the best thing" would
be for everyone to think of the bloodshed as "a bad nightmare"—presum-
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ably to be forgotten. No doubt several black customers of white merchants,
who later denied ever knowing Cleo Wright, fixated on the frightful vision
of themselves bouncing behind a car driven by cold-blooded racists. Oth-
ers, however, wanted to forget the lynching because of the self-destructive
anger that it engendered; they hoped to avoid the further tension that would
surely come should their emotions be channeled into protest. Black residents
privately discussed the brutal slaying and its traumatic impact on their com-
munity, but ultimately they manifested, if not believed in, Minnie Gay's fa-
talism: her son-in-law was dead, and everyone ought to "forget about the
whole thing."103
White Sikestonians responded to the shocking events along more seg-
mented lines of ideology, class, and gender. Those who caused or observed
Wright's death considered it righteous. Immediately after the killing, sev-
eral said in effect, "He got just what he had coming." Their numbers were
augmented by law-abiding citizens of both southern and northern back-
grounds who, discussing the execution throughout Monday, expressed nei-
ther remorse nor disfavor. Customers of a seed company, for instance,
reached a "general consensus" endorsing lynch law.104 Predictably, C.L.
Blanton—unreconstructed southerner, influential editor, and father of the
county's prosecuting attorney—captured the essence of community opin-
ion: the vigilantism served as "solemn warning for the night prowlers to leave
the community."105 Like their forebears, townspeople sought to reestablish
"their sense of order" by sanctioning the "display of brute force."106
Some individuals used the violence as an opportunity to express atti-
tudes usually kept beneath the surface.107 Men and women agreed on the
justification for Wright's death, though from diverse perspectives. Only "cow-
ards and dogs" would "sit idly by" while their women and peace officers were
attacked, reasoned a northern-born paralytic who—had he been mobile—
would have joined in the mob. Only a woman alone, reinterpreted a wife
and mother of one child whose husband worked a night shift, could "de-
scribe the fear that Mrs. Sturgeon must have experienced."108 For many, male
pride and female fear turned on issues of power and sexuality.
Other whites demonstrated fear of another kind. Apprehensive of "what
the colored people might do," they prepared for the worst and exhibited re-
lief when the threat of retaliation—which blacks never seriously consid-
ered—faded. They also expressed shame for the lynching, an act the town
could not be proud of.109 Perhaps for this reason, some residents considered
Wright's death unfortunate or, more quietly, condemned it. Troubled by
rope-and-faggot justice, they wished that Wright's fate had been determined
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by the legal process. Occasionally someone even admitted sorrow for "the
man who got lynched." Churchgoers expressed greater reservation than oth-
ers, believing that "by the laws of God it was wrong," yet neither they nor
their ministers publicly reproved the lynchers.110
Although residents such as Herald editor Clint H. Denman contended
that no other community in the state applied the Golden Rule more than
Sikestonians, only Rev. Joseph P. Read of the Christian Church directly ad-
dressed the subject of Wright's burning. On February 1, in "As I See Mob
Violence," he preached on the bloodshed that caused "a tragedy" and gave
the city "much unfavorable publicity."111 Other pastors appeared to shy away
from such controversy. "Church News and Announcements" carried no
lynching-related titles of sermons nor do congregants of the major churches
recall hearing their ministers speak out from the pulpit. Following south-
ern tradition, Protestant leaders—during and after the killing—failed to step
between mob and victim.112
Clearly, ministers were as shocked as any churchgoer by Wright's assaults
and his own death. Such bloodshed, remembered one, "never happened be-
fore."113 Given the heinous crimes of Wright, the anger of townsfolk, and the
southern tradition of Sikeston, some clergymen may have believed in lynch
law; more likely, they feared to aggravate an already volatile situation. In ei-
ther case, they considered the lynching "a hot potato" which, if condemned
(or endorsed), would drive "a wedge" into their congregations.114 While most
preachers thought their hands tied, at least one reacted out of personal fear:
within three weeks of the incident the recently arrived fifty-year-old Church
of God of Prophecy minister resigned his pulpit and returned to North Caro-
lina "scared to death." Ironically, he was Grace Sturgeon's pastor.115
More representative was Rev. Elbridge W. Bartley of the First United
Methodist Church. The son of southern, formally trained Methodist par-
ents, he shared the segregationist views of his congregation and, in the larger
community, practiced its personalism toward blacks.116 Occasionally, as in
his most famous sermon, "If I Had Wings," he injected self-mocking racist
humor: "I am like the good old colored brother, who stoutly refused to fly,
saying: 'Ah stays right here on dis terrah furmah, de more furmah de less
terrah.'"117 A thoughtful, seasoned pastor, who had graduated from Vanderbilt
University's School of Religion and administered church affairs with author-
ity, he considered violence un-Christian and could never endorse it. Yet he
refrained from publicizing his opposition to the lynching. Having settled in
the city only four months earlier, perhaps he felt in need of better rapport
with his congregation before confronting such a loaded issue. Moreover, his
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sizable church membership was divided into three distinct classes, which
made speaking for everyone impossible.118 Though he realized that his si-
lence gave comfort to those who wanted nothing said, he knew that an ef-
fective pastor could ill afford to antagonize congregants or lose their trust
by addressing controversy, particularly if he expected to serve as a concilia-
tor among them. Hence he kept quiet rather than split his church—or lose
his pastorate. The latter was improbable, since his appointive position came
from the Methodist Conference; fellow ministers who answered the direct
call of a congregation were much more vulnerable. Thus, his friend Rev. E.D.
Owen, whose First Baptist Church resembled his own congregation in num-
bers and class structure, also remained silent.119
Much like Bartley and Owen, who pastored the largest Protestant con-
gregations, and those ministering to smaller ones, Father John J. O'Neil con-
fessed only to himself. Privately, he considered the lynching an immoral
intrusion upon God's jurisdiction but refrained from saying so during mass.
He had arrived in Sikeston six years earlier, an Irish-born and -trained priest,
who had studied at a St. Louis seminary and served a parish there before
being assigned to Saint Xavier's. He also took a "lively interest" in civic af-
fairs, which exposed him to controversial issues—none more volatile than
race. He surely understood that some parishioners accepted the lynching
while others condemned it, indicating anew how race and culture tran-
scended religious beliefs. And he must have sensed that because of the unity
among local Protestants and Catholics, who supported segregation and each
other's fund-raising activities, his congregants never imagined themselves—
a religious minority—as potential lynch victims.120
Smaller in number, more culturally distinct, more historically perse-
cuted, and without religious leadership in Sikeston, Jews felt less secure than
Catholics. Some Catholic youths witnessed the lynching, for example,
whereas Jewish residents apparently shied away from it. They experienced
shock and resignation when learning of the execution but publicly remained
silent. In part, their silence reflected personal beliefs that pogroms were "acts
of God" and that sheyneh layt (fine Jews) like themselves were peaceful
people.121 Though they were hardly cowards, their passivity also reflected
a primordial understanding that Jews could replace blacks as "shock
absorber [s]" for white southerners facing change. Certainly, Leo Frank had
served as "a surrogate" for both the black rapist and the industrial revolu-
tion that threatened the New South thirty years earlier.122 For this reason,
one Jewish proprietor spoke for many when he condemned the lynching
years later. He denied the possibility that Jews could have become victims
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like Wright, yet contradictorily admitted that they avoided trouble in 1942;
speaking out against the bloodshed would have accomplished little and ex-
posed them to ridicule or worse.123 However subconsciously, Jewish residents
invoked a survival technique that many blacks also employed: personal
umbrage, even denial, and public quietude.
In this atmosphere, blacks stayed clear of whites for the week or so fol-
lowing Sturgeon's attack and Wright's killing. They remained close to home
and even closed their school on Monday. That day very few domestics ap-
peared at white homes, and only twelve of sixty employees reported to the
Sikeston Cotton Oil Mill, forcing it to shut down for several days.124 And
when laborers did return to the company that had employed Wright and
that was located across town, they worked their shifts and "got the hell back
home quick." Most Sunset women waited even longer before they ventured
downtown, warned by their men to get the shopping done with haste.125
Many whites reacted in kind. Immediately after the lynching, cabdrivers re-
fused to enter Sunset, and residents throughout the city locked their win-
dows and doors. Also for the first time in memory, women were escorted,
especially after dark, and their movement restricted; they "just didn't go any-
where by themselves."126
Predictably normal race relations did return over the coming weeks and
months, its pace largely determined by individual impressions of the vio-
lence and personal white-black connections. As in the antebellum era, white
paternalism and personalism hastened the reconstruction of racial civility.
Prominent citizens sought to protect their domestics and handymen against
"aggression and abuse."127 One evening shortly after the mob violence, for
instance, Walter Griffen waited in his car for a friend shopping in a down-
town drugstore, only to be harassed by a local constable. He exchanged words
with the officer, attributed the altercation to a C.L. Blanton suggestion for a
black curfew, and complained to his employer, Dr. T.C. McClure. He played
his part well, hinting that he would have to quit working for the physician
lest he be arrested while running errands. He enjoyed knowing that McClure
gave the mayor "hell and hallelujah" and that Presnell, in turn, reprimanded
the offending lawman.128
Reestablishing race relations was hardly smooth, but most whites un-
derstood that someone like Griffen was an entirely different person from
Wright. In the wake of bloodshed they needed to insist—as would later white
southerners facing the tumult of an emerging civil rights movement—that
the races "lived in Utopian harmony." So did some established blacks such
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as Alvin Dotson, who remembered no recrimination among people who "got
along like two peas in a shell."129
Boosters and officials, too, moved to protect Sikeston's image. Follow-
ing a week of "unfortunate publicity," attorney Ralph E. Bailey Sr. appeared
before city council on Tuesday, February 2. He presented for its consider-
ation a resolution expressing "horror" over Wright's crime and the lynching
that it sparked; "deep regret" for the mob violence, particularly in the City
Hall; and "united willingness to assist in any possible way" the apprehen-
sion of those responsible for the crime and "for bringing humiliation upon
the city." Bailey's petition, which also declared appreciation for local police-
men, state troopers, and the county prosecutor—who did "everything in their
power" to prevent the murder—received the unanimous support of Presnell
and councilmen.130
Bailey, a former congressman, called on Governor Donnell three days
later in Jefferson City. Representing the bankers, businessmen, and other
"substantial citizens" who had initially asked him to prepare the council reso-
lution, he reiterated that "strong sentiment" existed in Sikeston for "a com-
plete investigation" into the tragedy and the "punishment" of its ringleaders.
He delivered the facts to Donnell, a fellow Republican, without presenting
new evidence or requesting state intervention. In fact, acknowledging that
divided opinion existed in Sikeston and doubtless having traditionalists such
as C.L. Blanton in mind, he met with Missouri's chief executive primarily
to tell the world that local modernists opposed mob violence.131
That same day, February 5, Denman, one of three prominent Sikes-
tonians who originally sought Bailey as their spokesman, penned "We Stand
to Defend." He too condemned both Wright's "terrible crime" and "the dis-
graceful mob violence," yet focused on the law-abiding people of Sikeston
who regretted that "passions ran riot." Presenting a long history of their as-
sistance to black residents, he criticized the undeserved scorn heaped on the
community by outsiders. In "Don't Be Misled," the Herald editor, again like
Bailey, deemed that citizens throughout the nation expected Donnell to keep
"the name of Missouri above reproach by insisting that local officers bring
the guilty to justice," openly challenging those like C.L. Blanton who charged
the governor with political motives.132
Planter E.P. Coleman Jr., another of the organizers responsible for
Bailey's councilmanic resolution and gubernatorial visit, responded to a New
York Times editorial written immediately after the lynching, commending
the editor's sensitivity to the shame of most townsfolk. His letter, which ap-
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peared in that newspaper's pages on February 7, reiterated the modernist
position: neither "one wild Negro" nor "300 white hoodlums" represented
black or white Sikestonians.133
Others shared the outlook of Bailey, Denman, and Coleman. Between
Bailey's appearance before city council and his visit with the governor, mem-
bers of the American Legion adopted a resolution designed to parry
external criticism. They unequivocally condemned the lynching, while com-
mending the efforts of state police officers. In rapid succession "other civic
and service dubs," such as the Lions, endorsed the legionnaires' resolution.
Civic and business leaders thus revealed the reluctance of many white resi-
dents to assume responsibility for the violence, seeking instead to marginalize
and reduce its significance for the entire community.134
Whites also moved to ease the anguish of Grace Sturgeon. Council mem-
bers donated $50 from municipal funds toward flying Sergeant Sturgeon
home from California, and local Red Cross members quickly collected an
additional $150 that brought him to his wife's side.135 In a similar gesture of
good will, employees of the International Shoe Company, where Grace
worked, contributed to a purse for her hospital expenses. And, perhaps most
personally uplifting, churchgoers from various congregations filled "sunshine
baskets" with an assortment of gifts.136 By assisting the victim, townsfolk set
themselves on the long process of recovery.
In contrast, white—and black—Sikestonians thought less immediately
of Ardella Wright. Councilmen never considered her plight. A Red Cross
representative, sensitive to St. Louis inquiries and feeling compelled to as-
sure the public that there existed "no color line when serving humanity,"
specified that shortly after the lynching his organization had offered to help
Ardella Wright but received word from her family that no assistance was
needed for the moment.137 Sunset blacks, perhaps believing with Red Cross
officials that Ardella Wright preferred to be left alone, or fearful of being
associated too closely with Cleo Wright, seemingly provided little if any aid
to his wife. Within two weeks of the bloodshed, however, St. Louis area do-
nors organized by Nanetta Mitchell, wife of the Argus business manager,
began contributing to a fund for Wright's widow that ultimately exceeded
$200.138 Ardella Wright needed and welcomed the kind of support that she
could not accept from those who killed her husband or could not get from
those who lived as her neighbors.
To a significant degree the bloodshed focused whites' attention on them-
selves, some never forgetting the horrific, indelible events. Several adults who
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witnessed the dragging and burning of Wright no doubt experienced the
same nausea that had forced David E. Blanton to leave the killing site. Cer-
tainly, more than a few youths were devastated: one teenager woke up from
nightmares for some time afterward, and a twelve-year-old was so "over-
whelmed" that fifty years later he remembered his sick feeling.139 Perhaps it
was most psychologically debilitating to the children of five years and
younger who were paraded by Wright's grotesque, seared corpse as an ob-
ject lesson in the proper treatment of an inferior race.140 At least one child
from a family of one daughter and two sons whose father escorted them past
the carcass required a doctor's care before the sun set. Small wonder that
earlier antilynching crusades stressed the emotional damage of mob violence
on children.141
Nonetheless, teaching racism through "direct observation," wherein
blacks—symbolized by Wright—were cast negatively and treated brutally,
achieved its purpose among other white youth. One eighteen-year-old, surely
typical of many whose families hailed from eastern mountain areas, grew
up on a farm where violence occurred as a way of life. Having butchered
livestock, killed rabid dogs, experienced corporal punishment, and seen
blacks physically abused, he felt neither emotional nor queasy upon witness-
ing Wright's fiery death, and he knew of no one traumatized or made ill by
it. If anything, the bloodshed reinforced what he and many others had been
taught about blacks and justice in a frontier society.142
Such a lesson also "took" with numerous school-age children who
viewed Wright's immolation, his corpse afterward, or photographs of both
without ever flinching. Within days of the savagery a "bunch" of students
brought photographs of his body into their classrooms and later displayed
them about their neighborhoods. Their parents had snapped most of the
pictures, though some may have come from vendors, who hawked them for
twenty-five cents apiece.143 With or without visual props, pupils joked about
the lynching's impact on blacks who exited town like "rats leaving a sinking
ship." One youth entertained his classmates with the image of a fleeing black
pushing "a wheel barrel" down the highway.144 Given the racial judgments
learned from adults, siblings, and peers as well as from observation and so-
cialization, some students shifted easily from mocking to terrorizing black
residents: several weeks later they taunted and stoned "Negro girls on their
way to and from Sunset Addition."145
Blacks also understood the lynching message: the races were not to
mingle; if they did, what happened to Wright would happen to all trans-
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gressors. In fact, Sunset men venturing past the execution site were baited
by lynchers to "come and look. You may be next"; and Sunday School chil-
dren leaving nearby churches trembled at intimidating remarks: "Here's what
we do to your kind."146 Elderly blacks experienced similar terror. Caroline
Brown, a seventy-year-old widow who fled Sikeston within days of the lynch-
ing, died several weeks later in St. Louis, her health having declined in part
because of worry over "memory of the terrible mob."147
Long before the lynching, of course, mothers admonished children to
be careful around whites because of their past brutalities. They preached a
golden rule yet warned that some people were just bad. Like female slaves
before them, they taught their progeny survival techniques: namely, obey-
ing white society in order to avoid "pain, suffering, and death," yet not to
the point of "unconditional submission" or at the risk of jeopardizing kin.148
Following Wright's slaying, mothers comforted their children, particularly
those who suffered terrifying dreams after having seen Wright dragged. Julia
Renfro, for one, held her younger child every night for a month and said
little to her elder son, believing the lesson of white violence self-evident.149
Thus, some youths dealt with the incident by thinking for themselves, while
men like Griffen found comfort in the belief that whites were fully capable
of distinguishing between Wright and other blacks.150
Like those whites who found humor in the bloodshed—including one
Sikeston youth enrolled in a southern military school who playfully warned
a black waiter to serve well lest he experience the fate of Cleo Wright—black
youths exploited the horror.151 In Sunset Addition, pranksters singled out
Julia Renfro and her young sons. Soon after Wright's destruction they
knocked on and shook her door "a good number of times," until a friend
reversed the scare tactics one evening. Upon hearing a man's voice for the
first time, they "hit the street flying." This group demonstrated an insensi-
tivity to lynching crises and an ignorance of nightrider folklore, both pow-
erfully embedded in southern black culture.152
Either through personal experience or by word of mouth, then, graphic
details of Wright's violence and of his demise very quickly became common
knowledge in the close-knit community. Phone conversations and church
contacts on Sunday and press coverage and store or workplace meetings on
Monday spread the story, sometimes inaccurately: many blacks believed that
state troopers led the mob in Sunset; some whites heard that Wright's body
was "packed in a sack, covered with acid and then dumped into a hole out-
side of town."153 Most persons, however, transmitted the basic facts correctly
and remembered them years later.
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Black residents in nearby communities east and west, such as Charles-
ton and Poplar Bluff, heard the story firsthand from refugees fleeing Sikeston.
They well understood the historical pattern of racial violence in the South
and feared its eruption in their own locales. "When those things start," re-
called one prominent leader, "you don't know where in the hell they're go-
ing to end."154 And blacks below Sikeston, aware that planters had broken
up the tenant farmers' meeting in Caruthersville, envisaged Wright's lynch-
ing as one more example of "mob rule" in the Bootheel.155
Unlike all previous racial violence in southeast Missouri, however, the
lynching of Cleo Wright became a cause celebre. Its impact extended beyond
local residents—themselves divided both along and within racial lines—and
evoked national censure that generated state and federal investigations. Com-
ing as Sikeston moved toward modernization and as the nation entered
World War II, Wright's public execution raised questions about personal re-
sponsibility and civic duty in a democratic society founded upon law and
order.
3 Law and Order
News of the lynching quickly spread beyond the immediate area via radio
broadcasts and newspaper copy. State and national reporters, including rep-
resentatives of the Associated Press, Associated Negro Press, and Southern
News Service, soon followed the story into Sikeston to pepper local officials,
newsmen, and residents for information. Several gravitated toward Paul
Bumbarger, staff writer for the Standard and author of its major lynching
story, which became the basis for accounts published near and far. But since
journalists of both races found him "very polite" yet cautious about becom-
ing "mixed up in a racial situation," they also sought their own material.1
As black Missourians heard broadcasts and read news reports, they
called on officials to investigate the bloodshed. Within twenty-four hours
and in advance of what the Pittsburgh Courier would soon label the "Double
V Campaign," residents and organizations statewide pressed Governor
Forrest C. Donnell for a democratic victory at home as well as abroad.2
Arthur Euing of St. Joseph, a combat veteran of World War I, opined that
all citizens needed protection under the law; Lorenzo J. Greene, a professor
from Jefferson City, contended that in order to "erase the stigma" of law-
lessness the lynchers must be apprehended.3 Groups as ideologically dispar-
ate as the Communist Party of Missouri and the St. Louis Urban League
added that Wright's death—"an act of vicious Hitlerism"—endangered na-
tional unity, sabotaged war preparations, raised suspicion among nonwhite
allies, and gave "hope to Hitler and his Axis partners." Such an occurence,
asserted the St. Louis YWCA Public Affairs Committee, should make white
Missourians "feel ashamed and degraded, and fearful of the future."4
Black leaders, especially from St. Louis and Kansas City, quickly trans-
formed private outrage into organized protest, inspired by the National As-
sociation for the Advancement for Colored People (NAACP) and the hope
of democratic victory worldwide. Shortly before the lynching, for example,
the president of one NAACP chapter had received word from national ex-
ecutive secretary Walter White that the "destiny of Negro America" would
be determined by the war; for this reason, the association's work "must be
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expanded, rendered more effective and made a vital part of the life of every
community." His message reflected the thinking of many local officers who
understood immediately that Wright's slaying in broad daylight and within
weeks of Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor was "made to order for the
N.A.A.C.P."5
St. Louisan Sidney R. Redmond led the way, probably having provided
the national office with some of its earliest information on the lynching.6
As a result of phone conversations with Walter White he called members of
his chapter together within forty-eight hours of Wright's cremation, orga-
nized a meeting with Donnell on Thursday, and planned a mass rally on
Sunday. He broadened the base of protest by drawing on eight chapters and
several business and civic groups for the gubernatorial conference.7
On January 29 Redmond arrived in Jefferson City with eighty-seven
persons. Their names, reading like a Who's Who of Missouri's black elite,
included St. Joseph's Dr. William A. Simms, Charleston restaurateur Marshall
Currin, Kansas City Call editor C.A. Franklin, St. Louis attorney R.L.
Witherspoon, Columbia's Rev. Ernest S. Redd, and Jefferson City's Profes-
sor Lorenzo J. Greene. That they thought alike reflected longstanding per-
sonal, class, and racial solidarity; Kansas City NAACP president Carl R.
Johnson and National Negro Business League regional vice-president U.S.
Falls of St. Louis, among others, had protested to the governor well in ad-
vance of Redmond's call for action.8 That they acted as a group evinced
equally well-established networks and cooperation among more than
NAACP affiliates: rival editors Franklin, J.E. Mitchell of the Argus and N.A.
Sweets of the American, for instance, protested in person and in print.9 At
least fifteen women, many elite and most from Jefferson City, and less well-
known Missourians such as Lee Johnson from Sikeston, marched as del-
egates.
Redmond's delegation came from all parts of the state. Anchored in
Jefferson City with twenty-eight participants, it drew heavily from St. Louis
in the east and Kansas City in the west, which respectively provided twenty-
two and twelve delegates, added four and nine from nearby Columbia and
Mexico, one from south central Lebanon, five from northwest St. Joseph, and
three from northeast Hannibal. Southwest Missouri was not represented, but
three members hailed from southeast Charleston and one from Sikeston.
Only the last and the delegate from Lebanon lived in cities without NAACP
affiliates.
Clearly, the association's officers, themselves elite, interacted with the
black vanguard to forge an impressive statewide activism. Redmond ensured
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that achievement by gaining an audience with the governor, creating a
bonafide coalition, and sharing authority with its members. The group gath-
ered in the state capitol at 11:30 A.M., chose spokespersons, and adopted a
resolution. Editor Sweets chaired the delegation. The St. Joseph and Kansas
City NAACP presidents, a St. Louis minister, and a Kansas City resident rep-
resenting all women of the state addressed Donnell at 1:00 P.M. Attorney
Witherspoon then read the resolution aloud, charging what blacks every-
where believed: that Wright had been left unguarded, without medical care,
and in an insecure place; that police and prosecutor neither threatened the
lynchers with arrest or firearms nor identified and apprehended them af-
terward; that Sgt. Melvin Dace led the mob to Sunset Addition and with other
officers watched idly as the victim burned. Given this "breakdown or impo-
tency or complicity" of law enforcement, the petition asked that Donnell
investigate the activities of Dace, Sheriff John Hobbs, and their subordinates;
relieve David E. Blanton of his duties in this case and replace him with a
special prosecutor; and call the state legislature into special session to enact
an antilynchinglaw.10
Delegates heard Donnell respond in "a sincere and satisfactory manner,"
promising a thorough probe and regretting that state law did not give the
chief executive power to remove sheriffs and prosecutors from office for fail-
ure to perform their duty. They also listened as Blanton informed the gov-
ernor that "some progress was being made toward" identifying those in the
mob. Thus they departed fully expecting Donnell to bring those responsible
before "the bar of justice." "We Negroes," Franklin reminded Donnell after-
ward, were learning "how to handle the tools of democracy."11
Franklin, of course, understated the savvy and contribution of neoabo-
litionist editors like himself, Mitchell, and Sweets. Upon first hearing reports
of Wright's death, Franklin and Mitchell had wired Donnell for his com-
ments. They sent reporters into Sikeston, while Sweets himself journeyed
to the killing field.12 Simultaneously, as they conferred with the governor on
January 29, they printed graphic coverage of the execution. "Southeast Mis-
souri Lynch Mob Escorted by Policemen," charged Call headlines, while the
Argus screamed, "Sikeston Lynch Orgy Stirs U.S." In accompanying editori-
als, "Missouri Shame!" and "That Sikeston Mob," Franklin and Mitchell
stressed the lynching's savagery, the doubt that justice would prevail, the
challenge to war aims, and—in Mitchell's "Anti-Lynching Bill"—the call for
a federal measure to protect black life and deliver on the promise of democ-
racy.13
This activity, combined with that of the conference and the white dai-
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lies, whose stories began the day after the lynching, quickened the pace of
black protest. Perhaps because of the proximity to Sikeston—which lay 135
miles due south and easily reached by U.S. 61—and because of the enor-
mous coverage given the incident by the local NAACP and journalists, St.
Louis area residents, more than any others in the state, demanded justice.
Virgus C. Cole, for one, inquired about the supposed freedom in "this great
Democratic form of government." Members of her race could not attend
white schools or work in numerous industries and, worse yet, lived unpro-
tected lives: men were "shot down and burned like dogs" and women raped
without retribution. Yet in this crucible, her twenty-one-year-old son pre-
pared to risk his life for the defense of "a White Man's country" that reduced
black hope to belief in a vengeful God who "sees all things."14
Divine intervention aside, 3,500 individuals like Cole attended the
NAACP mass rally in St. Louis on Sunday, February 1. They filled to over-
flowing the Pine Street YMCA's gymnasium and two lobbies, forcing orga-
nizers to turn away another 2,000 people, start the program a half-hour early,
and hold meetings both upstairs and down. For three hours they heard some
twenty speakers of both races and several affiliations. Audience and press
attention, however, focused on three voices: Rev. J.B. Ross repeated his charge
that Sergeant Dace had led the lynchers, former congressman Leonidas C.
Dyer renewed calls for a federal antilynching law, and Mayor William Dee
Becker pressed for a state grand jury inquiry. Those listening agreed—par-
ticularly with Becker's contention that the lynching stemmed from "the same
kind of class hatred this nation is fighting a war against"—and passed reso-
lutions expressing dissatisfaction with the state police report, which defended
trooper action, and support for the NAACP's efforts.15
Significantly, then, between Thursday and Sunday Redmond raised the
level of protest. He expanded the crusade from eighty-seven elites to include
hundreds of everyday citizens, liberal white leaders, and another political
power in the mayor of St. Louis. Also renewing the drive for an federal anti-
lynching law, which the national office had sought since 1918, he pushed
the governor for state legislation, billed the mass meeting as an antilynch-
ing rally, and raised $150 among its participants to carry the association's
drive further.16
Redmond's well-publicized activities encouraged additional programs
and assisted some already planned. On February 6, delegates from the Ne-
gro Baptist Ministers' Alliance of St. Louis trekked to Jefferson City, met with
the governor, and urged a "complete inquiry" into the lynching. That Sun-
day St. Louis businessmen and housewives held a mass meeting, as did
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NAACP affiliates throughout the state. The St. Louis County branch, for
instance, drew 500 persons to Douglas High School in Webster Groves, where
they heard some of those—including Robert L. Witherspoon—who had con-
ferred with Donnell ten days earlier, adopted a resolution condemning
Wright's murder, and donated $43.23 to the antilynch law fund.17
In fact, the series of NAACP gatherings on February 8 were planned by
the Kansas City chapter's president shortly after Wright's burning. Carl R.
Johnson responded to the crisis as quickly as Redmond, cooperated in his
preparations for the gubernatorial conference, and may have provided him—
indirectly via Walter White—with the idea of mobilizing branch members
to assure its numerical success.18 Johnson's handiwork demonstrated the far-
reaching extent of black protest.
Personal and group agitation continued throughout the state during the
first two weeks of February. Some came from previous sources such as Rev.
C.B. Johnson of Jefferson City, a member of the NAACP delegation to
Donnell, who prophesied that his God, mindful of "all the evil" done by white
men, would have "a hand" in meting out justice.19 Other protesters voiced
their anger for the first time. Members of the Negro Community Council
of Sedalia took up the familiar cry to punish the lynchers lest government
officials appear to condone the very "atrocities that make civilization blush."
And the Butler County Negro Citizens Committee questioned Sergeant
Dace's conduct and requested gubernatorial action. Regrouping in the face
of a killing only forty-eight miles east of their headquarters in Poplar Bluff,
committeemen and -women claimed to speak for all "law-abiding Negro
citizens" in the vicinity.20
Similar protest mounted nationwide. From late January through early
February, black citizens and leaders responded almost in lockstep with their
counterparts in Missouri. Sparked by radio, white daily, and black weekly
press coverage of the lynching in every major urban center, they spoke to
editors, officials, and leaders in "Double V" language.21 Representative of
numerous correspondents, a thirty-three-year-old husband, father of three
and U.S. Customs Guard from Brooklyn, New York, asked Franklin D.
Roosevelt what 13,000,000 black Americans and the "Dark races" worldwide
were to think of Wright's murder: was "Democracy just for the white Ameri-
can?" Franklyn R. Johnson also requested that the president abolish Jim Crow
throughout the nation, push for a congressional statement on the "un-
American slaying of Cleo Wright," and thus give blacks the "heart to fight
and die for America." Hopeful that others would back up his call, he gave
Walter White permission to publish the letter.22
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Of course, the NAACP executive secretary had already acted publicly
on several fronts. He telegraphed Roosevelt on January 26, immediately upon
hearing of Wright's death, that nothing short of "positive, affirmative ac-
tion"—specifically, enactment of an antilynch law—would assure "citizens
of all races" that democracy "applies within as well as outside of the United
States."23 White also released his telegram to the press and contacted
Redmond for the latest information, reaching the St. Louis president the
following day. In a series of phone conversations they laid plans for the con-
ference with Governor Donnell on Thursday and the mass meeting on Sun-
day.24
Before those efforts came to fruition, White inquired whether Redmond
could send a "competent investigator" into Sikeston. The suggestion stemmed
from both longstanding NAACP policy and personal experience as the
association's lynching authority, one who had investigated mob violence and
published Rope and Faggot: A Biography of Judge Lynch in the 1920s. White
recommended Mary Taussig Tompkins, a white St. Louisan who knew south-
east Missouri.25 She and her husband, L. Benoist Tompkins, visited the lynch-
ing site on January 29 and 30. They interviewed several black and white
residents—including "leading citizens"—to ascertain "the trend of commu-
nity feelings," but "made no attempt to obtain evidence for the prosecution"
of lynchers.26
White collected information from other sources as well and pressed the
protest nationally. In addition to the Tompkins report he received personal
statements about Wright's killing and ensuing events from Ross and from
Redmond, and an advance copy of the Kansas City Call lynching stories based
on the visit to Sikeston of reporter Lucille Bluford.27 From these references
he forged a strategy of propaganda to promote greater protection of black
life.
White understood well the need, in the words of St. Louis County
NAACP members, to strike "while the iron is white hot." Hence, in a series
of press releases between the date of the lynching and early February, he
linked the bloodshed in Sikeston to the brutal attacks on black soldiers in
Alexandria, Louisiana, and both to the question of democratic war aims.
Within two weeks of Wright's death, White's battle cry became "Remember
Pearl Harbor . . . and Sikeston, Missouri!"28 Perhaps he or association staff
members originated the powerful slogan, but others arrived at it indepen-
dently. "What Pearl Harbor was to international law, Sikeston was to our
national law," opined Rev. Russell S. Brown as early as January 28; "Truth
Truly" informed Governor Donnell of the exact saying four days before it
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appeared in an NAACP press release; shortly thereafter a Chicagoan urged
Defender subscribers to adopt—in the face of the Pearl Harbor battle slo-
gan—"our own cry for the things we hold dear": "Remember Sikeston, Mo."29
Regardless of its origin, White's association popularized the "new national
slogan," and black editors soon pushed it in print.30
White also continued to work with chapter presidents, especially
Redmond. He cooperated with the latter's plans to gather petitions endors-
ing an antilynch bill, send a delegation to Washington, D.C., and organize a
silent parade to protest racial pogroms: NAACP tactics developed in the wake
of the East St. Louis race riot of 1917 and designed to bring redress through
exposure and pressure.31 To advance that purpose further, White and his staff
planned for a pamphlet on Wright's murder to be distributed "to congress-
men, senators, and other influential Americans."32 Meanwhile, he released
excerpts of the Tompkins study, particularly its emphasis on "the feudal na-
ture of southeast Missouri," where blacks were viewed as brutes to be kept
subservient and where tension was promoted between poor white and black
laborers; alleged black assertiveness and white solidarity across class lines
wrought bloodshed. Quoting the Tompkinses, the NAACP press release made
much of "breakdowns in our legal system" when local judges and jurors "be-
lieve in lynching." Widely published by the black press, the Tompkins probe
reinforced the association's drive for federal prosecution of lynch mobs.33
White also received advice from E.T. Summytt, president of the St. Louis
County chapter, who passed along the legal ideas of prominent whites and
advocated involving federal authorities in the case.34 In fact, White's legal
representatives, led by Thurgood Marshall, had already begun negotiations
with the U.S. Justice Department and, by mid-February, had received its
Criminal Division's "investigative attention."35 Significantly, NAACP and
Justice Department lawyers initiated a legal strategy requiring neither a fed-
eral law nor, therefore, dealings with the conservative, southern congress
members who had filibustered all previous antilynching measures.
Success on any front, White realized, required relentless public pressure
on local, state, and federal officials. He knew, too, that NAACP members not
only provided the core of such protest activity (as Redmond and Johnson
had demonstrated to Donnell and Becker) but, in doing so, raised the
association's stock. Thus, both to advance the challenge to Wright's lynch-
ing and to build the association into the most powerful civil rights organi-
zation, White's office worked to enlarge Missouri's chapters.36 On the heels
of the Pine Street YMCA meeting of February 1, for example, Redmond re-
quested field representative Daisy E. Lampkin's presence to start his chapter's
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membership drive; St. Louis was "in fever heat" and "hundreds of people"
were volunteering for work. Within two weeks he and Lampkin launched
the drive and soon added 3,331 members.37 Small wonder that White's na-
tional staff considered printing the pamphlet on Wright's burning complete
with a "membership blank" and "sales stuff."38
NAACP efforts also fostered white protest, though much of that came
spontaneously from several parts of the state. Within days of the atrocity,
St. Louis area residents expressed their disgust to editors and officials. At-
torney Dyer, perhaps the best-known champion of an antilynch law in the
1920s and 1930s, wrote that "burning a human being at the stake" proved
the presence of lawlessness in the state and the need for federal legislation
to restore equal justice. "Misguided persons," added an everyday St. Louisan,
should never be permitted to destroy "the fruitage of civilization," and a
Columbia professional reiterated that lynchers' setting themselves above
Missouri law could not be tolerated.39
Similarly, citizens from southeastern communities, including those
of the Bootheel, mourned—in the poetry of H.H. Lewis—Wright's
"cringing tones," "muffled moans," and "spirit downed."40 Like the Cape
Girardeau bard who wrote these lines during the Great Depression, con-
temporary protesters associated the lynching with "lags in our South-
east Missouri civilization," which they condemned—according to one
Lilbourn modernist—as "too prevalent for a presumed intelligent de-
mocracy." They also linked it to the war against "heel-clicking Nazi mili-
tarists" and their anti-Semitism, which showed one traditional resident
of "pure southern stock" and slaveholding ancestry "how disgustingly
terrible race hatred can be."41
Organizations in the largest municipalities gave added weight to indi-
vidual complaints. Religious groups led the way, with the Ministerial Alli-
ance and the Council of Churches of Kansas City censuring mob violence
as "a menace to all free institutions" and the Inter-racial Commission of the
Metropolitan Church Federation of St. Louis redoubling efforts to "build a
true democracy."42 St. Louis area affiliations of the Council of Catholic
Women, Fellowship of Reconciliation, and Young Men's and Young Women's
Hebrew Association reinforced the point, as did several secular associations.43
White journalists, too, landed hard on the lynchers and more than any
other segment of society articulated the modernist view so prevalent in ur-
ban centers. Editors from St. Louis, Kansas City, Independence, and Joplin
berated mob violence as a shameful reversion to "a state of mass barbarism"
which permitted Hitler to "sneer at our hypocrisy."44 "Not In Poland, Not In
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Conquered China—but Right In Missouri" read the caption of a St. Louis
Star-Times cartoon that depicted gleeful, club-wielding, Neanderthal-like
mobsters standing over the burning body of Cleo Wright, whose face gri-
maced in pain and arms stretched skyward as an oversized forearm and fist
inserted above the bloodthirsty horde grasped a rope attached to his neck.45
Only papers in "Columbia, St. Joseph, Springfield, and other communities"
that had experienced lynchings, noted one prominent editor, failed to con-
demn "the Sikeston mob" and cover its activities fully.46
Once again, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch proved most outspoken. Its edi-
tors publicly pressed for the prosecution of those guilty of Cleo Wright's
murder. They privately advised local black leaders about possible federal vio-
lations by the lynchers, and perhaps played a role in the St. Louis Newspa-
per Guild's resolution for prosecution of the perpetrators "in accordance with
the best interests of Democracy."47 Sikeston residents, even some who op-
posed the lynching, wondered why press coverage "had to go on and on"—
that of the Post-Dispatch in particular; "dragging it to the coals." What did it
take "to quell the nation's outrage?"48
The answer seemed to be justice for all. Exactly because the lynching
challenged democratic tenets during a war against totalitarianism, it drew
national attention and demands for state and federal action. Newspapers,
magazines, and radio announcers "played up" the tragedy "for all it was
worth-and-more," or so it seemed to Clint H. Denman of the Sikeston Her-
ald.49
Former residents living in Illinois, Michigan, and New York expressed
shame for their "old state," as did an Ohioan, who deplored the presence of
racial hatred when survival called "for unity against Hitlerism."50 Others also
living beyond the Show Me state felt disgrace that members of their own
race had carried out this lynching. One citizen knew of nothing four-legged
"so wantonly cruel"; another envisioned the lynchers as "traitors to their
country."51
Numerous organizations across the nation protested in the same idiom.
Kentucky members of the Association of Southern Women for the Preven-
tion of Lynching deemed mob violence indefensible, and Arkansas repre-
sentatives of the Women's Society of Christian Service likened it to the
conduct of America's enemies.52 Northern associations—for instance the
Federal Council of Churches of Christ—believed the bloodshed disgraced
everyone, violated democracy, and undermined Christian ideals. And nearly
five hundred Ohio University students called for the "immediate passage"
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of the antilynching bill.53 Other groups endeavored to provide direct redress.
"What happened in Sikeston too closely parallels events in Nazi Germany,"
admonished officers of the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
in Washington, D.C., who suggested a $5,000 reward—themselves pledging
a tenth of that sum—for information leading to the lynchers' capture and
punishment.54
Opposition to the lynching appeared in the national press, ranging from
eastern liberal dailies to more moderate publications elsewhere. "It was,"
noted the Washington Post, "an act on a par with the diabolical murders per-
petrated by Nazi and Japanese gangsters"; it raised questions, contended the
Tampa Daily Times of Florida, about "what kind of democracy we claim to
be fighting for." Many other dailies agreed and, like the Chicago Sun, ex-
pressed concern for black patriots or demanded federal legislation to end a
barbarism that would cause even Heinrich Himmler to blush.55
Though never embarrassed for himself, Governor Donnell broke with
traditional gubernatorial indifference to local violence long before the pro-
test emerged and well ahead of its peak in mid February. Hearing of Wright's
death within an hour of its occurrence, he immediately arranged for Sikeston
and state officials to protect Sunset residents. He also wanted the law "fully
enforced" and those responsible for the bloodshed apprehended, telling
David E. Blanton to make "an example" of them.56 He concurred with the
Scott County prosecutor's suggestion for a state grand jury and, by early
evening, had issued a public statement calling for "a searching and thorough
investigation" of the lynching. His decisive action and view of the incident
as "a disgraceful blot" on the state drew the praise of many, including those
who soon organized the statewide protest.57
For many reasons Donnell set precedent, though the need to restore
order and demonstrate justice during a war against lawless, racist, totalitar-
ian powers loomed large. He desired, as had earlier modernists, a regulated
society free of "violent encounters."58 A devout Methodist, he promptly de-
clared Wright's death wrongful; a pragmatic thinker, he moved to prevent
Wright's lynching from becoming a pogrom; a governor believing in "stew-
ardship" and "strict construction," he criticized the denial of due process to
Wright and determined that his murderers would face its full force. Donnell
also reaffirmed the superiority of democratic values, as had most American
intellectuals, jurists, and politicians who feared the authoritarianism of Italy,
Japan, and especially Germany.59 A Phi Beta Kappa recipient, University of
Missouri Law School graduate, thirty-third degree Mason, and Republican
48 The Lynching of Cleo Wright
Party leader, he knew—as Dyer later reminded him—that blacks were fight-
ing and dying for democracy abroad while "in our own state" the law was
"thrown to the winds."60
The public outrage over Wright's killing simply accentuated Donnell's
predilection for state intervention. In the weeks following his unhesitant
resolve, he received more than a hundred letters, postcards, and telegrams,
as well as some petitions.61 He met with delegations and learned of the dem-
onstrations held in several Missouri cities. Some black Missourians con-
tended that democracy meant "less than a promise from Hitler." Liberal
whites bolstered their ranks, as did members of both races outside the state
who considered the lynchers "more barbaric" than the Nazi leader and more
threatening than saboteurs. Almost everyone felt shame that "this dirty deed"
had smeared state and nation.62 Their protest raised a basic question: if gov-
ernment could not protect its citizens, who could it protect?
Donnell's reply depended on the Scott County prosecutor. Protective of
state rights, he had little choice but to rely on Blanton and the state grand
jury process rather than call in federal authorities. The governor's duty, ad-
vanced the Herald editor, required that he respond to national protest and
keep "the name of Missouri above reproach by insisting that local officers
bring the guilty to justice." If Donnell did otherwise, concluded his Sikeston
supporter, he would be an unfit chief executive.63
Given the almost immediate criticism directed at Blanton and Sergeant
Dace—he heard from several sources that the county prosecutor claimed
himself unable to identify individual lynchers and that the trooper had led
the mol>—Donnell anticipated the necessity of a state grand jury investiga-
tion in order to protect their reputations, his genuine effort, and the state's
integrity.64 The governor certainly understood that criticism of the Scott
County prosecutor heightened because of his residency in a southern town,
his initial belief that an inquiry might be unsuccessful, and his father's edi-
torial remark that the lynching "was deserved."65
Of course, personal and party concerns also motivated the governor. He
had emerged as the only Republican in Missouri elected to state office in
1940, winning his first campaign ever despite Roosevelt's third-term tri-
umph; he had benefited from the collapse of the Pendergast machine in
Kansas City and its statewide effect.66 It was noteworthy, however, that his
victory by only 3,613 votes required an overwhelming majority in St. Louis
County and strong support in traditionally Democratic St. Louis and Kan-
sas City. He knew that some blacks had deserted the Democratic Party be-
cause of former Governor Lloyd C. Stark's handling of the tenant farmers'
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roadside demonstration. He knew further that many whites of both parties
had supported him in the aftermath of the election when disgruntled Demo-
crats, in an unsuccessful effort to "steal" his office, charged voting irregu-
larities.67 Sensitive to these political realities and aware that most of the
protest over Wright's killing came from black and white supporters in St.
Louis and Kansas City, Donnell acted quickly in their behalf. "For God's sake
and ours, don't let us down at a time like this," pleaded a black St. Louisan.68
To be sure, the lynching was "a hot potato."69 Donnell knew of the back-
lash as some whites criticized him for interfering in a local issue: the law
that governed whites "will not control a beast," contended one St. Louisan;
another sent Donnell a newspaper clipping of his order for the lynching in-
vestigation with the message "NIGGER LOVING GOVERNOR."70 Many let-
ter writers, however, supported Donnell's efforts, as did the delegations led
by Redmond and Sikeston attorney Ralph E. Bailey. Donnell, of course, un-
derstood the political stakes, but his decision came unequivocally, before any
indication of public support and for reasons that transcended politics.
President Roosevelt, through the United States attorney general, set pre-
cedent for similar reasons. Francis Biddle reacted to what became over three
weeks a nationwide outcry. Politics, public opinion, black protest, and war
diplomacy made him "vitally interested in this case."71 He knew that "flocks
of telegrams" and messages were pouring into the Justice Department, White
House, and Capitol Hill, where black Congressmen Arthur W. Mitchell of
Illinois demanded—two weeks after the lynching—that the president "speak
out in condemnation of the Missouri terrorists."72 He knew, too, that NAACP
and Justice Department representatives had conferred several times during
the same period.73 Quickly, then, Biddle agreed with Victor W. Rotnem, head
of the department's Civil Rights Section (CRS), and Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Wendell Berge, director of its Criminal Division—which included the
CRS—that the lynching was more than "a local problem." Distressed by Japa-
nese propaganda depicting Wright's death as an indication of what East In-
dians might expect if the democracies won the war, on February 10 Biddle
ordered an FBI probe into the incident.74
Biddle was also disturbed by the lynching's impact on black morale,
national unity, and probably his own liberal sensibilities. Certainly he knew
that Wright's murder had delivered—in Walter White's words—"the most
crushing blow to Negroes."75 Even more than discrimination in defense in-
dustries or segregation in the armed services, it struck at the heart of citi-
zenship: the right to live in peace. Perhaps he also feared A. Philip Randolph's
prediction that "wild outbursts" like the Alexandria military riot and the
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Sikeston killing would soon get "out of hand"; the international president
of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters raised anew the specter of more
racial disunity.76 In sum, Biddle, a Harvard-trained Philadelphia lawyer of
distinguished ancestry, patrician bearing, and New Deal sentiment, consid-
ered the denial of basic constitutional rights a "tragic mockery" and a threat
to victory.77
Consequently, the attorney general concluded that some action on his
part—within very carefully drawn parameters—was imperative. He must
have realized that the president would not support renewed calls for an
antilynch bill, which he had evaded throughout the 1930s for fear of alien-
ating southern Democrats whose votes he needed to pass New Deal pro-
grams. Nor would Roosevelt embrace Randolph's suggestion for a Negro
Citizens' Committee to advise him on racial matters; another upstart body
might—like the recently appointed Fair Employment Practices Committee
that the black leader had forced on the president—incite even greater south-
ern reaction. Given the established politics and priorities of Roosevelt, who
concentrated on the Depression and the war rather than on race relations
in either era, Biddle focused on legal approaches within his department.78
As solicitor general, 1940-41, Biddle had participated in the Justice
Department's early efforts "to breathe new life" into the civil rights statutes
of the Reconstruction era; now, as attorney general for less than six months,
he brought to that office "the eager flame of reform." Upon being confirmed
by the Senate in 1941, Biddle had reflected on his philosophy and record,
which advocated "respect for all human beings." Despite Biddle's role in the
internment of Japanese Americans, the war accentuated his liberal tenets,
placing them in a global context and imbuing them with a life-and-death
urgency.79
Biddle's actions in the Wright case reflected the political reform and ju-
dicial activism of the 1930s. Indeed, early in that decade Roosevelt and his
New Dealers envisioned citizens in "the conglomerate, as 'one third of a na-
tion' rather than individually," and stressed positive government.80 While they
never emphasized racial equality, they included blacks in separate adminis-
trative programs. Even Attorney General Homer S. Cummings, who stood
aside "as the battles over lynching raged" from 1933 to 1939, invoked fed-
eral statutes in nonracial cases that set precedent for later civil rights suits.81
More revolutionary judicial activists acknowledged the theory of "dis-
crete and insular minorities" and the need to protect them.82 By 1938 both
political and judicial forces were poised to expand civil rights for blacks and
respond to NAACP pressures for change. In that year Roosevelt publicly pro-
Law and Order 51
posed the federal investigation of all lynchings, and the high court handed
down Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, incomplete but highly significant
steps toward shielding blacks and smashing segregation.83 In line with those
developments and pressure from organized labor, in 1939 Attorney General
Frank Murphy, a New Dealer, judicial activist, and former NAACP board
member, marked "a turning point in official thinking" by creating the Civil
Liberties Unit (CLU) in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department.
Over the next two years, CLU attorneys developed strategies and changed
the unit's name to the Civil Rights Section (CRS). When Biddle (succeeding
Robert H. Jackson) became attorney general in 1941, the stage was set for
federal activity in civil rights. Biddle signified his intentions very early, fil-
ing an amicus curiae brief in support of Congressman Mitchell's suit against
segregated transportation.84 He also seemed ready to go beyond Supreme
Court cases and, through the CRS and the FBI, protect black citizens.
In short, Donnell and Biddle realized, as did most liberals, that the pres-
ence of Nazi-style racism during a war for democracy brought into ques-
tion "the moral integrity of white America." Wright's was the first lynching
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and therefore required their immediate
attention. Neither had much choice under the circumstances, though both
officials expressed genuine concern for the constitutional fights of black citi-
zens. Biddle, whose commitment to civil rights predated the tragedy, may
have thought that the "remote likelihood" for the conviction of lynchers in
the border states could serve to deter mob violence in the Deep South.85
Initially slowed by questions of political concern and federal jurisdic-
tion, Biddle soon followed Donnell's lead. On February 10 he informed the
governor of the FBI investigation, giving assurances that it would "in no sense
conflict" with the state inquiry. Three weeks later, on the eve of the state grand
jury hearing, he responded positively to the governor's request for a copy of
the FBI report and permitted the federal investigators to testify in the state
proceeding.86 Indeed, Biddle broke precedent all along the line, from order-
ing the first federal lynching investigation to conducting an FBI probe "for
the benefit of state authorities."87
Meanwhile, responding to Biddle's order for an investigation into
Wright's death, two FBI agents from St. Louis—both named Jones—jour-
neyed to Sikeston. They interviewed forty-three witnesses during the week
of February 15, either at the State Highway Department building on Main
Street or in a parked car near an individual's place of employment. Although
they "worked quietly and with no publicity," according to the Herald, their
presence was known about town and mocked by some white residents.88
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Occasionally, they came upon an unsuspecting subject who considered their
introduction as "the Jones boys" a practical joke being played by a friend.
Once they flashed their credentials, however, "the real Joneses" conducted
anything but humorous interviews.89 They also collected editorial comment,
newspaper clippings, photographs, and a floor plan of City Hall. By Febru-
ary 23 the agents had submitted their fifty-page report to their superiors,
who passed it along to CRS lawyers.90
The FBI effort overlapped that of county and state personnel. In fact,
federal agents interviewed the prosecuting attorney and area lawmen, at-
tempting to identify lynchers and prospective witnesses.91 But "under no cir-
cumstances" were they "to investigate the case jointly" with the state attorney
general's office or identify confidential sources.92 Bureau investigators co-
operated with the county prosecutor but protected their agency's jurisdic-
tion and informants.93
David E. Blanton began his own inquiry immediately after the lynch-
ing and, from personal memory and unnamed informants, compiled a list
of mob members. Quickly he engaged Sergeant Dace and Trooper John
Tandy who recalled more names, ran down clues, and located onlookers and
participants in Wright's murder. He remarked later that the troopers never
presented a written document of their interviews, and federal agents uncov-
ered "what we already had." Soon enough, however, the county prosecutor
benefited from the FBI probe.94
State and federal investigations described the lynching, named those
responsible for it, and provided extensive clippings; in addition, Blanton
gathered photographs. No doubt he heard about the many snapshots taken
by ghoulish, event-minded, or entrepreneurial spectators, who shared them
with friends, sold them locally, proffered them to out-of-town newspapers,
or hid them. And, of course, he knew of several pictures taken by local news-
men.95 He seemed to believe that these photographs belonged to private citi-
zens fearful of the investigation or that they depicted close-ups of the victim
and distant shots of large crowds rather than identifiable portraits of mob
members. Thus only the five prints he received from the camera of State
Trooper Vincent P. Boisaubin—which showed Wright's charred body, the
vehicle that dragged him, and the mobs before City Hall and at the lynch-
ing site—bore the credibility necessary for legal prosecution.96
Blanton also heard that motion pictures had been taken of Wright's kill-
ing. Although mob members were said to have seized one film and the pho-
tographer to have destroyed a second, he was alleged to have received a third;
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shot with a telephoto lens, which identified the lynchers beyond a doubt.97
He later denied having received or viewed any movies of the incident, how-
ever, a recollection borne out by FBI files.98
Early on, Blanton requested that a member of the state attorney's office
assist him in the grand jury proceeding, since he himself might be "a wit-
ness for and on behalf of the State."99 Consequently, Governor Donnell ar-
ranged for Assistant Attorney General Harry Kay to work with him—placing
the State of Missouri even more directly in the case—and armed him with
a copy of the FBI report, which he had requested for the grand jury pre-
sentment. Four days before that body convened, Kay arrived in Sikeston to
prepare for the prosecution.100
Meanwhile, Blanton arranged the entire proceeding. He considered
bringing the case before local justices of the peace, yet feared "forcing their
hands" only to have them bring an abrupt end to the legal process by releas-
ing all suspects. Believing it difficult to sway judges directly affected by public
opinion, Blanton sought another strategy.101 He placed "every confidence"
in Circuit Court Judge James C. McDowell, who—upon viewing the evi-
dence—agreed to place the crime before county jurors in the first grand jury
called in five years.102
State law authorized the judge to assign the selection of jurors to either
the county court or the sheriff. McDowell slated the proceeding for March,
when his docket would be clear, and asked John Hobbs for, in the sheriff's
words, "a panel of'good men.'" Among those chosen, McDowell designated
R.H. Mackley, a Blodgett merchant-farmer, foreman of the twelve-man jury;
the others were insurer F.M. Craig and merchant Theodore Horn from Illmo;
druggist L.D. Lankford and building and loan officials P.N. Keller and M.H.
Stubblefield from Chaffee; merchant Frank Frobase from Benton; barber
Edwin Burger and retired farmer Tony Gosche from Oran; banker Joe
Matthews, mule dealer-realtor R.D. Clayton, and garage operator Charles
Eakers from Sikeston.103 For reasons of ill health, Matthews and Stubblefield
were replaced by Benton land overseer William English and merchant Wade
Miller.104 Essentially, jury members reflected judicial tradition: all male, all
white, and all proprietors of varying wealth, representing various—if largely
central—sections of the county.
On Monday, March 9, McDowell empaneled the jurors at the Benton
Courthouse, a two-story stone edifice dating back to 1883 and located in
the heart of Scott County.105 For fifteen minutes he instructed the jurors to
exercise their duty without influence from outside interference, local intimi-
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dation, or racial prejudice; to indict any one who violated the law; to keep
the proceeding secret. "We want," he concluded, "law and order in this
county."106
So did Blanton and Kay, who summoned thirty-eight witnesses that day
and the following morning. Blanton questioned the lawmen, alleged lynch-
ers, and knowledgeable spectators; Kay interrogated the county prosecutor
himself, helped with several others who testified, and kept notes of the state-
ments.107 They elicited charges and denials, even some unintended humor
as when Kay referred to the trunk of the car behind which Wright bounced
as a "trundle." Concentrating on the identity of those responsible for his
lynching, they nevertheless touched on the accusation that state police had
led the mob; serious about uncovering lynchers and pinning down gossip,
they included four black witnesses. They concluded late Tuesday morning,
March 10, believing their evidence sufficient for indictments.108
The jurors, however, failed to return a single indictment. They deliber-
ated for three hours and, upon Judge McDowell's return, issued their ver-
dict at 4:30 P.M. to a courtroom of fewer than fifty white persons. They found
"insufficient evidence to return a true bill" and, indirectly dismissing the
allegation that troopers had collaborated with lynchers, complimented the
highway patrol and county officials for their efforts in the face of the mob.
They adjourned quickly, as McDowell accepted the fifty-two-word report
without comment.109
Nor did Blanton or Kay immediately respond to the verdict, though they
must have sensed the reasons for it. In fact, the jurors identified closely with
the area. Living in small towns linked to a rural setting, they either shared
multiple social relationships with some of the defendants or well understood
the significance of such ties. Consequently, they no doubt gave consideration
to future encounters with friends and townsfolk who based their close-knit
society on an amiable, broad network of socioeconomic interests.110 These
jurors, rather than having been members of the mob (as suggested by some)
or protecting themselves for roles in future violence, as did nineteenth- cen-
tury jury members, simply respected community mores.111 They knew that
most people, even among those who condemned the lynching, expected
them to go through the motions and then "let dead dogs lie."112
Moreover, many jurors considered themselves southerners and their
locale part of the South, where racial justice operated in a for-whites-only
framework.113 Their identities, combined with a state structure that granted
judicial districts enormous leeway and permitted one dissenting juror to
scuttle the proceedings, prompted many observers to predict the verdict—
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"an easy guess"—well in advance. Grand jurors understood, as did one black
editor: "You can't indict a community."114
That "no mob formed against the mob that formed" also revealed the
disdain of area residents for outsiders.115 Significantly, McDowell had in-
structed jurors not to be "intimidated" by journalists and protesters from
beyond the area, contending that "the best citizens in the world" lived in Scott
County and that they did not need "anybody else to enforce the law." He
warned against holding local blacks accountable for Wright's misdeed, yet
mused that protest elsewhere "might stir up more trouble" and prove "more
injurious to the colored race" than had the Sikeston mob. In other words,
he called for "law and order" within well-established community and racial
parameters.116
Given this frame of reference, jurors claimed that no evidence justified
a true bill. They readily accepted the denials of would-be lynchers and dis-
regarded the testimony of officials, in essence taking the word of the accused
(and thus defending the community). They easily set aside the presentations
of prosecutor and lawmen, in part because of their own loyalties and in part
because of McDowell's instructions, which were "a model of caution, reserve
and legal punctilio."117 They heard the judge refer to Wright as the person
"who was supposed to have been mobbed" and issue instructions to return
verdicts "if" rather than "because" the law had been violated, thereby point-
ing up the absence of an antilynching law.118
Some jurors must have read McDowell's earlier public contention that
the "most important question" of the case turned on Wright's condition: if
medical testimony established that Wright was dead at the time of his ab-
duction from jail, it was "very unlikely" that indictments for murder would
be forthcoming. Of equal importance, Dr. E.J. Nienstedt, who had treated
Wright hours before the lynching, testified before the grand jury that Wright
"was certain" to have expired, though he could not say how soon.119 In real-
ity, the paramount question for jurors involved Wright's guilt or innocence,
not whether alleged lynchers had apprehended, dragged, and burned a liv-
ing human being or a cadaver. And jurymen, like the white constituents from
which they were drawn, believed that Wright was the "son-of-a-bitch" who
assailed Grace Sturgeon and "got what he had coming." They deemed him
"the right man," thereby making insignificant the conundrum of when he
died—and at whose hands.120
On the heels of the grand jury verdict, Judge McDowell openly con-
firmed his true feelings. Denounced by Mayor Becker of St. Louis for origi-
nally having said that he was "too busy" to call a grand jury, he lambasted
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the mayor in turn for having played to black voters by accusing county offi-
cials of the failure to protect Wright, and he chided FBI agents for entering
the case and stirring local racial divisions. Furthermore, he called protest
meetings, such as the NAACP rally where Becker held forth, "just another
form of mob rule." The son of southern parents and a longstanding Charles-
ton attorney with "extensive farm interests," McDowell spoke in part for the
besieged community; in part, he spoke for himself as a former prosecutor
and state senator and a recently elected member of the court who resented
the assertion that he needed only "order his clerk to summon the jury—the
Prosecuting Attorney can do the rest."121
In retrospect, McDowell appeared "cold toward the investigation," in-
fluential with the jury, and representative of most area residents.122 He made
no mention that "the dignity of the State had been outraged," seemingly more
concerned about the reputation of southeast Missouri. Hence the jurors re-
ceived coded instructions and the witnesses lost their memories in a pro-
ceeding opposed by most local opinion and, consequently, destined to fail.
Judge and jurors responded collectively, like earlier southern elites who op-
posed mob rule yet were taught to fear centralized government and defend
local autonomy.123 They evinced their own and their white neighbors' deep-
seated parochialism and historical memory, resenting—in the phrase of the
Charleston Enterprise-Courier editor—interference from "upstate sociological
busybodies."124
Despite the hope of judge and jurors that the grand jury report would
end the matter, Kansas City and especially St. Louis "busybodies" protested
loudly. The Post-Dispatch editor referred to the proceedings as a "fiasco," as
did white communists and black sorority sisters.125 "Another Blot on Mis-
souri" vented the Argus editor, having predicted earlier that "powerful forces"
possessed "brushes all ready for a general whitewashing of the case" and of-
ficials prepared, like Pontius Pilate, to permit it.126
The editor went on to ponder the governor's sincerity, and the vice-presi-
dent of United Electrical, Radio, & Machine Workers of America (CIO) ac-
cused him of having requested long before that the federal government
withdraw from the case.127 Donnell refused comment on the grand jury ver-
dict until he had consulted with Kay and State Attorney General Roy
McKittrick, then publicly announced—almost as the charges were leveled
against him—that he had met with the state attorneys. On March 13 he as-
sured the United States attorney general of his interest in "the possibility of
proceedings based on the violation of Federal Statutes" and of his full co-
operation in prosecutions stemming from the lynching.128 He also privately
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informed the union official that his charge regarding gubernatorial efforts
to keep Biddle from investigating the crime "was mistaken."129
Donnell's clarifications notwithstanding, critics were more concerned
about pressing the case. "The state authorities made a miserable failure in
bringing the lynchers to justice," declared the St. Louis NAACP branch presi-
dent.130 Most blacks had questioned the wisdom of giving responsibility for
the state investigation and presentment to Blanton and Dace, who were
themselves suspect, lived in the area, probably had friends among the lynch-
ers, and in the county prosecutor's case depended on public support for re-
election.131 Blacks also wondered how a grand jury composed of jurors from
the lynching area—and themselves the lynchers or "friends, relatives, and
sympathizers" of the lynchers—could mete out justice.132 Perhaps they knew
that mob members rarely faced legal action and that of those in Missouri
who had, only 3 percent had drawn convictions.133 Thus blacks, supported
by white allies, renewed demands for federal action.134
Both races were aware that U.S. Attorney General Biddle had launched
a federal investigation shortly after the lynching. In cooperation with the
governor's effort, however, he had delayed the decision to empanel an inde-
pendent federal grand jury until the state jurors had returned their verdict.
Now he acted unhesitatingly, undoubtedly more sensitive to black feelings
and international opinion because of a recent racial clash over federally built
houses in Detroit.135 On March 11, one day after the jury's decision and two
days before Donnell's pledge of cooperation, he announced that the Justice
Department would continue its lynching investigation.136
Biddle quickly set another precedent by assigning the case to the Civil
Rights Section (CRS), whose lawyers pursued legal strategy set forth two
years earlier. Formulated by Albert E. Arent and Irwin L. Langbein under
the direction of the section's first head, Henry A. Schweinhaut, the scheme
rested upon Reconstruction statutes (Sections 51 and 52, Title 18, United
States Code) but advised using those laws only "in cases of flagrant and per-
sistent breakdown of local law enforcement," since their application might
arouse antagonism over states' rights.137 Clearly, CRS attorneys considered
Wright's death more shameless and embarrassing than constitutionally or
politically explosive.
Led by section head Victor C. Rotnem, CRS personnel endeavored to
bring Wright's murderers within "the purview of existing federal criminal
statutes." This required challenging Supreme Court interpretations that lim-
ited the Fourteenth Amendment and jurisdiction over lynching to state ac-
tion.138 Since the amendment protected the right to due process of law, the
58 The Lynching of Cleo Wright
attorneys contended that it also permitted federal assistance to protect that
right when state governments failed to do so. They maintained further that
Sections 51 and 52, respectively derived from the Enforcement Act of 1870
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, pertained to lynching cases. Section 51 pro-
hibited private citizens from conspiring to deny another citizen his or her
constitutional rights, making such conspiracy punishable by $5,000 fines,
ten-year prison sentences, and ineligibility for federal office. Section 52 pro-
hibited lawmen under the color of law from willfully depriving citizens of
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected" by the Consti-
tution and federal laws, and punished violators with one year's imprison-
ment, a $1,000 fine, or both.139 It appeared to departmental lawyers that
Wright had been willfully denied equal protection of the law and deprived
of his life, without due process, by private conspirators and local authori-
ties who failed to shield him from the mob.140
Rotnem and his staff knew that convincing grand jurors and, ultimately,
Supreme Court justices of their legal position would not be easy. Prelimi-
nary studies under Schweinhaut's direction found that Section 51 had been
used solely against the crime of conspiracy—leaving "some of the most fun-
damental constitutional rights" unprotected—and that Section 52 had been
little used, perhaps because of the vague wording "color of law" and "will-
fully."141
Lacking other alternatives, however, Justice Department attorneys
moved to forge Sections 51 and 52 into an antilynching law. They seemed
buoyed by district and Supreme Court rulings in 1940 and 1941. In United
States v. Sutherland (1940), a suit involving southern police brutality (which
was subsequently dropped), the district judge ruled that a lawman exceed-
ing his authority acts "under color of law" to deprive his prisoner of equal
protection rights, thus violating Section 52. Supreme Court Chief Justice
Stone endorsed that ruling on the misuse of power in United States v. Clas-
sic (1941), when the Justice Department prosecuted Louisiana election com-
missioners for primary election fraud. Stone also found that the officials
violated Section 51 by conspiring to deny citizens their voting rights. CRS
attorneys believed these cases, especially Classic, expanded legal interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment and of Sections 51 and 52 to enable pros-
ecution of lynchings.142
As federal lawyers concentrated on overturning past Supreme Court
rulings, Berge sought Thurgood Marshall's advice on the department's pros-
ecution theory. And Rotnem considered the NAACP counselor's request—
originally suggested by a St. Louis area chapter officer—for a federal case
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led by representatives from Washington, D.C., rather than the United States
attorney for eastern Missouri: Harry C. Blanton, brother of the Scott County
prosecutor and supposed friend of the Sikeston police.143 Berge and Rotnem
went further; they decided to name a "Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral" (probably for reasons of departmental politics regarding Blanton). They
asked prominent St. Louis attorney and former president of the American
Bar Association Jacob M. Lashly to serve and discussed the case with him
for two weeks before he agreed, on April 11, "to come in."144 Their desire to
please the NAACP, combined with Lashly's procrastination, delayed official
announcement that a federal grand jury would investigate the lynching.
When it came, however, the special appointee's high profile and the recent
"vigorous action" for black Detroiters in the housing controversy brought
Biddle's office double kudos from liberal organizations.145
The Justice Department benefited further from DonnelPs unwillingness
to release Kay's account of the Benton Courthouse testimony and from its
own publicity efforts. When State Attorney General McKittrick decided that
grand jury notes could be delivered only to the county prosecutor, for ex-
ample, he and the governor looked disingenuous after having vowed to co-
operate with the federal probe.146 And, while Lashly pondered the special
prosecutor offer, Justice Department officials informed the news services of
their "moving on a wide front to protect the civil rights of Negroes" in Ar-
kansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas, and, of course, Missouri.147
Meanwhile, CRS lawyers quietly acquired the state grand jury notes from
Harry C. Blanton via David E. Blanton, the sole person deemed legally quali-
fied by the state attorney to possess the telltale evidence.148 In line with
Lashly's request, they assigned Irwin Langbein—special assistant to the U.S.
attorney general and an originator of the antilynching legal strategy—to as-
sist with the federal grand jury presentment in St. Louis.149 And they ordered
FBI agents back into Sikeston for additional interviews focusing on specific
details and the actions of local lawmen.150
Much work still lay ahead as the CRS lawyers and Lashly debated theo-
ries and culled Kay's notes, Blanton's photographs, FBI reports, and Justice
Department summaries for evidence. Before the end of March, Berge and
Rotnem approached Lashly about Section 52. Sikeston lawmen, they con-
tended, could be accused of having taken either "positive steps to avoid their
duties" or "willful 'inaction'" in the face of the lynchers; though the inac-
tion thesis lacked "substantial precedent," the Sutherland and Classic deci-
sions bolstered the first theory.151 Berge and Rotnem also raised "the
possibility of indicting members of the mob as aiders and abettors" of the
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policemen under Section 550, Title 18, United States Code, or as violators
of Wright's guarantee of due process under Section 51. The first approach,
they admitted, necessitated proving that the lynchers knew of the officers'
intent to violate the victim's civil rights, and the second required reversing
judicial interpretation.152
As Lashly questioned all theories without offering alternatives, CRS at-
torneys settled on Sections 51 and 52.153 Believing that omitting mob lead-
ers would weaken the case "appreciably" for jury and propaganda purposes,
they selected Section 51 over Section 550; it seemed precise enough to in-
dict lynchers for interfering with the state's obligation to provide Wright a
fair trial, yet narrow enough not to offend "ordinary ideas of federalism."154
Realizing that their theory contained "several fundamental weaknesses" and
necessitated going at least "one step beyond which the Supreme Court" had
thus far "seen fit to go," they argued that the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
anteed Wright due process "at the hands of the state" and freedom "from
any lawless intervention by third parties"; and that exparte Riggins (1904)
provided precedent for interpreting Section 51 as an exercise of necessary
and proper congressional power to protect due process, thereby permitting
the prosecution of lynchers who interfered with state officers discharging
their constitutional duty. But CRS counselors believed that the case against
the officers was legally stronger. Relying on Section 52, they cited positive
steps taken by lawmen—state action—that cost Wright his life. Indeed, FBI
reports revealed names and detailed activities.155
Nevertheless, Lashly and Langbein were in no hurry to appear before
the grand jury. Reputable witnesses had identified Wright's murderers, but
indicting them on the basis of Section 51 appeared—in Lashly's words—
"pretty tenuous."156 Shortly before the federal grand jury convened, his su-
periors admitted that such a theory would move quickly "to the Supreme
Court on a direct constitutional question." The wisdom of "this or other
theories" could still be debated internally: since U.S. Attorney Blanton de-
termined jury dates, Lashly and Langbein put testimony before the grand
jury in May but withheld their indictment until June.157 They would benefit
from the split session "to put a good shine on the indictment" before pre-
senting it.158 Essentially the case against the lynchers was important for in-
dicting Sikeston policemen.
On May 18, then, in the courtroom of U.S. District Judge Charles B.
Davis, Lashly and Langbein began "United States v. Walter Kendall, et al."
Unlike prosecutors in the state case, who focused solely on the lynchers, they
sought primarily to determine whether Wright had received adequate pro-
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tection by lawmen. They called fifteen witnesses over three days, drawing
heavily on David E. Blanton, Sergeant Dace, Trooper Tandy, Police Chief
Kendall, and Assistant Police Chief Wallace, as well as Ardella Wright, Rich-
ard and Minnie Gay, and suspected lynchers.159 Identifying lynchers through
the testimony of Blanton, Dace, and Tandy, Lashly and Langbein prepared
the ground for an indictment based on conspiracy as defined in Section 51.
In fact, they knew that hours before the lynching several whites had inquired
about Wright's wounded condition and that at least three whites had solic-
ited townsmen interested in "mobbing the negro."160
The Justice Department lawyers also attempted to demonstrate the vari-
ous roles that officials played in Wright's apprehension by lynchers. Despite
black allegations that Blanton had given prior approval to the lynching, other
black witnesses admitted that the county prosecutor had been sincere, if
"completely ineffectual," in his effort to disband the crowd at City Hall. And
against the accusation that he had led the mob to Sunset Addition, federal
attorneys confirmed that Dace and fellow troopers had done "everything
within reason" to protect Wright and warn black residents; the prosecutors
accepted Dace's decision not to fire into the crowd for fear of harming in-
nocent people and, no doubt, his Paul Revere-like ride through Sunset streets
as displays of "reasonable judgement."161
Thus, Lashly and Langbein focused their attention elsewhere. They con-
sidered the conduct of the police chief and his assistant "most reprehensible"
and in violation of Section 52.162 Although Chief Kendall stood against the
mob from 10:00 A.M. until it abducted Wright, he never saw "the Negro" and
made no effort to follow the lynchers. Instead, he stayed in his office while
they murdered his prisoner, then went home for lunch. Wallace appeared
even more cowardly to federal prosecutors. After taking Wright's confession
at 10:00 A.M., he went about his "regular police duty." Returning to City Hall
at 11:15 A.M., he noticed three or four hundred "very quiet and orderly"
people out front, and within twenty minutes departed to answer a police
call. Shortly after lunch he drove to Sunset Addition, saw the large crowd,
and "turned around"—only to go back that afternoon and recover Wright's
corpse. "I happened to be out there," he told FBI agents.163
Hard evidence notwithstanding, Lashly and Langbein lost their bid for
indictments against lynchers and lawmen. Following their initial present-
ment, the grand jury recessed from May 21 to June 3 and again from the
afternoon of June 4 to July 1, and did not issue its verdict until late that
month. To be sure, Lashly and Langbein sought additional information to
bolster their case, examined thirty-five witnesses in all, and elicited 1,091
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pages of testimony.164 Long before the jurors publicly issued their special
report on July 30, however, federal prosecutors knew that no indictments
would be forthcoming and discontinued ongoing FBI investigations.165
The jurors' report officially condemned the incident as "a deplorable blot
upon the reputation of this State." Since Wright was dead or near death,
however, they considered the violence "useless." More puzzling, even though
admitting that lynchers had denied Wright due process, they concluded that
"the facts" did not constitute "any federal offense." State troopers did "a fine
job," and municipal police apprehended Wright quickly but thereafter "failed
completely to cope with the situation." To prevent the recurrence of such "a
tragic breakdown of the protections of government," the jurors urged Mis-
souri authorities to study the law enforcement agencies that dealt with the
lynchers.166
Not everyone agreed with the verdict. Liberal editors labeled the jury's
report a whitewash and called for a federal antilynching law. National and
state reputations would suffer in the face of Nazi propaganda, editorialized
the Post-Dispatch.167 More bitterly, black Missourians charged the jurors with
purposely overlooking facts and condoning Wright's murder in a country
where even saboteurs received fair trials.168 And CRS personnel must have
wondered, as did Rotnem, how jurors could admit that Wright had been
denied due process yet conclude that the lynchers had committed no fed-
eral offense.169
The expertise and commitment of Justice Department officials had
failed to overcome legal precedent, internal differences, racial prejudice, and
probably resistance to federal interference. Throughout the grand jury pro-
ceedings, federal lawyers developed their legal theory, only to find the ju-
rors unconvinced of its logic or unwilling to overturn precedent. Laypersons
serving on the jury must have found the complicated thesis, law terms, and
Supreme Court references exceedingly difficult to comprehend. What con-
stituted "conspiracy" by citizens or willful denial of rights by lawmen? Which
of the half-dozen federal cases cited challenged or upheld existing litigation?
Such sophisticated legalities were all the more baffling for having been pre-
sented over several weeks interrupted by recesses. Jurors heard the strongest
witnesses on the first days of the proceeding and those who denied culpa-
bility or claimed forgetfulness afterward: Blanton, Dace, and Tandy corrobo-
rated the federal case in May, but alleged lynchers and frightened onlookers
undermined it repeatedly until the time that the verdict was reached weeks
later.170 Small wonder that the jury seemed unprepared to make history by
adopting legal theory that countered "a long unbroken line" of Supreme
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Court cases and itself would require verification by the highest tribunal.
Some of the jurors abhorred Wright's lynching but found federal arguments
for indictment wanting.171
Their skepticism may have mirrored Lashly's, for he never fully em-
braced the CRS's theory. From the beginning, he doubted that lynchers and
police could be linked satisfactorily "to supply the conspiracy requirements"
(Section 51) or that lawmen could be shown conclusively to have deprived
Wright of his rights (Section 52) .m Apparently he based this contention on
the initial FBI investigation, which "did not give very much encouragement
to the case"; nor, supposedly, did follow-up inquiries. The facts, he later told
both Biddle and newsmen, failed to place "the offenders... within the cov-
erage of any federal criminal law."173 The special prosecutor's reasoning
puzzled federal attorneys; even the conduct of Wallace and Kendall did not,
according to Lashly, "rise beyond negligence, lack of foresight and ineffi-
ciency." Admitting that the indictment against the Sikeston police command-
ers "might be sustained," he objected on "psychological grounds" to bringing
charges against one or two individuals when so many more were culpable;
he considered it "unlikely to bring constructive practical results."174 He
seemed unconcerned for the trauma experienced by Wright or the need, in
Walter White's phraseology, for examples of "vigorous affirmative action"
to "stem lawlessness against Negroes and other minorities."175
Lashly's position, pervading all aspects of the government's case, appar-
ently influenced some jurors. Justice Department officials had selected a
special prosecutor with impressive credentials. An Illinois-born, Missouri
resident, avid Democrat, former partner of Governor Donnell (1927-32), a
man well thought of in legal circles state- and nationwide, he possessed all
the necessary political and public characteristics for the sensitive, historic
assignment. Yet he lacked the prerequisite most required for legal victory and
judicial revolution: grand jury and criminal law experience. His reputation
rested on "liquidation and bankruptcy matters."176 Consequently, Lashly rel-
egated the preiminary work to junior members of his law firm, supervising
them in "frequent short conferences." Within a week of the grand jury date,
however, he had not given the case "very much solid time," and his assis-
tants seemed to be "thrashing over old straw" already covered by Arent and
Langbein in their "civil liberties bible" and by Jim Doyle in the Classic case.177
Despite Langbein's efforts, Lashly resisted the embroidery of Sections
51 and 52; even a high-level conference with Biddle and Berge midway
through the grand jury proceedings failed to change his mind. They had
followed NAACP advice and appointed a special prosecutor, only to err dras-
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tically by selecting a strict constructionist to present a brief grounded in an
elastic interpretation of federal law.178 (Ironically, Lashly had been recom-
mended by Roger N. Baldwin, director of the American Civil Liberties
Union.)179 "Under existing laws nothing else could have been done by the
grand jury," he told the press.180 Morover, he aided its efforts to save face.
After adjournment on July 1, he was approached by some jurors who de-
sired help "in getting up a report" that would prevent the public from con-
sidering their action "a condonation of the lynching." He raised their request
with Berge and Rotnem, also noting that the grand jury wished "to hold the
result in secret until some later time."181
Berge took his time responding, and Biddle misled the public by deny-
ing reports that "the grand jury had completed its investigation," thus giv-
ing the Justice Department time to consider its options.182 Clearly, CRS
attorneys influenced the jurors' carefully crafted statement and at the same
time prepared a news release that stressed the crime against Wright, the state
grand jury's failure, and the call for more effective "machinery" if local,
county, and state authorities were to retain "exclusive jurisdiction in lynch-
ing situations." Above all, both documents released on July 30 reiterated CRS
theory; the press release concluded that "the blind passion of a mob can not
be substituted for due process of law if orderly government is to survive."183
Instead of an indictment, overstated one insider, the Justice Department "got
an excellent report from the Grand Jury."184
Still, Biddle, Berge, and Rotnem must have wondered why Lashly ever
agreed to head the federal inquiry. Perhaps he acted—in Biddle's words—
for reasons of "unselfish patriotism," realizing the case's "national im-
portance" for the war effort. Win or lose, Biddle had assured him, his
participation would strengthen "the forces of law and order throughout the
country." As "an outstanding Missourian" and former American Bar Asso-
ciation president, one suspects, Lashly relished the recognition and oppor-
tunities for public service provided by the assignment.185 Nor could he, as a
lawyer, pass up such "a provocative challenge," one dealing with the "flagrant
breakdown of order and failure of government."186 Until the end, he insisted
that he welcomed the chance to improve that "deplorable situation."187
In addition to the differences between Lashly and CRS attorneys, racial
bigotry worked against their efforts. Everyone, including the attorney gen-
eral, realized that the case was "fraught with prejudice."188 Though it is diffi-
cult to document the racism of individual members, the jury shared the
popular belief that stereotyped Wright as a dying black rapist undeserving
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of civil rights. Ignoring the law—which clearly stated that if the victim was
alive when taken by the mob, his rights had been violated— jurors consid-
ered that the lynching mattered little because Wright was dead or "would
have been dead within a short time." Further ignoring the law—which clearly
assumed one's innocence until proven otherwise in court—the jurors de-
clared Wright "a brutal criminal" guilty of assault. He was denied due pro-
cess, but their great concern lay with future, "entirely innocent" lynching
victims."189
Moreover, the jurors, like those on the state grand jury, disapproved of
outside interference. If the citizens of southeastern Missouri resented up-
state busybodies challenging local authority, they certainly disliked federal
attorneys threatening states' rights. Wittingly or otherwise, the jurors pro-
jected the conservative reaction to New Deal encroachment that had already
occurred in Congress and in some state houses, especially on racial issues.
Doubtless, "state rights and strict constructionism remained remarkably
healthy" in their minds, despite the previous decade's centralization.190 Per-
haps some recalled the Missouri roadside demonstration, perceiving—as had
Governor Lloyd C. Stark—federal farm administrators as "troublesome."
Others may have seen in Nazi totalitarianism further justification for dis-
approving big government.191 Harboring those beliefs, they reconciled within
themselves the injustice done Cleo Wright.
Although seated in St. Louis, drawn from the entire eastern district, and
supposedly "less influenced by local climatic conditions," the federal jurors
resembled the Scott County jurors in important ways. Most were bankers,
businessmen, insurers, and realtors; some were ranking officers in sizable
companies; and all were "more or less responsible persons" with a stake in
society; most had their residences in a concentrated area, that of St. Louis
and its suburbs.192 Predictably, then, as white male entrepreneurs, they dis-
played their own concept of the status quo and federalism, if not racism and
provincialism. Like area church members and university professors ap-
proached by petitioners seeking signatures for a federal antilynching
statute, they indicated that rapists "had it coming" and that communities—
whether in urban centers or Bootheel hamlets—needed the shield of white
supremacy.193 And, unlike Benton jurymen who found only an adversary in
the county prosecutor, federal jurors who may have genuinely opposed
lynching associated closely with Lashly's own doubts about the case; he was
one of their own, geographically, socioeconomically, and philosophically.
Why else would four or five or more jury members have approached him
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throughout the month of July about "our grand jury problem"? Clearly, they
sought—both directly and "casually"—his assistance with their final re-
port.194
For the moment, that report closed the case. State and federal prosecu-
tors had raised many issues, even if neither jury addressed them, and local
residents heard numerous rumors about Wright, his victim, his captors, his
protectors, and his killers. Yet although they may have thought that law and
order had been restored, perhaps even that justice had been done, impor-
tant facts remained elusive. Like Wright himself, whose killing was granted
no inquest and whose body received no postmortem, the acts of bloodshed
and the community's response needed an autopsy.195
4 Autopsy
Among numerous questions posed by the lynching, the most significant in-
volved those touched by violence. Beyond names that suddenly blazed across
wire services and headlines, who exactly were Cleo Wright and Grace Stur-
geon? Was he a black beast and she a white innocent, or were they lovers
whose passion turned to bloodshed? And, their personal relationship aside,
what drove him to such a savage act and her to such an indomitable desire
for life? Indeed, the responses to these queries pushed beyond sexual innu-
endo to reveal much about a racial and cultural heritage that fostered
Wright's aggression and demanded Sturgeon's defense.
Since few in Sikeston admitted knowing Wright, both black and white
reporters described him simply as a young cotton oil mill worker with a
prison record; sometimes they misreported his age. NAACP representatives
identified him as a transient cotton picker or simply ignored him in their
lynching investigation.1
Wright remained a mystery in part because of his recent arrival and er-
ratic behavior. Born in Jefferson County, Arkansas, nearly twenty-six years
before these events, he had come to Sikeston in the spring of 1937. That fall
he was caught tampering with an automobile belonging to a state police
commander and served sixty days in the county jail.2 He then settled in the
black community for nearly two and a half years before committing a sec-
ond crime. On May 16, 1940, Wright burglarized the Sikeston Sales Com-
pany, taking $15.95. He again admitted his guilt, was sentenced to two years
in the state penitentiary, and served seven months at Jefferson City before
being released on parole. From February 18, 1941, to January 3, 1942, he
reported regularly to Police Chief Walter Kendall, held a job, avoided trouble,
and became a free man—three weeks before the assault on Grace Sturgeon.3
Before that tragedy, Wright appeared to be no more than a petty thief.
In 1937 he found employment as a laborer for Milem Limbaugh and, once
released from county jail, for J.C. Oden in 1938 and part of 1939. He worked
as a cake stripper at the Sikeston Cotton Oil Mill later that year, and during
his parole from the state penitentiary in 1941 and into 1942. Both at
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Limbaugh's service station on the corner of Kingshighway and Malone Av-
enue and at the mill farther east, where Malone Avenue turned into U.S. 60,
Wright impressed his white employers as "a good worker," industrious and
dependable, never causing trouble.4
Wright's personal life also seemed respectable. He courted Ardella Gay,
married her on February 10,1940, in nearby Benton, and established their
home in Sikeston at 207 Luther Street. There, in the west end of Sunset Ad-
dition, he and Ardella enjoyed a sense of family with his in-laws, Mississip-
pians Minnie and Richard Gay, who lived close by. During the period of his
parole, Ardella became pregnant with their first child.5
Those who knew Wright at that time liked him. Although he rarely at-
tended church—in part because he worked on Sundays— ministers of the
community considered him "a pretty nice sort of fellow." Rev. S.D. Woods
of the Second Baptist Church, for example, had supported his request for
parole.6 Sunset residents such as Walter Griffen, who managed the baseball
team for which Wright played outfield, verified that he got along well with
teammates; and when on occasion Griffen obtained his temporary release
from the Scott County Jail to play in games, he never proved troublesome.7
Similarly, white citizens such as Lynn Ingram remembered Wright as "neat
looking" and "friendly," never resentful.8
Likewise, Ardella and her parents gave the impression that all was well.
The Gays belonged to the Church of God in Christ and considered Wright,
himself raised a Baptist, a quiet, "decent man." Cleo, said his wife, "had been
good to her."9 Although concerned over Wright's prison record, Richard Gay
supported him. So did Minnie Gay, who considered him "a nice boy." Not
surprisingly, then, friends and relatives of the Wrights and the Gays recalled
"just a big happy family."10
After Wright's lynching, those who had known him said little. Clearly,
blacks were frightened: the Gays had distanced themselves from their son-
in-law when police officers sought to leave him in their care during the last
hours of his life. Whites, too, feared repercussions from the lynchers, and in
some cases embarrassment for having sponsored Wright for parole; in fact,
petitioners had included Mayor George W. Presnell, City Attorney Robert
A. Dempster, and Justice of the Peace W.R. Griffin. Their endorsements re-
vealed personalism, paternalism, and even tenderheartedness. "This boy,"
contended City Collector J.W. Mathis, "will make a good citizen if given the
opportunity." Perhaps they, like southerners elsewhere knowing of black eco-
nomic hardship, expected his thievery, even gave it tacit approval as proof
of black inferiority and, therefore, justification for the color line.11 That
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Cleo Wright, about 1937.
Courtesy of Linetta Watson Koonce.
Wright returned to the oil mill at a time when white employers refused to
hire "real mean" black males indicated further the positive view that many
whites had of him, or the influence of trustworthy black petitioners such as
Richard Gay and the Reverend Woods with white power brokers.12
Thus Wright's attack on Sturgeon shocked everyone and hinted at a
more troubled personality than one simply wearing the mask of survival and
deceit demanded by white society. Yet no one questioned whether he had
indeed slashed Sturgeon and Night Marshal Perrigan. Partly this reflected
the impact of his confessions, though it is doubtful that they were legally
acceptable admissions of guilt. In shock and pain from batterings, gunshot
wounds, and loss of blood, Wright must have been spent and certainly less
than alert—conditions never given "a thought" by those who arrested him
or by the county prosecutor; they simply accepted Wright's self-incrimina-
tion and the circumstantial evidence surrounding it. Accordingly, they dis-
missed without investigation his initial explanation of having been bloodied
in "a fight with two Negroes" just before encountering Perrigan.13
Many other whites believed Wright because he gave his confession while
dying and because it fit the facts of carnage: the attacks on Sturgeon and
Perrigan. Still others, one suspects, embraced his guilt rather than face the
horrifying thought that a crazed black rapist remained at large. Wright's
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confession, as well as any evidence, hearsay, or fabrication that identified him
as the culprit provided relief to Sturgeon's neighbors, for instance.14 In a fi-
nal analysis, journalist Paul Bumbarger speculated on "the essence of all mob
violence: the guy is guilty, so let's go hang him."15
Black townsfolk too deemed Wright guilty. Many followed the thinking
of whites in believing that his attack on Perrigan offered proof of his attack
on Sturgeon.16 Some had heard that he was "bad with a knife," and others
had known him to be belligerent when drinking, quite capable of having
cut both victims. And, given the pattern of residential segregation in Sikeston,
they realized that he had no cause to be in Sturgeon's neighborhood other
than for theft or "whore chasing."17 Several blacks acknowledged Wright's
wrongdoing for reasons of personal survival. Aware that whites needed an
immediate captive to ease anxieties about a black brute, they feared wide-
spread terror should Sturgeon's assailant prove elusive. In other words, Sunset
residents accepted Wright's guilt as dictated by his capture and, most im-
portant, by the message of his death for all blacks who dared "step out of
line." Significantly, they emphasized that he acted alone. Sikeston blacks, like
their nineteenth-century southern counterparts, understood both the pos-
sibility of Wright's guilt and, should they condone or ignore it, the certainty
of their own annihilation.18
Less certain than Wright's attack on Perrigan was his assault on Grace
Sturgeon. Neither she nor her sister-in-law, Laverne Sturgeon, could posi-
tively identify the assailant because it was dark inside their house. Laverne
told reporters that she looked up from her bed to see "a Negro man" by the
window, and that he had been watching the premises "for some time."19 A
month later, when interviewed by FBI agents, she and Grace again identi-
fied the intruder as "a Negro because of his voice" and his body odor. Grace
also remembered that while being treated at the hospital, she heard Wright—
himself receiving medical care in the basement—exclaim "Oh, God!" in "the
same voice that she had heard in her bedroom."20
If these flimsy descriptions hardly proved Wright's culpability, his en-
counter with Perrigan and Jesse Whittley lent credibility to his guilt. He ap-
peared one and a quarter miles west of the Sturgeon home within thirty
minutes of the assault, wearing blood-soaked trousers and carrying a "very
bloody" knife in his pocket. That he attempted to run as soon as he saw the
vehicle left no doubt in Whittley's mind that "he was the one who did it."21
His resistance to arrest followed by his assault on Perrigan seemed the reac-
tion of someone who had done much more than fight with other blacks (an
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act that would have brought no great punishment from white society). Given
his usual demeanor before white authority, attacking Perrigan made no sense
unless Wright had been provoked, a possibility denied by Whittley, or un-
less he had committed an even greater crime than that of attempting to kill
a white lawman—itself an act inviting violent reprisal. Cutting the night
marshall with the same ferocity demonstrated by Sturgeon's assailant also
suggested more than the coincidental patterns of different slashers. Like other
black men trapped in a system that assumed their guilt and obliterated their
humanity whenever they crossed lines of sex and authority, Wright, when
cornered—in the Sturgeon home and in the police car—acted as if he be-
lieved it necessary to kill in order to live. Surely this was why Sturgeon's
would-be slayer commenced his attack upon her with the pronouncement,
"You'll never live to tell this."22
For all these reasons, Wright's confession at City Hall was believed to
evince his guilt. What he is purported to have told Milburn Arbaugh, Milem
Limbaugh, and Assistant Police Chief Harold Wallace contained informa-
tion that, if actually given and correctly repeated, clearly indicted him. Be-
yond admitting that he had cut "that white woman," Wright retraced his steps
that evening. He told of patronizing the Farmers Cafe until 9:00 P.M., report-
ing for work at the oil mill a half-hour later only to discover that his shift
would not work that evening, and then heading south to Sturgeon's home.
His movements until he left the mill had been confirmed by eye-witnesses
and were restated separately and without significant deviation by Arbaugh,
Limbaugh, and Wallace.23 Nor did Wright repeat his first claim that he had
been fighting with unidentified blacks just before his capture, or offer any
other alibi.
Years later the Sturgeon women reiterated that the assailant spoke and
smelled like a stereotypic black man, but for the first time Grace claimed to
have caught a glance of him passing her hospital room before descending
the basement stairs to the emergency room for treatment. Whether or not
this sighting occurred, she repeated that Wright's voice identified him as her
assailant, though she acknowledged again her inability to recognize him vi-
sually.24
While fighting for her life in a darkened room and at close quarters,
however, Grace Sturgeon knew well her intruder's size and clothing. Stand-
ing 5'6" and weighing 135 pounds, she had traded blows with a "broad-
shouldered," "muscular" man two or three inches taller than herself and
wearing a leather "waist coat"; she desperately clung to the slick jacket in an
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attempt to deny him the space needed to wield his knife. Still, her intestines
spilled out as he cut from her left to right, revealing himself to be right-
handed.25
In addition, Sturgeon insisted that her slasher fought and spoke like a
sober person. Very sensitive to the smell of alcohol, she sensed no trace of it
on him.26 Neither did a black policeman when he conversed with Wright four
hours before the attack; nor did Perrigan and Whittley upon apprehending
him half an hour after it.27 To be sure, Richard Gay testified that Wright
reeked of whiskey shortly before daybreak and long after his capture, ap-
parently having been plied with it by an unknown Samaritan intent on eas-
ing his pain. And Wright's own midmorning confession of having attacked
the woman while drunk represented the impact of shock, trauma, and al-
cohol as much as conscience.28 Significantly, however, whatever he did dur-
ing the late hours of Saturday and early hours of Sunday, he did with a clear
head.
Sturgeon's descriptions fit Wright in several categories. He stood 5'10",
weighed 175 pounds, and possessed a "husky," athletic build. When caught,
he was wearing a "jacket" or "waist coat," though his captors never described
its composition. And, as a baseball player, he batted and threw right-
handed.29 In other words, Wright resembled the intruder in voice, height,
weight, size, dress, use of hand; he had not been drinking on the night of
Sturgeon's attack; and he shared with her slasher the choice of weapon, fe-
rocious aggression, and blood "all over his clothing."30
The individual pieces of evidence regarding Wright's whereabouts and
actions during the early hours of January 25 appear moot, but taken together
they provided a cumulative weight that persuaded most townspeople, black
and white, of his guilt. And, regardless of their own divergent and often self-
serving reasons, they seem to have been correct in condemning Cleo Wright.
In all probability, it was he who slashed Grace Sturgeon—but for what rea-
son? Did he intend to take her money, her honor, or her life? Or was his ac-
tivity, as rumored among Sunset residents, more scandalous than whites
dared assume?
Given his previous thieving, Wright might have intended to steal from
Sturgeon and then overreacted when discovered. Conceivably, he had been
responsible for the citywide rash of burglaries that had occurred the previ-
ous November. That thief slid in and out of white homes through windows,
lifting wallets from trousers and handbags from bureaus until suppressed
by police patrols. Some of his robberies occurred while victims slept, and at
least one took place on Kathleen Avenue. When caught in the act, however,
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the notorious "Negro purse snatcher" had fled, not fought. His slight build
did not fit the description of Wright, nor did the items he stole—for example,
a .32 caliber pistol—appear ever to have been in Wright's possession.31 More-
over, when Wright entered Sturgeon's home, he never mentioned theft and
gave no indication of seeking loot.32 And five weeks after his death, another
black man, perhaps the renowned burglar himself, attempted to break into
811 Gladys Avenue, almost directly behind the Sturgeon premises—which
closed the subject of Wright's motivation having been thievery.33
Most white townsfolk, of course, believed that Wright had intended to
rape Sturgeon. Their racial and sexual beliefs dictated such thinking long
before the police chief publicly confirmed it. Some Sikestonians in fact as-
sumed that Wright had raped her. Even Sturgeon's step-grandfather, H.D.
Davenport, who came running to her rescue and knew her situation first-
hand, inexplicably spread the rumor. In truth, Sturgeon had not been raped;
only Wright's declaration that he intended to kill her triggered her fierce re-
sistance: "I said to myself, 'Oh, no you're not!'"34
Whereas whites envisioned Sturgeon the random victim of "a lust mad
negro buck," blacks in Sikeston believed her to have been Wright's lover. Sup-
posedly, she had followed him from Arkansas, and on this particular night
he was discovered—by visitors or a neighbor—entering her home. Others
claimed that his detection occurred because of a lovers' quarrel, which led
to her knifing. In any case, alleged blacks, Sturgeon cried rape in order "to
keep her clothes clean."35
Given the history of the South, blacks found this story plausible. They
believed that some white women were attracted to black men and, if dis-
covered having sexual relations with them, were absolved of all wrongdoing
(which was untrue); they believed, too, that other white women possessed
"racially heightened imaginations" and claimed rape where none occurred
(which was true).36 Sunset residents realized that "racial orthodoxy" and
white male jealousy required the denial of any mutual desire between Stur-
geon and Wright, which meant that accusations regarding their encounter
would point in only one direction—his.37
Lacking firsthand evidence, black Sikestonians launched the rumors
about the Sturgeon-Wright affair as angry payback for his death and their
powerlessness. Walter Griffen, for one, believed that these stories were a way
for blacks to "get by," to inflict revenge without incurring white reprisal: such
gossip served as "a universal form of aggression," however passive, and per-
haps an effort to manage the frightful situation.38 If Wright had acted out
of sexual motives based on an established relationship with Grace Sturgeon,
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there was no reason for whites to destroy or condemn other members of
the black community.
Significantly, the rumor of sexual liaison surfaced only after the assault
on Sturgeon and in contradiction to the testimony of Wright's wife. Black
police officer Henry Bartlett told federal agents that Wright "had been go-
ing with Mrs. Dillard Sturgeon regularly" but provided no evidence for his
claim (which appeared to have come from a black newspaper); he based his
speculation on a remark of Ardella Wright that her husband's death "was
no more than I expected." However, on two separate occasions Ardella de-
nied any knowledge of Cleo's having "relations with a white woman"; she
clarified her so-called death premonition by saying "she had a peculiar feel-
ing that something was going to happen to her parents."39
Long afterward, Ardella changed her story to claim that Cleo had been
Grace's lover: she told Wright's sister of having confronted Sturgeon about
the affair before the lynching.40 Yet though she might have lied to federal
investigators about Cleo's relationship with Sturgeon for fear of physical
harm by whites, she had little reason to give friends the impression that such
charges against her husband were trumped up.41 Furthermore, given south-
ern etiquette, her altercation with Sturgeon would have been unacceptable
and much talked about in both black and white circles. Ardella would have
had to visit Grace in her home, at her place of work, or in downtown
Sikeston—all locations where neighbors, workers, or shoppers could hardly
ignore an interracial argument by married women over one of their hus-
bands. Very young and sheltered by the Gays, Ardella did not seem self-as-
sured enough to press the issue. Nor did any source, black or white, then or
more recently, substantiate her contention. Her showdown with Sturgeon
appears to have been concocted after Wright's death as a means to save face.
Ironically, whatever humiliation Ardella felt over Cleo's love for a white
woman resulted from rumors that blacks originated and that she could not
stop by denial or affirmation.42
Sturgeon steadfastly denied ever having met Wright's wife.43 Though a
handful of whites described Grace as "a loose woman" who ran around while
her husband served in the military, they did so only after the lynching with-
out knowing her personally and without naming Wright—or any other man
of either race—as her lover. They based their portrayal solely on hearsay,
probably endeavoring—as did white counterparts who lynched alleged black
rapists elsewhere—to distance themselves from the supposed rape victim's
humiliation. Consequently, they impugned Sturgeon behind her back in
order to protect their own reputations as white people, their illusions of ra-
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cial purity, and their need for an impenetrable color line; because of their
minuscule numbers, however, they made no attempt to ostracize her from
the community. Instead, Sturgeon became a counterimage for their white
supremacist psyche, "a shady character" who crossed the black-white bar-
rier one time too many.44
In sharp contrast, most white residents protected the racial order by
unequivocally supporting Sturgeon, whom some knew personally. Next-door
neighbor Glenda Whittley, wife of Jesse, judged the Sturgeon-Wright rumor
impossible. Eight months pregnant with her first child during the time of
the supposed affair, she had been staying at home all day and noticed noth-
ing of the sort; Grace, she insisted, was "not like that." Similarly, prosecuting
attorney David E. Blanton described Sturgeon as "a fine person" and dis-
missed the gossip as baseless. So did such townsfolk as cafe owner Gilbert
Clinton, who knew Sturgeon and her family less well but considered them
upstanding.45 Numerous individuals interviewed by federal agents echoed
these sentiments, leaving them to conclude that the sexual encounter never
occurred and that Sturgeon's reputation and "moral character" were "above
reproach."46 They seemed correct: if she and Wright were lovers, why did he
not know about Jimmy or Laverne? Why did he prowl around before enter-
ing Grace's home? And why did he come in it through a window? A par-
amour would surely not have been so ignorant or acted so oddly.
Still, the rumors persisted, and for over a year "threatening letters" came
to the Sturgeon home. One bore a mock marriage proposal from a Potosi
mate-seeker who said that he had fallen in love with Grace's newspaper
photo. Another from a St. Louis resident accused her of being "crazy about"
black youths, including one in 1931 whom she had tried to have lynched
for attempting "to quit her."47 These letter writers drew the attention of law-
men, who investigated the 1931 incident, denounced it as false, and reported
Sturgeon "perfectly innocent of all charges."48 Sturgeon, for her part, believed
that the correspondents were black, delivering retribution for Wright's death.
She anguished over their emotional impact, crying "many a tear" for a very
long time.49
Those accusing Sturgeon of having gone dancing with Wright or send-
ing him love letters, however, unwittingly touched on the possibility of more
widespread race mixing in Sikeston. Given the rumors about herself, Grace
soon heard about white women who frequented the "dives" in Sunset or sat
with black customers in the rear of downtown establishments such as Farm-
ers Cafe, which Wright patronized. Proprietors and waitresses denied such
conduct, and respectable residents both black and white played down inter-
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racial affairs as rare.50 They loomed as intolerable, far worse than one-night
stands with streetwalkers who peddled themselves to willing customers, par-
ticularly white cadets from the Missouri Institute of Aeronautics.51
Hearsay about Sturgeon and Wright, then, brought to the surface the
question of forbidden racial behavior—and Cleo's reputation. Officials pro-
duced evidence that he had chased white women before. Sgt. Melvin Dace
said he thought of Wright "as soon as he heard" about Sturgeon's assault,
because three years earlier Wright had written to a reputable young woman
in Sikeston—not Grace—"requesting a photograph of her and telling her
that he was in love with her." Dace had pursued the issue, only to determine
that Wright had violated no law.52 Similarly, U.S. Attorney Harry C. Blanton,
brother of David, reported that a nineteen-year-old from St. Louis claimed
to have been raped by Wright in 1941 while she was in Sikeston selling mer-
chandise. She had entered a car driven by Wright and contended that he
compelled her to "have intercourse with him"; she had said nothing after-
ward because of her "humiliation" and his warnings that she "would be ru-
ined."53 Though few, if any, citizens knew of these accusations, state police
and federal authorities believed them further proof of his guilt.
In truth, though the evidence is sketchy, Wright did become attracted
to white women and engage in a pattern of escalating sexual transgressions
that ended with the assault on Sturgeon. His letter of 1939 to the married
woman in Sikeston implied that she had a child, though not necessarily his,
and that he feared contacting her but missed her and wanted to return to
her: "Just a few lines to let you hear from me. This leaves me O.K. and hope
it will find each of you enjoying life like birds in the springtime. I been go-
ing to write you ever since I been back [in Arkansas] but was afraid to but
this morning I had to if it cause the world to turn up I can't rest at night
for dreaming and thinking." He asked her to send a picture, for it would pro-
vide "a lot of consolation" should he never see her again, but he preferred to
see her if she would "say so." Poetic and yearning, he closed by extending his
"love and greatest wishes."54 While Sergeant Dace gave the impression, sup-
posedly suggested by the woman handing over the letter "immediately upon
receipt," that Wright's feelings were unwanted and unrequited, his troop com-
mander, Sgt. O.L. Wallis, considered them "rather sentimental."55 In any case,
Wright's letter indicated an affair with someone who had ended it (most
likely because it threatened her way of life in Sikeston's white community).
Perhaps Wright raped the St. Louis teenager two years later, though that
is very questionable. He had been a chauffeur just before he burglarized the
Sikeston Sales Company in 1940.56 On parole the following year, he could
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have been moonlighting as a driver at the time of the alleged assault, but he
showed no signs of aberrant behavior until shortly before the attack on Stur-
geon. Wright's accuser, furthermore, seemed somewhat unsure of his iden-
tity. She had never encountered him before—or apparently after—her visit
to Sikeston; she might have seen a photograph of him in the St. Louis press
immediately after his death, but it was another two months before she came
forward with her accusation. In fact, between the lynching and the rape
charge, the same girl made news by claiming to have been swindled by a man
who had impersonated the brother of cowboy actor Gene Autry and who
absconded with her money and property after promising to marry her. For
this reason, and perchance because she was "rather buxom, attractive, well-
built," Harry Blanton considered it "barely possible" that she was seeking
publicity.57
Whatever the truth of her story, Cleo Wright had been sexually active
in Sikeston. He believed himself stricken with gonorrhea, though he prob-
ably misdiagnosed his condition; he told prison officials in July of 1941 that
he thought himself cured without having "taken shots"—an impossibility.
Nor did Ardella or their child, born after his death, show signs of that or
any other sexually transmitted disease.58 Nevertheless, that Wright thought
himself infected revealed extramarital affairs and verified the later suspicions
of his wife, who shortly before his death accused him of "running around
with other colored women."59 In truth, he had been sexually intimate with
at least one white woman before his marriage and possibly more than one
black women after it, deceiving members of both communities and, for a
long time, Ardella. Few, if any, knew him as a lady's man, perhaps because
Wright's survival among whites and, one also suspects, his standing among
blacks—who deemed circumspection in affairs "a virtue"—required utmost
discretion.60
Certainly his liaison with a white woman, much less his assault on Stur-
geon, would have been unthinkable to those who had grown up with Wright
twenty miles northeast of Pine Bluff in rural Arkansas. Delivered by a mid-
wife in 1916, he lived behind Gilliand Road, across from the Gilliand plan-
tation and slightly northeast of Gethsemane. There, on Highway 31, he
frequented the convenience store of Henry Walker Jr., which provided gro-
ceries, gasoline, and credit. He also attended the local Baptist Church and
grade school, just beyond the tiny emporium, and played baseball in the field
behind it. On weekends he ventured nearly seven miles due south to
Altheimer, on Highway 79, where one could buy a "fresher" or see a movie.
Or he journeyed northeast on that route to Wabbaseka for a ball game.61
78 The Lynching of Cleo Wright
The young Wright's everyday world, however, was fixed within a plan-
tation economy. Those about him raised cotton for profit, vegetables and
livestock for personal use. Whether sharecropper, tenant farmer, or prop-
erty owner, all worked long hours and understood their subservient posi-
tion. The hundred families of croppers and renters who worked the Gilliand
place benefited from the cabins, school, and even burial payments funded
by a paternalistic owner, who also dispensed self-serving justice and exploited
their labor. Lillie Clorah, who had worked in the fields as a youngster and
young adult, remembered that life in the area was "as close to slavery as you
can get." Though a smaller number of blacks, like Wright's family, lived be-
yond the estate, they too realized that "the big man got the big end of it."
And while those who owned or rented land fared better than seasonal la-
borers working on plantations, they rarely expressed class bias. Among
blacks, recalled John Henry Rasberry, who rented directly across from
Gilliand, "there was no big Is and little yous." Individuals doing well shared
their bounty with less fortunate neighbors; hog killing in hard times became
a social event, filling bellies—and warming hearts.62
At times, blacks and whites cooperated. The Walkers lived across the road
from the Oliver Mason family, for example, and got along well enough to
share water pumps and stay in touch later in life. Like other blacks in the
area, most of whom traced their origins to the slave South, Henry Walker Jr.
and his wife, Leona Banks Walker, instructed their twelve children to work
hard and mind their own business. Whites had the advantages, they admon-
ished behind closed doors; and blacks must know their place in a society of
Jim Crow schools and theater seating. That would bring success, as it had
for the Walkers, who owned the store and seventy-two acres of land that their
sons parlayed—through loans from white bankers and business dealings with
other blacks—into three hundred acres.
Wright, of course, had learned similar lessons. His mother's parents,
James Woolfolk and Lucy Moorehead, had migrated from Alabama. Each
had been previously married; he was the father of Prince and she the mother
of Willie. They met in Arkansas, accumulated 160 acres of farmland, and
raised three more children together: Caleb, John, and Alonzo. In 1907 at the
age of twenty-one, Alonzo married Temp Humphrey, a farmer fifteen years
her senior and father of teenage daughter Bettie. She settled on his sixty acres
off Gilliand Road and soon became pregnant, but their union ended in trag-
edy when lightning struck Temp. Within a few months of Temp's death she
gave birth to their son, Wiley Arnett, and faced a lawsuit over her inherit-
ance. She yielded fifteen acres to Bettie, then married and raising a family.63
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Nearly a year after that litigation, on January 26,1910, Alonzo married
Albert Leak Watson. He worked as a logger and lived on Gilliand Planta-
tion, where his parents James and Parthenia had settled upon leaving Pine
Bluff. Little is known of them or his sisters Cornelia and Alice, but they were
all residing in the Gethsemane area when he married Bessie Lusby of
Wabbaseka in 1904. That union ended in divorce, despite the birth of a
daughter; Bessie took baby Willie to Pine Bluff and ultimately remarried,
while Albert met and wed Alonzo, and moved to the Humphrey homestead.
Over the next fifteen years he kept in touch with daughter Willie and helped
raise stepson Wiley, while she gave birth to their own family: Cleodas (1916),
Alice (1920), James (1921), and Linetta (1925).64
When they married, Alonzo (twenty-four) and Albert (twenty-six)
seemed opposites. She was a Baptist, he a member of the African Methodist
Episcopal Church (AME); she college educated (having studied at Branch
Normal School in Pine Bluff for two years), he grade-school literate; she out-
going, dominant, sometimes high tempered and hard edged, he reserved,
easygoing, a "very nice man." Yet they complemented each other, and their
faith ran deep: Alonzo came from a family of preachers, and Albert taught
Sunday school.65 They attended services regularly in Gethsemane, their
churches and their Christianity divided only by the pavement of Highway
31. They also balanced each other in the secular world. She taught school
throughout the area, and he read the newspaper every evening. She as a
teacher and he as a farmer, they both contributed to the family upkeep—as
did their children, who helped Albert raise cotton for cash, corn and hay for
livestock, and vegetables for food. And they both had a say in major finan-
cial dealings, though Alonzo did the negotiating.66
Most significant, they cooperated as parents. They permitted their chil-
dren to choose between the Baptist and Methodist faiths, revealing neither
personal disappointment nor marital difficulties as each child joined
Alonzo's church. They established house rules together and closed ranks on
discipline, though Alonzo served as the lone enforcer until the boys became
so big that whipping them required Albert's assistance. As in business deal-
ings, they played different roles according to their personalities.67
In Gethsemane the Watsons enjoyed a reputation as "one of the most
respected families." Alonzo and Albert labored hard, feared God, and meshed
well with their neighbors. Though neither wealthy nor prominent, they drew
status from her land ownership—Alonzo, many knew, would add to her
holdings with the inheritance of thirty-seven acres of Woolfolk property—
and professon: she came into contact with numerous families, teaching sev-
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Alonzo and Albert Watson, with two of their children, James and
Linetta, in 1942. Courtesy of Linetta Watson Koonce.
eral grades in one-room schools, for many years on the Gilliand Plantation.68
Alonzo's own children also mixed well. Like their peers, they worked in
the fields, attended church and school, and enjoyed their free time. The boys
hunted, fished, and played baseball; the girls watched the games or played
jacks. Both went swimming in warm weather, when the boys also stole wa-
termelons or engaged in other high jinks. In the colder months school pro-
grams provided some entertainment, as did church socials, concerts, and
Christmas observances. Occasionally everyone, including adults, watched a
movie in Altheimer, separated from white patrons by only an aisle.69 Older
teenagers and young adults enjoyed more leeway. Perhaps they "barrel-
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housed," gathering spontaneously for some home brew, music, and danc-
ing. In contrast, married couples attended more formal affairs such as birth
parties and fish fries. Given the absence of speakeasies in the area, blacks
created their own social outlets beyond home, church, and school.70
Still, strict rules applied to dating. Mothers, like slave women before
them, belied the myth of black promiscuity and endeavored to slow down
boy-girl relationships. Even when walking to church, they admonished their
daughters to stay within sight: "Sister, I can't see you."71 Girls did not date
until sixteen years of age, when boys could visit them in their homes under
"the watchful ear" of parents. At seventeen they enjoyed much more free-
dom, stepping out with boyfriends to a school play or accompanying them
to basketball games in Altheimer, Humphrey, and Pine Bluff. Those with
access to an automobile took rides or, against parental dictate, attended house
parties.72
Serious courting occurred in the upper teens, culminating in marriage
as early as age eighteen for girls and twenty-one for boys. Couples wanting
to marry earlier were limited by parental influence and economic reality:
hence the usual three-year age discrepancy between brides and grooms. Girls
who married before their eighteenth birthdays usually did so because of
pregnancy and because their lovers consented freely to matrimony or were
pressured into it. Where boys refused to enter wedlock, however, pregnant
girls were shunned by nonfamily members of the community. Separated
from their age group and sheltered by their parents, they wore loose-fitting
clothing to conceal their condition. But once they gave birth, all was for-
given; the family expressed joy; the neighbors, acceptance. Young mothers
of illegitimate children now associated with wives and mothers usually older
than themselves. They also dated again, many marrying without stigma in-
dividuals other than the fathers of their children. Illegitimacy thus revealed
double standards, family love, and community tolerance.
In contrast, interracial dating and miscegenation was unacceptable for
either teenagers or adults. Both races considered this intimacy the major
taboo. Some parents lectured their children on the subject; others never ap-
proached it directly, but all children understood its gravity. Boys, in particu-
lar, were taught "how far to step" and sometimes frightened by the possibility
of overstepping into a lynching. "I didn't even want to get close to a white
woman," recalled one Gethsemane youth.73
In the home of Alonzo and Albert, Cleo and his siblings also learned
how to lead productive lives. Alonzo constantly encouraged them to "hold
your head up, you can be anything that you want." They lived under a rigid
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set of rules that stressed obedience, accountability, and religiosity. Everyone
ate together and returned home by sundown unless on a date (for which
the boys enjoyed later curfews); everyone attended Sunday church services
and participated in a revival once or twice a year. Family members stayed in
prayer meetings until adjournment; no one left early. As they grew older, if
they decided to forgo a worship service, they were confined to the house.
Alonzo and Albert also discouraged gossip, shared few secrets with their
children, and imposed rigid discipline.74
For the first eighteen years of his life, Cleo thrived in this atmosphere.
He related well to his brothers and sisters, despite age differences and occa-
sional rivalries. He attended church regularly, completed the eighth grade,
and learned to tap dance and play the piano.75 He excelled as a pitcher whose
fast ball, according to catcher James Walker, could "knock a mitt off your
hand!" Cleo's Gethsemane team defeated the likes of Wabbaseka and Dudley
Lake. They played hard, inciting curses and fist fights that kept their games
off limits to younger teens.76
Beyond his athletic talent, Cleo seemed ordinary for Gethsemane dur-
ing the period between the Great War and the Great Depression. His family
and friends considered him friendly, pleasant, and trusting. He accepted
people easily and made friends quickly, which sometimes led to disappoint-
ment and confrontations. He was never a bully, but if provoked or ridiculed
he made his tormentors "pay the price." He backed down from no one, ex-
hibiting a fierce temper and muscular physique that few dared to challenge.
Yet he held no grudges.77
More than to anyone else, Cleo looked up to Wiley. Eight years older,
his half-brother had completed ninth grade, had an easygoing personality
and a temper. He could be "pretty mean"; though he did not look for fights,
he never permited himself to be pushed around. Still, he would do almost
anything for friends. He enjoyed barrelhousing and gained the reputation
of a fancy dresser and playboy. In time, he became disenchanted with fam-
ily rules and his stepfather. Believing that Albert Watson treated him differ-
ently from the other children, he left home at age seventeen to live in St. Louis
with his uncle Caleb Woolfolk.78
That occurred in 1925, when Cleo was nine years old. Seven years after
this he quit school, saying later that he had to work with Albert because of
the Depression. Cleo also began dating, however; he developed a fondness
for older women and thus needed additional income at a time when few
males in his world valued schooling and when he sought more distance from
his well-educated mother. Given his new-found independence, he chafed
Autopsy 83
under her admonitions. Like Wiley, albeit for reasons of personal freedom
more than of personal rejection, and probably because of Alonzo more than
Albert, he left home; in 1934 he went to a Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC) Camp.79
Cleo came back, though, and for several weeks in the summer of 1935
found himself reunited with Wiley. His half-brother had returned a convicted
felon. After living for a number of years in St. Louis, he had struck out for
Detroit, where—in the depressed economy of September 1930—he broke
into a store and served five years of a fifteen-year sentence before making
parole.80 Back in Gethsemane, Wiley related better than ever to Cleo, their
respective ages of twenty-seven and nineteen enabling them to share expe-
riences that had been impossible when Cleo was younger.
Having few choices, Wiley moved back into the Watson home. He came
to an understanding with his compassionate stepfather and mother which,
of course, required Wiley—an adult and a carouser—to live by the rules. The
toughest was that anyone out after curfew stayed out until the next morn-
ing; hence, though he kept his clothes in the house, he came and went every
two or three days in order to avoid a middle-of-the-night confrontation with
his parents. "More or less freeloading," he still found time for Cleo. He also
carried a gun and on one occasion drew it during an argument with his half-
brother. Under these circumstances, Alonzo worried about her elder son's
influence on the younger.81
It was likely through Wiley's experience that Cleo understood what
home life held for him and decided to break away permanently. On Septem-
ber 3,1935, he enlisted for four years in the U.S. Navy, specifying a desire to
travel and begin a military career. Designated Mess Attendant 3d Class, he
reported to the Naval Training Station at Norfolk, Virginia, and then the Na-
val Hospital at Portsmouth, Virginia. In mid-October he became ill and re-
turned to Norfolk. There he slept on duty, refused to obey orders, and
received "five days of solitary confinement on bread and water." Neverthe-
less, he completed his training in mid-December and reported to the USS
Wyoming. Cleo's ordeal was not over, however: from February 7 to 9 he lost
three days "on account of sickness due to [his] own misconduct"; on March
1 he disregarded orders and again dined on bread and water for three days;
and immediately following that punishment he received an undesirable dis-
charge for "reason of unfitness."82 Ironically, he had discovered military rules
to be as stifling as those of Alonzo and Albert. Rather than finding more
liberation in the service, he found naval commanders who deemed him im-
mature and dashed his dream.83
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Cleo hardly noticed that his undesirable discharge was less serious than
a dishonorable one, which would have required a general court-martial.84
He wrongly believed himself to have been released without honor and in
March 1936 cared only about returning to Arkansas. There he continued his
quest for independence, choosing to live in Pine Bluff, where he found work
as a truck driver. He visited his family on holidays but rarely stayed over-
night—though he and Wiley, who still resided in the family home, spent time
together despite their twenty-mile separation.85
Just as it appeared that Cleo might turn his life around, he found him-
self unemployed.86 Increasingly, he visited with Wiley, and the two brothers,
along with William Moorehead and Bob Johnson, robbed a store in
Wabbaseka. Moorehead remained in the car while Cleo, Bob, and Wiley en-
tered Beye's grocery in the late evening of May 9,1937, and, without using
force, took $80. Needing money but bearing no animus toward the Chinese
proprietor, they held him up during store hours and without wearing masks.
They proved themselves doubly foolish if they also believed that Beye's race
would dissuade white authorities from hunting for them.87
Wiley was identified within days—possibly with planter assistance—and
arrested the following Sunday at the Gethsemane Baptist Church. He told
Altheimer and Pine Bluff lawmen where to find the loot, shocking Alonzo
and Albert when a search revealed that hiding place to be their smokehouse!
He astounded them even more by fingering Cleo as an accomplice. Why he
named his half- brother but neither cousin Moorehead nor friend Johnson
puzzled everyone in the family, particularly Alonzo, who experienced "a
double force of grief."88
Indeed, Alonzo had suffered much in recent months. On January 29 she
had lost sixteen-year-old Alice, named in honor of Albert's sister, to pneu-
monia (following an appendectomy). That bereavement, combined with the
belief that Wiley dragged Cleo into the crime and then identified him for
authorities, resulted in Alonzo's refusal to aid her eldest son. She had mort-
gaged the family homestead seven years earlier in a vain effort to prevent
him from going to prison in Michigan. This time, with Albert's assistance,
she concentrated on saving Cleo.89
On the evening of Wiley's apprehension, Albert and Alonzo's brother
John Woolfolk visited Pine Bluff to warn Cleo—only to find themselves be-
hind bars alongside Wiley, accused of assisting the younger thief to escape.
Soon released, they returned to Gethsemane. Wiley pleaded guilty to high-
way robbery and, given his record and parole violation, drew a seven-year
term at the Cumins State Farm in Gould.90 He paid for the crime alone, never
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mentioning Moorehead or Johnson. Only Cleo felt "so hot" that he quick-
stepped to Missouri."
In Sikeston he began a new life as Cleo Wright (an alias to fool officials).
His clumsy attempt to steal a pistol from the state police commander's car
that September revealed the anxiety of a novice on the run. Twenty-one years
old, unemployed, alone, and influenced by Wylie's gun-toting example, Cleo
sought a weapon for protection and perhaps self-confidence. His awkward
theft of the cash box came three months after his marriage to Ardella in Feb-
ruary 1940, when he was jobless again and feeling greater responsibilities.
Freed after six months, he lived an exemplary life for several months before
suddenly becoming a monster.
Only Cleo's wife sensed radical change in his behavior, but without re-
alizing its portent. Near the end of his parole, in December 1941 he began
coming home in the wee small hours. He claimed to be frequenting pool
halls, but she suspected him of running with women.92 Equally revealing, in
responding to the request "State any difficulties you face" in his final proba-
tion report that same month, Cleo pleaded: "Please at once, let me know
what I'm suppose to do now. My time is up Jan. 3rd."93 Plainly, he received
no instructions, for his behavior became more unpredictable in the follow-
ing weeks and included casing the white neighborhoods south of the oil mill.
Finally, on Saturday, January 24, he left home in the afternoon, though his
shift did not begin until 10:00 P.M. He appeared at Farmers Cafe that evening,
reported for work on time, learned of his shift's cancellation, and disappeared
for nearly three hours before striking the Sturgeon home. Cleo's aggression
seemed impromptu and sober, yet it erupted from deep-seated frustration
and escalating resentment that fostered a predilection, if not a precise date,
for destruction.
Indeed, his savagery marked both transmogrification94 and the abrupt
end of a short-lived life in search of itself. His journey had taken him from
rural Arkansas to small-town Missouri, through four distinct stages of de-
velopment: country boy, struggling teenager, troubled youth, and desperate
young adult. Shaped by the interaction—and inherent contradictions—of
an achieving family and a limiting racial milieu, his situation ultimately
proved unbearable. Unlike thousands of other young black males born into
a southern society that denied their very manhood, he snapped under its
weight.
From birth to age eighteen, Cleo experienced both idyllic and stressful
circumstances. He enjoyed a close-knit, successful family—educated mother,
religious father, loving siblings—and an equally cohesive black community.
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Encouraged to succeed by parental example and conversation, he also faced
house rules that every brother and sister deemed too rigid. Unlike James,
the youngest male, whose quiet personality resembled that of his father,
Cleo—like Wiley—challenged the strictures.95 He rebelled against lessons
that taught survival in a racist society and, in the process of building char-
acter and shaping citizenry, also stifled his humanity and—increasingly—
his masculinity. Thus his defiance of rules, especially as a teenager, became
an assertion of individualism and manhood. So did his reputation both as
a fast ball pitcher and as someone never to cross, "an idealization of per-
sonal violence" that drew admiration in rural southern communities.96 Per-
haps his attraction to older women revealed further a desire for recognition
as a mature male.
Joining the conservation corps and, more decisively, the navy, Cleo dis-
closed an even greater longing for freedom. He knew that remaining in
Gethsemane meant stifling home rules, arduous work for room and board,
and little opportunity for self-fulfillment.97 Possibly inspired by Wiley's ex-
ample, he left home, only to discover in military life—as Wiley had in Michi-
gan—more intolerable and depersonalized conditions; his misconduct
brought familiar punishment from offended superiors.
Cleo returned to Arkansas in 1936, still determined to succeed on his
terms. He ran with Wiley but pursued his own dream, only to have it dashed
by unemployment. In the face of this final setback, brought on by a depressed
economy that dogged the crucial decade of his coming of age, he crossed—
for the first time—the legal line and joined Wiley in highway robbery. He
succumbed to his devotion to Wiley, whom Alonzo judged the "rotten
apple."98 Cleo certainly looked up to his half-brother: the older, self-assured,
gun-carrying, sharp-dressing lady's man who openly defied parents and
authorities and, even though jobless, steadfastly refused to work the family
farm. As his own world collapsed, Cleo embraced Wiley's deviance. More
than younger brother having been led astray by older brother, however, they
shared very similar responses to their very similar upbringing: namely, re-
bellion against the peasant life expected of them and the struggle for man-
hood in a restrictive home and society. As their experiences intersected in
the spring of 1937, Cleo saw himself in Wiley—in part because his urban
environment accelerated changes in his self-perception and his expectation
for race relations. Unable to reconcile with either the world of his parents
or the wider one of Pine Bluff, he reverted once again to disobedience. In
this context, he joined Wiley to steal from the Chinese merchant.99
Cleo's experiences, like Wiley's, signaled more than insolence and, in
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Sikeston's urbanlike if not urbanized setting, became full-blown defiance.
Beyond the problems at home, he battled racism. While his naval record fails
to specify what orders he disobeyed or whether his actions were a response
to race-baiting officers, as was likely then, Cleo's thefts in the Bootheel did
bear racial connotations. He endeavored to pilfer the highway patrol
commander's pistol and money from the employer who laid him off, risky
expressions of resentment and revenge toward white authority. More point-
edly, shortly before his assault on Sturgeon, he had indicated preferring ar-
rest "by a colored officer" rather than a white lawman. That he never had
been known to challenge the caste system while in Arkansas accentuated the
significance of his evolving racial animus.100
Even more provocative, between criminal acts he struck at the caste
system's core in 1939 by establishing a sexual relationship—the greatest of
taboos—with a white woman. Again, he acted "out of character" and broke
with his past.101 In Arkansas, he had dated black females and "never went to
the other side of the fence"; he knew well that a black man caught with a
white paramour "wouldn't have the chance of a rabbit."102 That he gambled
with his life in such a liaison signified, like his escalating theft of white prop-
erty, movement through a range of emotions—rage, anger, and hatred—to-
ward hostile and violent behavior.'03
On the eve of his attack on Grace Sturgeon, Cleo stood teetering be-
tween southern traditions that pitted—especially for men—servility against
antisocial behavior.104 Thus far, like all black males, he had experienced in-
consistencies in parental teachings: love that fostered obedience and crushed
"aggressive styles" in a white world; ambition that limited success accord-
ing to white proscription; caution that engendered fear of but dependency
on white people.105 Hence, for most of his life Cleo had worn a mask of de-
ception, which slipped—for example, in the navy—when its slavishness be-
came too heavy. Always in the past he had reassumed the masquerade, most
successfully in Sikeston where neither blacks nor whites sensed his bitter-
ness; always in the past he had begun anew the struggle to step out of his
assigned "place" and find himself. Suddenly, in December of 1941, he real-
ized that whites, whether in Gethsemane or Sikeston, would never permit
him to be human "except in rejection, rebellion, and aggression."106
Cleo's mask became oppressive as the self-hatred inherent in a life of
subservience finally overwhelmed his drive for manhood. His forced migra-
tion and repeated jail terms subverted his efforts to succeed: instant flight
delivered him from the clutches of Arkansas lawmen but consigned him to
racial restrictions, marginal economics, and personal limitations in Sikeston;
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county and state prison terms forced him to focus on his immediate mis-
fortunes and bleak future in Missouri.107 Married to young Ardella, about
to become a father, and working long hours at the oil mill, he was an ex-
convict living close to in-laws and in a segregated society. He wanted much
more at the very moment that his obligations became most weighty and his
status most devalued. If shame involves a sense of failure and loneliness, he
expressed both, simultaneously seeking directions from the parole board and
distance from Ardella.108 By entering Sturgeon's home, Cleo as much as ad-
mitted failure.
Cleo's sister Linetta suspected that he smarted at failing to live up to the
standards set for him by Alonzo and, less assuredly, Albert.109 He identified
more with his mother, who with her "desperate love" of rules and corporal
punishment—like devoted black mothers before and after her—sought to
prepare him for survival.110 He knew, too, that Alonzo's life "set the emo-
tional tone" for his own life, again much as the lives of her counterparts had
done for other sons throughout the South.111 Perhaps for these reasons, he
joined Alonzo's church and seriously considered marrying someone like her:
a woman older than himself who taught school at Gilliand.112 In time,
Alonzo's domineering personality and Albert's powerless presence, both as
a father and as a black man, combined to chase Wiley out of the home and
drive Cleo to Wiley as his model. Concurrently, he tried to deliver on his
mother's teachings and his own freedom, only to be frustrated by personal
immaturity in the navy and economic depression in Pine Bluff.
On the run in Sikeston, he kept in touch with Alonzo and continued to
find strength in their mutual "truly worthwhile acts." He attended the fu-
neral of her mother, Grandma Lucy Woolfolk, during the winter of 1938 and
returned the following summer with Ardella. In turn, Alonzo visited him in
1941, and between these reunions they exchanged letters; she also corre-
sponded with his bride and mother-in-law.113 Even after landing in the peni-
tentiary, Cleo articulated his mother's lifelong influence, desiring further
education and impressing officials; he wanted to complete high school and
projected a cooperative attitude, some initiative, and "fair" morals.114 A year
and a half before turning from thief to assailant, he still dreamed of per-
sonal deliverance from a demanding family and a bigoted society.
Cleo's aspirations clashed not only with his upbringing but with un-
ending race barriers. Given his earlier failures and the botched robbery that
resulted in Wiley's incarceration, he had arrived in Sikeston with "some re-
alistic paranoia." His bitterness grew in the face of hard times, further law-
breaking, and prison sentences; though he never manifested psychopathic
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symptoms, living in an urban environment accentuated his anomie, loneli-
ness, and racial conflict. Of normal intelligence, he struggled with self-im-
age and societal strictures yet remained fairly stable until the very end.115
Then he exploded in an act of violence, stemming from his personal failure
in a racist system, which for a moment probably seemed "psychologically
liberating" and physically empowering.116 At that instant his life changed
drastically.
So did that of Grace Sturgeon. Born twenty-nine years earlier on Sep-
tember 25,1912, in Marston, Missouri, the daughter of Golda Jane Haynes
and Charles Franklin Skalsky, she had grown up in New Madrid County with
brothers Harold and Orville and sister Millie. Her mother came from Rec-
tor, Arkansas, and her father from Daviess County, Kentucky, respectively
from Irish-Indian Kentuckians and German Jewish immigrants. Her father
farmed 280 rented acres of land; he employed two hired hands in the sum-
mer and several pickers in the fall. Family members pitched in to raise "a
yard full of chickens, hogs, geese, ducks, and turkeys"; they killed their own
meat, grew their own vegetables, and enjoyed "plenty to eat" but made little
money.117
Raised by poorly educated but "loving parents," Grace received both
secular and religious teaching. She attended schools at Conran, Kewanee,
and Matthews, completing the eleventh grade, as did her sister; her broth-
ers advanced through ninth grade. She had embraced her mother's and
father's Baptist faith yet worshiped at the Methodist Church, the only avail-
able meeting house in the neighborhood. There she participated in church
socials but also enjoyed hearing the music and watching couples dance at
"play parties."
Grace too learned about race. Living in the upper Bootheel, which ex-
perienced fierce economic competition along racial lines in Marston and a
lynching in New Madrid at the beginning of the twentieth century, she came
of age in a rural society characterized by white paternalism and black sub-
servience.118 She noticed little outward tension, recalling that a nearly blind
black man sometimes worked for her father, at the same dollar-a-day wage
paid white laborers, and played the piano at white dances; he was one of the
few blacks residing in the area. Whether permanent or transient, the chil-
dren of black parents attended a segregated school. Grace knew, moreover,
that those who came in for the harvest were known as "cotton picking
niggers," reputed to be lazy, guileful, and in need of a firm hand.
Perhaps in part because of these racial attitudes, Grace considered her-
self less than handsome. Though no one ever cast aspersions on her appear-
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ance, which was, in fact, appealing, she was conscious of her coal black hair,
brown eyes, and especially dark complexion. As a very young child she
mourned the equally dark-headed youngest sister who had died in infancy;
she had named Carletta Marie and admired her light skin. Similarly, she
thought Millie better looking than herself despite the freckles that accom-
panied her red hair and, most favorably, fair coloring.119
In addition to an aversion to black people, Grace learned about sex. Her
mother warned that men, especially those with "slick tongues," were capable
of getting young girls in trouble. Given the racial order and its open
condemnation of miscegenation, these maternal cautions, surprisingly,
transmitted no special fears about black males, though Grace, of course, com-
prehended the supremacist credo that white teenagers like herself should
never "get connected" with black men. Nor did she receive explicit lessons
about intercourse and pregnancy. Shooed from overhearing female gossip
and from observing barnyard births, she nevertheless understood the con-
cern about rape. She took her mother's frequent admonition "Watch your
corners!" to mean that "there could be harm."
In 1929 Grace carried these beliefs into Sikeston when, forced to leave
the farm because her father became ill, the family moved to Ruth Street. She
matured quickly as the oldest sibling at sixteen and, along with her sister,
found employment at the International Shoe Company doing piecework for
Depression wages. While they contributed much-needed income to the fam-
ily, their mother cared for her school-age sons and declining husband. After
Grace's father died at the age of fifty-three in 1932, the Skalsky family re-
mained a close-knit one.
In the early 1930s Grace accompanied her recently converted mother
to the Church of God of Prophecy, where she met J. Dillard Sturgeon. She
married him in 1932, moved to 847 Kathleen Avenue, and in 1933 converted
to Prophecy and gave birth to James Dillard. She named Jimmy after his
twenty-three-year-old father, the son of Roberta Waters and Simeon Stur-
geon, who had grown up in Sikeston with siblings John, Charles, Ralph,
Donald, Nina, and Fannie May. Grace must have seen in Dillard qualities
that she possessed, those of a quiet, gentle person. She admired most his deep
religiosity and scriptural knowledge, which he expressed easily as a result of
having completed the eighth grade in Sikeston and attended Bible school in
St. Louis; perhaps, too, she related to his being the grandson of a Baptist
minister. Grace in turn touched the core of Dillard, who described their re-
lationship as "a lifelong romance." When she met him, however, he was re-
cuperating from a traffic accident that ended his bible studies, boxing career,
Autopsy 91
Jimmy, J. Dillard, and Grace Sturgeon in 1942. Courtesy of Michael L. Jensen.
and truck-driving job. Thereafter, he found work with the Scott County
Milling Company, Works Progress Administration, and finally the local ar-
mory.120
Sturgeon's affiliation with Company K aided him in becoming caretaker
of the drill center, located on U.S. 61 between Matthews and Kathleen, within
three blocks of his home. There, during the last days of the Depression, he
taught Jimmy to clean rifles or gave him the run of the building. He also
trained older boys for Golden Gloves competition, empathizing with those
who shared his religious beliefs or impoverished upbringing. And despite
the segregation of Sikeston, he permitted Jimmy to converse with black
sharecropper children living in the fields below Kathleen Avenue.
Having risen to the rank of supply sergeant, which resulted in everyone
calling him "Sarge," Dillard also personified Company K. Assigned to Camp
Robinson, Arkansas, in early 1941, he served as personal adviser to several
guardsmen and informal spokesperson for their unit. He assisted younger
enlistees—sometimes as outright ghostwriter—with family letters or news-
paper stories, and became popular as secretary of the regimental chapel and
one of five of its choir members from Company K.121 Predictably, when Ja-
pan bombed Pearl Harbor, family members and friends called Grace for in-
formation about the future of their loved ones; they trusted Sarge's
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interpretation of events more than that of their own men. Before the "day
of infamy," however, Grace and Jimmy stayed in contact with Dillard. They
journeyed to Little Rock six or seven times throughout the year—as often
as possible given the family's limited income— riding the bus or traveling
with the sisters of other guardsmen. Dillard wrote letters, called periodically,
and visited when he could; at home he assisted Grace and "rolled all over
the yard" with Jimmy. On the afternoon of December 7 he called, finally
getting through telephone lines abuzz with anxious conversations and veri-
fying Company K's orders to depart almost immediately for the West Coast:
Bakersfield, California.
Grace adjusted to wartime sacrifices in Sikeston, believing that she and
Jimmy could survive. Their situation eased in early 1942 when Laverne Stur-
geon, wife of Sarge's brother John, moved into the Kathleen Avenue home.
During the previous year she had met John at the Second Baptist Church in
Little Rock while he too served with Company K at Camp Robinson and
married him after he transferred to the U.S. Army Air Corps at St. Louis.
Laverne accompanied John to Scott Field in Bellville, Illinois, but they soon
found themselves separated by the events at Pearl Harbor; he reported to
Savannah, Georgia, and she stayed for a time with his parents at their farm
near Blodgett, Missouri.122 Not liking it there, Laverne found a job in Sikeston
and arranged to live with her sister-in-law.123 '
Although younger than Grace by six and a half years, Laverne also came
from a rural background. She had lived on a farm near Prescott, in south-
west Arkansas, with two sisters and their father and mother, James Blant
Willson and Minnie Baker. She never knew her mother well; Minnie was a
victim of stomach cancer very early in Laverne's life. Soon she found her-
self being raised by James's second wife in Hope. She came to love Alice Ward
and adapted easily to life in the small town, where her father operated a fur-
niture business and farmed in the area. Raised a Baptist in "a very strict home,
a very good home," she graduated from high school and beauty school in
Little Rock.124
Having left the Prescott farm at age seven, Laverne nevertheless absorbed
the racial beliefs of her father and mother, as well as her stepmother, whose
parents had owned slaves. She recalled a segregated, personable society of
landowning whites like her father—an Arkansas native—and sharecropping
blacks; she spoke with black "old ladies" and experienced neither fear nor
tension. Even as a small child, however, she was "not close" to black children
and recalled no interracial activities other than sitting together at revivals.
In time, she learned the paramount taboo against dating across the color
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Laverne Sturgeon in 1942.
Courtesy of Michael L. Jensen.
line. Though not given to derogatory language like "nigger," she wanted noth-
ing to do with blacks.
Laverne's sister-in-law's house in Sikeston was located on the far east
side. A small frame dwelling—kitchen and dining room in the back, bed-
room and living room facing the street—with one rear door and two front
entrances that opened onto a porch, 847 Kathleen anchored the southwest
corner of that unlit road and Pine Street, which ran north for a quarter-mile
to intersect with U.S. 60 directly across from the Sikeston Cotton Oil Mill.
It was within walking distance of the armory, due west, and a quarter-mile
from Grace's and Laverne's jobs on Greer Avenue, two blocks north. Though
in a sparsely settled area, the Sturgeon house occupied the same side of the
street as the Whittleys', separated only by a vacant lot. It faced the home of
Grace's grandmother, eater-corner across the street, and lay one block south
of her own mother's place on Matthews Avenue. Out back, beyond a hand-
ful of homes on Gladys Avenue, stretched farmland occupied by black share-
croppers, while east, across Pine, there was pasture.125
Isolation characterized wartime life for everyone in Sikeston, including
the Sturgeons, who worked long hours and rarely socialized. They rose early,
Grace getting Jimmy ready for school and herself off to work by 7:00 A.M.,
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leaving him at her grandmother's until classes began, and returning to col-
lect him sometime after 5:30 P.M.; Laverne opened the Powder Puff Beauty
Shop an hour later in the morning but stayed until eight o'clock for evening
customers. Both women worked more than five days a week and generally
walked to and from their jobs, though Laverne took a cab during inclement
weather. While Grace awaited Laverne's arrival in the evening, she washed
and hung out clothes, or ironed them. Grace attended church services on
Wednesday night and sometimes worked half-days on Saturday, but only
Sunday provided a day of rest and family get-together: morning worship,
midday dinner, afternoon leisure, evening rest.126
January 24 began as a routine Saturday. After breakfast, Grace left Jimmy
with her grandmother and went to the shoe factory until 11:00 A.M. Back at
home, she ate a light lunch and cleaned house, scrubbing the front porch as
the last chore on a pretty, sunny, unusually warm day. She visited with her
mother and an aunt from Michigan, remembering the day as the eve of the
tenth anniversary of her father's death. After they left, Grace prepared sup-
per and waited for Laverne, who was working a full shift that day. Later she
helped Jimmy with a lesson, took a bath, and wrote to Dillard, while Laverne
turned in early. By 10:30 P.M., everyone was under the covers and soon "sound
asleep."
Grace awoke to the noise of someone tampering with the back door and,
thirty minutes later, to the sound of the intruder raising her bedroom win-
dow. Everything imploded: he entered, cursed, slashed, and retreated; Grace
bled all over her house and her porch, cleaned so immaculately a few hours
hours earlier; Laverne ran through the rooms, screamed into the phone, and
scurried across the street; Jimmy awoke, was riveted to his cot by fright, and
then brought to life by the sight of his wounded mother. Mercifully, the vio-
lence ended almost as quickly as it had begun, and later that morning Grace's
blood and Jimmy's footprints through it also disappeared under the scrub
brushes of several neighbors.127 But their trauma and Laverne's remained
forever, periodically brought forth by images and sounds of what many be-
lieved had begun as an attempted rape.
In fact, Cleo Wright fit many characteristics of most modern sexual as-
sailants: attractive, young, married, of average intelligence, respected by
neighbors (and prominent whites); he also possessed a criminal record,
seemed insecure during the weeks before the assault, acted on a weekend,
and, significantly, planned his moves in advance.128
Several incidents shortly before the assault led the Sturgeons, their neigh-
bors, and lawmen to conclude that Cleo had been watching the house "for
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some time."129 One woman had seen a black man run across her yard; an-
other reported having been grabbed by a black man near her outhouse; oth-
ers purportedly observed him in several different places; and Assistant Police
Chief Wallace announced that Cleo's footprints indicated he had prowled
the vicinity. Despite the absence of positive identification, few now doubted
that "the Negro" in every instance was Cleo.130
Certainly Grace and Laverne later believed that Cleo had tried more than
once to enter their home. The Thursday evening before his breakin, the rear
screen door had slammed shut, and the next day Laverne found "big foot-
prints out back." Though Grace initially thought that a dog had run against
the door, Laverne considered loading a shotgun for protection, but she dis-
missed the idea for fear Jimmy and his friends would hurt themselves. And
of course, on the night of the assault, Grace heard noises at the back door
thirty minutes before Cleo appeared in the bedroom window.131
In all probability, Cleo somehow came into contact with Grace or
Laverne and followed her home. Each woman denied ever having met him,
but Grace recalled three black males, middle-aged and younger, who walked
down her street in the early mornings and late afternoons, presumably to
and from the oil mill—though this seemed far afield for Cleo's normal route
to work. Grace suggested, too, that perhaps he had seen Laverne in the
beauty shop, one block south of Malone Avenue, which he did travel to
work.132
Laverne believed that Cleo found Grace "all by herself" in the late after-
noons and spied on her from the back lot.133 But Grace remembered that
about a week before the attack Laverne thought she had been followed two
or three times through the armory park. One wintry night she heard some-
body behind her and "tried to run." She never saw anyone, male or female,
black or white, but neighbor Glenda Whittley agreed that "that's who the
man was after": Laverne's late working hours and solitary walks home had
caught Cleo's eye.134
In this way, like later rapists, Cleo apparently mustered courage for his
plan to attack. More than simply having watched the Sturgeon home, he
seems to have stalked Laverne and approached her home more than once;
doing so with impunity bolstered his confidence, and—assuming he was the
neighborhood prowler—he emboldened himself further by sneaking about
houses, running across back yards, and laying a hand on the woman next
door. That he acted alone, again like most later rapists, required several pre-
paratory acts of bravado.135
If Cleo was seeking Laverne, his plan went awry in the face of Grace's
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unexpected presence. Unlike most adult rapists, he confronted her without
having imbibed much, if any, alcohol and with a weapon common to
younger assailants.136 He unleashed a barrage of threats and obscenities de-
signed to control and demean Grace: the "verbal strategies" of all rapists.
Entering, he said that he intended to kill and, upon seeing Laverne and Grace,
expressed utter surprise: "There are two of you son-of-a-bitches!"137 He con-
tinued to curse as Grace absorbed his physical charge and turned his psy-
chological abuse to her advantage, repeating to herself, mantralike, that he
would not kill her. Cleo probably felt betrayed, having so completely mis-
read his prey, and certainly felt trapped in the grasp of Grace, who held onto
her life; he fought savagely until a car backfire sent him scurrying. Though
lacking the history of violence that characterizes most rapists, his street
brawls, his reputation as a punishing opponent, and his search for manhood
prepared him for this very moment when the drawing of blood came easily.
What began as an attempted rape escalated to assault but fell just short
of murder. Cleo did not evince the characteristics of a sex killer: one who
chokes his victim, engages in sadism, and suffers from sexual dysfunction.
He chose a stranger rather than an acquaintance to attack, as rapists and sex
killers often do, but nothing indicated an original desire on his part to slay;
indeed, he flashed his knife only after entering the house. Even then, Cleo's
repeated death threats came forth as predictable terrorist chatter rather than
final sentence—at least until Grace repulsed his initial assault. Within hours
of his having slashed her and Perrigan, he revealed an intention short of tak-
ing life; entering the hospital for first aid, he exclaimed (or so Grace con-
tended years later): "Oh God, I did not mean to kill them!"138 That Cleo
blamed his actions on alcohol disclosed further the alibi of a rapist rather
than a rape murderer.139
Like that of most historical figures, Cleo's motivation can be analyzed
only through his behavior. His response to racist barriers and personal dif-
ficulties revealed contradictions that were both independent of and linked
to one another; they reached back to slavery and, like more acceptable forms
of accommodation and resistance, "arose within a complex psychological
framework."140 Struggling in a one-sided relationship that accentuated white
power, fostered black resentment, and ultimately confirmed his own failure,
Cleo evolved from aspiring black youth to "bad nigger" and turned his ni-
hilistic rage on Grace.141
Initially, Cleo's resentment manifested itself in the seduction of white
women. His love affair with a Sikeston woman in 1939 corresponded with
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his nonviolent, masked personality. His alleged rape of the St. Louis teen-
ager a couple of years later, true or not, would have been consistent with the
shift toward the greater fury and consequent risk-taking that drove him to
steal from a former employer. After his stay in prison, his repressed impulses
broke through. He became more angry and intrepid; his attack on Grace
completed the emotional journey of endeavoring to be a black man in a white
society by violating one of its women. Cleo advanced from taking property
to figuratively stealing the one human object that every southern male had
been taught to place on a pedestal.142
Surely Cleo's genuine relationship with a Sikeston housewife and assault
on Grace indicated the intensity of that idealization. He, like most black
males, confronted the greatest contradiction in black-white relations: the
double standard that idealized white women and placed them beyond reach
of black men while permitting white men the pick of all females.143 He, like
some black males, ascribed to white women a mystique and found them—
without doubt because of the taboo—"intensely exciting" sexually.144 He, like
very few black males, crossed from a loving relationship—in which he sought
verification of his self-worth (perhaps even prideful conquest)—to a vicious
attack upon the white goddess.145 Thus, on leaving Farmers Cafe, Cleo was
said to have boasted that "he was going to get himself a white woman that
night."146
Cleo struck where he could hurt white men the most. Like that of black
males historically, his aggression, however deviant, stemmed in part from
social injustice and evidenced racial protest. And had he not been captured,
his payback could very possibly have escalated from rape to sex killing.147
His nuclear family, rural upbringing, and small-town living, however, hardly
resembled the urban ghetto experience of oppressed males in more recent
times, with its increasing socialization toward violence.148 Neither normal
nor heroic, Cleo's aberrant behavior should not be stereotyped as represen-
tative of all black men or dismissed as the fanatical exception of a few. Shaped
by variants of racism, it demonstrated anew that viewing women as objects
"fueled racial hostility."149
Cleo's violence occurred in a gender context, yet one never completely
free of racist intrusion. His assault on Grace targeted women generally, com-
bining the characteristics of a power rapist who engages in sexual conquest
as compensation for "feelings of inadequacy" and (much less) of a sadistic
rapist (without the ritualistic cruelty) who seeks revenge by punishing a ran-
dom female. Thus he planned his attack in advance, selected his victim ac-
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cording to her vulnerability, even stalked her, and used force readily. He also
displayed some traits of an anger rapist, who retaliates for imagined wrongs,
especially those by women, and expresses his fury physically and verbally.150
Although it is difficult to type a rapist who failed, Cleo reacted brutally to
Grace's resistance—as anger and sadistic rapists would do—when he may
in fact have intended a sexual conquest. His declaration in the cafe that night
implied as much, and his actions to the point of encountering his victim fit
those of a power rapist—the largest proportion of modern offenders—in
search of his manhood. Whatever his type, Cleo's actions, like those of all
rapists, were triggered by "unresolved conflict." Coming off parole, he seemed
purposeless and emotionally spent—"except for anger."
In fact, the source of Cleo's anger most likely included his parents and,
quite possibly, his wife and in-laws. He chafed under the dominant, over-
protective, sometimes punitive Alonzo and the aloof, largely uninvolved
Albert—though the former never appeared seductive, and neither seemed
cruel.151 He was estranged from Ardella, who accused him of infidelity, prob-
ably argued with him, and definitely "did not want him" in his wounded
condition. Her pregnancy and fear accounted for this behavior, but so must
have the influence of Minnie Gay, who believed "he would die any minute,"
and Richard Gay, who did not want to "stand the expense of burying him."152
Whether or not Ardella hurled racial epithets at Cleo during arguments,
thereby reinforcing his self-hatred, her (and her parents') rejection of him
in life and in death indicated limitations in their relationship. At critical times
in his life, then, he perceived the love of his parents, wife, and in-laws as con-
ditional. Just as racism molded the manner in which he was raised, it also
affected the nature of his marriage. Nevertheless, he attacked a white, not a
black woman, revealing the depths of both his own racial animosity and his
tie to Alonzo; he could not strike his mother or a symbol of her, even in
rage.153
Most provocative, Cleo's origins posed another possible explanation for
his rampage. Born Ricelor Cleodas Watson on June 16, 1916, he changed
his name in 1937 in order to evade the law after robbing the Chinese grocer.
He abbreviated his middle name and combined it with a supposedly ficti-
tious surname, which may have been that of his natural father: "Henry
Wright of Pine Bluff."154 Learning this name from Ardella, federal prosecu-
tors hoped to present the elder Wright's testimony before the St. Louis grand
jury and sent FBI agents in Arkansas to search for him. They followed nu-
merous clues, including the names of Henry Wright, Henry Watson, Cleo
Wright, R.C. Watson, and A.L. Watson. They combed Pine Bluff, Varner, and
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Gould, where they found a postal clerk who recalled handling mail for Henry
Wright and Cleo Wright, but that lead petered out. Finally, through the
Jefferson County jail records of Wiley's conviction for the Beye robbery, they
located Albert Leak Watson.155
In Gethsemane, Albert told FBI investigators that his wife, the mother
of Cleo Wright, had been married to Henry Wright. His testimony was veri-
fied by Alonzo, who elaborated that she had been separated from Cleo's fa-
ther twenty-two years earlier when he lived in Mississippi. She never heard
of his having visited Sikeston; neither Ardella nor Minnie Gay had mentioned
him in their letters. And, with that, bureau officials ended their search, un-
aware of the possibility of Cleo's illegitimacy or the implications that it bore
for the attack on Grace.
Why Albert would deny being the father of Ricelor Cleodas, and why
Alonzo would verify that denial is baffling. Perhaps he preferred to avoid
the agony and embarrassment of traveling numerous miles to bear witness
in an investigation of his son's horrific death. An intensely private, quiet man,
he farmed, attended church, and went into town "if he had to" but rarely
anywhere else; he had never visited or written Cleo. Possibly because of pride
and religious belief, Albert felt disgraced by his son's reputation as a rapist;
ironically, he and Alonzo believed Ricelor guilty as either the spurned lover
or sexual assailant of a white woman. Said Alonzo: "When you do wrong,
wrong will come to you." Together, they kept Ricelor's death from most of
their relatives and neighbors, and forbade their other children to discuss it.156
Nevertheless, if Ricelor was their first-born, Albert's rejection seems
incomprehensible. He had warned Ricelor when police sought him in the
Beye robbery. Hiding Ricelor's identity made sense then, and ignoring him
in Sikeston—except through Alonzo—seems in keeping with Albert's self-
possession, but cold-hearted in the face of a son's lynching. For a father who
treated Ricelor as his own and exhibited little strain in their relationship, he
reacted to him in death more as he had responded to stepson Wiley in life:
when Wiley landed in jail, Albert expressed most concern for Alonzo; when
Ricelor died, he again concentrated on her. Neither Albert nor Alonzo ever
inquired as to Ricelor's cemetery plot, believing that nothing remained of
his burned corpse or, like his own wife and in-laws, that burying his memory
proved more necessary.
Albert's unfatherly response to Ricelor's killing could be explained by
the youth's having been someone else's son. If so, it meant that Alonzo had
an affair and gave birth to Ricelor while married to Albert. Worse yet, if ac-
curate, her statement to the FBI indicated that she had separated from her
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lover, Henry Wright, in 1920, four years after Ricelor's birth and ten years
into her marriage to Albert—in other words, that she and Henry Wright had
shared their attraction for a very long time. Whatever the nature of their
relationship, at least one neighbor claimed years later to have heard a ru-
mor among blacks in the area that Ricelor was the child of Alonzo and an
unnamed fieldhand who lived behind the Watsons and worked land owned
by "ole man McDonald of Altheimer." And Ricelor's very dark complexion
was said to resemble that of his natural father; Albert was much lighter and
possessed straight hair.157
In direct contradiction, Ricelor's surviving sister and their mutual
friends remembered no such scandal. Linetta recalled that Albert treated
Ricelor "like he was his father," no differently from any other child in the
family. She knew of relatives in the area named Wright, most notably Willie
Wright, husband of Alonzo's cousin Lucandia, and his brother Milton Wright,
but no Henry.158 Nor had John Henry Rasberry, backyard neighbor and
grandson of Alonzo's first husband, ever heard gossip that Ricelor belonged
to anyone other than Albert; he considered impossible the idea that Alonzo
had run around, for the Watsons seemed a loving, reputable couple. Others
from Gethsemane and Wabbaseka, themselves unrelated to either Alonzo or
Albert, echoed these opinions.159
Ricelor himself confounded the issue. When he enlisted in the Navy on
September 3, 1935, he named Albert Watson as his father and next of kin,
yet five years later in prison he identified his father as one "George Wright,"
who had died in 1919 at the age of forty-seven; he referred to Albert Watson
as his stepfather.160 Between these revelations, Ricelor married Ardella and
told her and her parents that his father was "Henry Wright": hence the FBI
inquiry.
George or Henry notwithstanding, Ricelor's father seems to have been
Albert Watson. Though Alonzo filed no birth certificate for Ricelor Cleodas
Watson, Cleo Wright, or any combination of those names in either Arkan-
sas or Mississippi, that oversight was hardly unusual for the period or for
rural births attended by midwives; in fact, she officially recorded the birth
only of her youngest child, Linetta, which occurred nine years later.161 And,
significantly, no marriage or divorce records for Alonzo Watson and either
Henry or George Wright were recorded in the Jefferson County Courthouse
from 1906 to 1920, years during which George Wright supposedly died or
Henry Wright presumably separated from Alonzo; only her marriage to
Albert Watson was registered officially. Clearly, the story of George or Henry
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Wright having been the husband of Alonzo was a hoax; if either had fathered
Ricelor, he was illegitimate.162
That legal issue aside, the paternity of Henry or George Wright still ap-
peared suspect. No concrete description exists for the very black-complex-
ioned, younger, transient fieldhand who worked back of the Watson property
but did not stay very long (as Alonzo suggested of Cleo's father), and who
appears incongruous with his rival. And the only George Wright in the area
was dark brown, much smaller, and much older at the time of Ricelor's birth.
He had entered the Gethsemane area at age four with his parents in 1871
and remained a member of its community for the rest of his life, but he was
known neither as having toiled behind Alonzo's homestead nor as someone
whom Ricelor resembled facially and physically—height, weight, build—save
for skin color. Moreover, he came from Georgia, not Mississippi (as Alonzo
implied of Cleo's father). Remembered as a hard-working, law-abiding man,
though one who stayed clear of church, George enjoyed whiskey, tobacco,
and female companionship; still, this diminutive 5'3", forty-nine-year-old
commoner, taught by his father always to be "obedient," hardly seemed a
likely paramour for the younger, dignified, class-conscious Alonzo.163
Moreover, the Watson neighbor who reinforced the allegation of
Ricelor's illegitimacy said that the rumor about the fieldhand had been
launched after the lynching, and he described it in racist terms: "Niggers told
me he looked like his daddy... just as black as tar."164 Less self-serving and
more believable, Ricelor's sister and some of the family's friends doubted
the charge but did not dismiss it out of hand. Linetta confided, "All I can
say is I don't know and I never heard of it."165
Most telling, the chronology and content of Ricelor's and Alonzo's tes-
timony smacked of a poorly rehearsed alibi. Ricelor never claimed anyone
other than Albert as his father until after he fled from Pine Bluff and changed
his name. From then on, he and Wiley protected one another, Wiley not list-
ing him on his own prison survey that year and Ricelor returning the favor
three years later: he acknowledged an unnamed half-brother but lied about
his record.166 Ricelor's telling those same officials that his father was George
Wright—not the Henry Wright that he had earlier identified to Ardella and
that Alonzo later confirmed to FBI agents—disclosed either an error made
by the prison interviewer or evidence of his bogus story. The latter seems
very obvious: he claimed that his father, George Wright, died in 1919 when
he, Ricelor, "was an infant and his mother remarried," whereas Alonzo con-
tended that his father, Henry Wright, separated from her in 1920 and im-
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plied that he was still alive in 1942. Moreover, Ricelor fused parts of Wiley's
experience with his own, telling the interrogator that his early home life had
been "somewhat broken" because of his natural father's death but that his
growing up with a stepfather had been as pleasant as the "lack of financial
means would allow."167 Essentially, Ricelor and Alonzo told variations of the
same tale, a cover for his transgression in Arkansas, which one or both of
them confused for lack of use.
As revealing, Ricelor misspelled his alias in the 1939 letter to his white
lover, identifying himself as "CLEO WRITE [while] there in Sikeston." Spell-
ing the surname phonetically exhibited his limited education; he appears to
have corrected his error only after having been incarcerated in Missouri,
possibly as a result of observing its spelling by prison officials. And, consis-
tent with a person of legitimate birth, he signed the love letter "R.C. Watson,"
thereby disclosing—at considerable risk—his true identity: wanting the
woman he adored to know him for who he really was, as do many people
who believe themselves in love.168
It was probably Alonzo rather than Ricelor, just shy of twenty-one and
still very much influenced by her when he fled Pine Bluff, who concocted
the fable of his father. That she repeated the lie after her son's death exposed
the depths of her grief and embarrassment rather than callousness. And
Albert, given his own shame and sorrow, played along with the fiction,
though he must have found this issue very unsettling, coming nearly six
months after Ricelor's death. And as one who lived rigidly within the dic-
tates of white society, Albert also had reason to fear for himself outside of
Gethsemane: facing white prosecutors, lynchers, policemen, and journalists
miles away would have been a terrifying prospect.
In part, Albert consented to Alonzo's deception because he was Ricelor's
father. He treated Ricelor like James, his other son, but very differently from
Wiley, even though both older boys shared their mother's personality and
looks rather than his own. He recruited Alonzo's brother John, in a classic
example of extended family support, to warn Ricelor that Wiley had identi-
fied him in the Chinese merchant theft; he never assisted Wiley in a compa-
rable way during his troubled youth. His perennial conflict with Wiley, a
stepson, suggests that neither his love for Alonzo nor his religious faith would
have been enough for him to accept an illegitimate son for twenty years.
Perhaps most telling, Albert consented to plans for Ricelor to receive a por-
tion of the family's property on an equal basis with his siblings.169
Ricelor himself acted like a natural son long after having appropriated
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a bogus surname. That he took the alias from Alonzo's side of the family
hardly seemed in keeping with some sudden realization of having been ille-
gitimate and his mother promiscuous; rather, that he selected a sobriquet
protective of Albert and the family's identity suggests the act of a loyal son
and a calculating mother. Thereafter, he visited his parents twice, played host
to Alonzo once in Sikeston, and corresponded with her. Ricelor's family re-
lationships appeared much as they had before 1937: he was somewhat dis-
tant with Albert, very close to Alonzo, and seemingly free of the pain or
resentment of a bastard child.
Alonzo suffered pangs of conscience over Ricelor's death and sought
vindication. She met her brother Caleb in St. Louis, contacted the NAACP,
and considered filing a lawsuit against the police and City of Sikeston. She
never pressed the issue, however, wanting neither a "blood money" settle-
ment nor, most disgraceful, further publicity about the rape charge against
him and the manner in which he died. Having always taken care of the family
business, Alonzo managed the death of her son with little demur from
Albert.170
Tragically and unintentionally, she contributed to Ricelor's undoing.
Inspiring and loving yet hard-nosed and rigid, Alonzo argued with her chil-
dren, tore them up when they did something wrong, and monitored their
futures, for example, permitting Ricelor to enlist in the CCC. She stressed
propriety and respectability, urging her offspring to make something of
themselves, yet she could not parry—much less fully understand— the pres-
sures of racism that so truncated the manhood of Wiley and Ricelor. In the
family matrix of Albert's weakness and Wiley's defiance, Alonzo proved most
influential in the life of Ricelor; consequently, when he failed to reach the
status that she imagined for him and that he strove for, he held her respon-
sible. Yet though she failed with Wiley and Ricelor, she succeeded with James
and Linetta, whose honest, industrious lives disclosed that more than his up-
bringing led to Ricelor's fatal rage.171
Had Ricelor actually been illegitimate, he might have fled home for that
reason and, for psychological comfort, invented a natural father who de-
parted honorably. But in fact he left Arkansas because of the Wabbaseka in-
cident and created an imaginary past in order to dodge the law. He came to
emulate Wiley, ignore Albert, and resent Alonzo, who centered his life and—
along with white society—came to seem the cause of his emasculation which,
in turn, fostered resentment of all women. As a young man he neither talked
back to his mother nor treated women roughly, acting the "pussy cat" around
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them while being "high-tempered" with men. In the most revealing and de-
monstrable of acts, he overturned that chivalry and refocused his deep-seated
outrage on the morning of January 25.m
Like all rapists, Ricelor directed his hostility toward one female, Grace
Sturgeon, though both she and Laverne Sturgeon became his victims. Grace
fit many of the characteristics of modern rape victims: she was the approxi-
mate age and from the approximate class of her assailant, and smaller in size
than he. Like them also, Grace never considered the aggression a sexual act;
rather, she feared for her life from the moment the intruder came forward.173
Unlike them, Grace fought off her attacker, who failed to rape her—an im-
portant fact in her ability to cope with the traumatic happening and pla-
cate a racist and a sexist society that demanded "evidence of 'utmost
resistance'... [and] corroboration by other witnesses." Indeed, she resisted
in heroic proportions, insisted that she had not been raped, and in time spoke
frequently, perhaps therapeutically, about the incident. Having been told al-
most immediately by Perrigan, an officer of the law, that she had done noth-
ing wrong and unhesitatingly supported by family, friends, and townsfolk,
Grace escaped the worst of the guilt feelings and humiliation that haunt
many rape victims. Her mother especially helped, repeatedly assuring Grace
of her innocence from the night of the attack until her own death several
months later.174
Dillard, too, helped Grace over the hard times. He left California by
military transport without knowing whether or not she was alive and, be-
cause inclement weather grounded his flight, arrived nearly a week after the
attack. His St. Louis destination remained a military secret, further slowing
his return, as no one knew where to meet him. Finally in Sikeston, he re-
mained twenty days. He felt "torn up" and vengeful but acted calmly, want-
ing the issue to die down so that Grace could get well. Dillard never blamed
her for what had happened, and there were no "problems" between them
over it, yet they both worried that people would portray her wrongly, as a
promiscuous woman. When an Oklahoma lawyer suggested that he sue the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch for its supposed racy coverage, Dillard opposed the
idea rather than prolong Grace's ordeal. He even spoke of moving the fam-
ily away after the war.
Dillard also expressed concern for his son. Jimmy lived with Grace's
mother and younger brothers, Orville and Harold, while she recuperated.
He visited her in the hospital, where they told each other stories; he well
understood Dillard's encouragement to be brave and soon returned to
school. But despite the attention of his father and his uncles, he manifested
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signs of stress: he ran a temperature, found sleeping very difficult, and was
under a doctor's care for three weeks. Eight years old, Jimmy struggled with
the new routine of living with his grandmother and, worse, the fear of los-
ing his own mother. He also found the lynching talk of adults, more than
rumors by classmates, very upsetting; like his father he believed that people
should be left alone to work through such a tragedy. Jimmy recovered faster
than Grace, yet both agreed that things got much better when Dillard re-
turned home permanently following his discharge for respiratory problems
in August 1943.175
Grace herself endured numerous difficulties. She lay in a hospital bed
for nearly three months, then moved in with her mother and rented out the
Kathleen Avenue house for nine years before finally selling it. Despite this
escape from the trauma scene, she slept only twenty minutes at a time for
three years after the attack and, with the slightest nighttime noise, was "wide
awake and up."176 She found ridding herself of "his smell" difficult and
struggled constantly with flashbacks, pushing them away with good thoughts.
Grace recalled: "You don't forget," but if you dwelt on the assault "you'd lose
your mind."177 She also suffered physically, having to learn to walk again and
struggling with regulatory problems. She lost her slim figure and much of
her strength.178 Unlike many contemporary victims who experienced simi-
lar psychological and somatic complaints, however, Grace continued to en-
joy an intimate and tender relationship with Dillard.179
Predictably, Grace found some days very hard. Before she could walk
again, Assistant Police Chief Wallace asked her to testify before the federal
grand jury, a request that brought her to tears and required her doctor's in-
tercession to prevent. She also received numerous letters threatening to string
her up or harm her child, and once out of the hospital she drew attention
wherever she went. Some individuals pointed her out as having been sexu-
ally assaulted; one party from Effingham, Illinois, even showed up at her
front door a year after the incident to see "the lady who had been cut up by
the colored man." For two or three years she cried frequently and displayed
other signs of anguish sparked by public insensitivity, especially the allega-
tion that she and Wright had been lovers. In spite of familial and commu-
nity support, Grace thought about what she could have done to prevent the
assault.180
Laverne, too, suffered from the harrowing experience. A very nervous
person, she unraveled under the attack, racing through rooms, screaming
into the phone, and rushing across the street. Though surely in shock, she
received no treatment at the hospital but soon called her husband, who came
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Prison photos of Cleo Wright in 1940. Courtesy of Michael L. Jensen.
on emergency military leave. She left with him for Savannah, Georgia, within
ten days of the assault. She and her six-month-old son returned in early 1943,
when John Sturgeon was serving overseas, but lived only a short while with
Grace before departing permanently. Laverne never recovered fully from that
fateful evening; she sustained great damage to her nervous system and physi-
cal health. For the next seven years she lived like a rape victim, failing to sleep
well and jumping at every sound, which had to be investigated; fearing for
her physical safety, though without singling out black men.181
Laverne's emotionalism, one suspects, stemmed in part from guilt feel-
ings. Even before the assault, she had told Grace of having been followed;
afterward, she speculated that since only she had regularly come in late and
had been followed several times, she had been Wright's target. That Laverne
later forgot—possibly repressed—her own interpretation suggested pangs
of conscience because Grace had absorbed the violence, as did her visiting
Grace in the hospital for several days and doing everything to comfort her
before suddenly leaving town, unable to talk about the bloodshed without
becoming upset. Ultimately, she overcame the trauma by seeking "the Lord's
Autopsy 107
help" and relying on her husband—a Baptist minister—for comfort.182
In varying degrees, then, Grace, Laverne, and Jimmy suffered the post-
traumatic stress disorder common to victims who survive or witness others
in life-threatening episodes. They experienced depression, anxiety, difficulty
sleeping, and physical symptoms such as Jimmy's fever but were unable to
express anger even years later. Grace endured "recurrent and intrusive rec-
ollections of the event," and Laverne soon fled the area.183 Each woman
struggled with her psychological recovery. Grace's physical injuries provided
"concrete evidence" of the attack: her fight for life sparked more widespread
sympathy than accusation, and her very survival reduced self-recrimination.
Laverne identified with the attack; she had saved Grace by running for help
and, in her mind, nursing her for a long time afterward, but her recovery
was hampered by her high-strung personality and probably a feeling of be-
ing blameworthy.184 In many ways, Grace dealt with the tragedy better, but
no one involved, including Jimmy, recovered easily or fully.
However unwarranted, the victims and their families, like their assailant's
family, felt shame. They reacted similarly: both the Sturgeons and the
Watsons wanted the entire maddening episode to go away quickly; they nei-
ther discussed it among themselves and their loved ones nor sought vindi-
cation through attention-getting litigation; they kept their children as
uninformed as possible, Dillard never elaborating on the acts of violence to
Jimmy, and Alonzo telling the story of her son's death only in small parts to
James and Linetta. In truth, members of both families coped with their
wounds, but none of them forgot Cleo.185
In the final analysis, Ricelor Cleodas Watson metamorphosed into Cleo
Wright and embarked on a path of self-destruction. His life had been one
of submissiveness to parents, employers, naval officers, prison authorities,
and perhaps even in-laws-—a life extracted "rather than freely given," requir-
ing him to conceal his true feelings and pay a high cost in shame and self-
hatred.186 He had searched for himself at home as an adolescent and in several
refuges as an adult, only to encounter one crisis after another. When in early
January 1942 he entered the Sturgeon home to strike at his enemies, he
slashed and ran but soon reappeared, bloodied and calm, an easy suspect
for Perrigan's one-car dragnet; he failed to conceal himself well enough to
avoid capture, as if the violence on Kathleen Avenue had stripped away a
"self-blinding" to reveal the truth about himself as a disappointing son, poor
husband, and—powerless man.187
What specific incident set Cleo off may never be known, but his anni-
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hilation, like his earlier manifestations of alienation, involved white women
and racial taboo. He lent credence to James Weldon Johnson's "clear and cer-
tain truth" that race relations centered on sex, and he reinforced stereotypes
of black rapists. White fears aside, he acted as an individual—not for all black
men—in a crucible of racism that shaped and exaggerated his sexual trans-
gression.188
Cleo Wright represented both black beast and black victim, one who
stumbled and fell harder than most black males facing relentless oppression.
And with his death, lynchers and lawmen alike sought his quick burial.
5 Burial
Cleo Wright's lynching prompted questions that focused on the citizens and
officials of Sikeston. Which townsfolk took his life and why did they do so,
knowing that he already lay on his deathbed? And what resistance did would-
be lynchers encounter from lawmen who held Wright in their custody? Those
who sought answers, most notably the county prosecutor and federal attor-
neys, faced major obstacles as members of the mob and local policemen
scrambled to escape prosecution. They, and most town residents, wanted the
entire tragedy buried as quickly as possible.
Certainly, Sikestonians knew who executed Wright, having witnessed the
lynching directly or heard of it within hours. And since members of the mob
circulated outside City Hall among hundreds of spectators and struck in
broad daylight without the cover of masks, their names tumbled easily from
the tongues of townsfolk living in a close-knit community. Whites who dis-
approved of vigilante law deemed the lynchers "hoodlums," while blacks who
remembered past violence judged them "outlaws."1 Yet no one came forth
to finger the killers.
Fearing conflicts with friends and neighbors, and sharing their racial
beliefs, white bystanders near enough to see Wright's eyes roll as he bounced
down the steps of City Hall said they recognized none of the lynchers.2 Jour-
nalist Paul Bumbarger, who came "to get news," initially claimed that he had
lived in town only fifteen months but later admitted that for his own "pro-
tection" he had deliberately looked away when close to the action.3 Cafe
owner Gilbert Clinton, heeding the advice of those around him, destroyed
the movie that he took rather than be "run out of Sikeston." Other entre-
preneurs kept quiet to avoid having their businesses closed by boycotts.4 Even
those who seemed unafraid for themselves and who opposed lynch law be-
lieved that little would be gained by prosecuting the participants.5 For vari-
ous reasons, then, white residents understood their own reticence as only to
be expected in an autonomous, provincial community that functioned
through face-to-face relations, mutual dependence, and local pride. They
lived in a traditional society and responded to a set of socioeconomic mo-
res that outsiders viewed too simply as a "conspiracy of silence."6
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Blacks also said nothing. According to NAACP investigators, one south-
ern-born resident who witnessed Wright's dragging and burning "could iden-
tify the chief lynchers" but was terrified: "I ain't talkin' to no white folks."7
Black journalists visiting from Pittsburgh and Kansas City charged that there
were Sunset inhabitants willing to name members of the mob before the
grand jury in return for protection and, in one instance, relocation funds.
But none stepped forward, realizing the suicidal nature of bearing witness
against whites and, given Wright's fate, the inability of police to protect them.
Nor did they draw the interest of official investigators. Believing Wright guilty
and prosecuting attorney David E. Blanton's probe just "another case like
Mississippi," they chose safety over justice.8
Not surprisingly, like white counterparts Bumbarger and Clinton, the
handful of prominent black witnesses who did come to the attention of au-
thorities also feigned ignorance. George Scott, who observed the procession
that pulled Wright past his grocery, told federal agents and state grand ju-
rors that he recognized none of the white people. Similarly, Rev. J.B. Ross,
who held services within view of Wright's execution, heard others name four
of the lynchers and revealed their identity to Governor Forrest C. Donnell
and St. Louis NAACP officers but later testified that he possessed "no first-
hand information of the affair."9
Essentially, city and county lawmen responded no differently. Neither
Police Chief Walter Kendall at City Hall nor Sheriff John Hobbs at the ex-
ecution site, for instance, recognized a single person in the mob of three
hundred. Their inability to identify people whom they had policed for nearly
twenty-five years bespoke the community mores that regulated all wit-
nesses.10 If officials—including Henry Bartlett, the lone black patrolman—
would not identify those responsible for Wright's killing, why should Sunset
Addition residents?11
Prosecutor Blanton stated within a week of the lynching that the "bet-
ter elements" of the community did name mob leaders.12 If they did, their
identities never appear in the records. Perhaps well-known citizens such as
cleaner Tip Keller and landowner Leo Fisher, who told federal agents noth-
ing, confided in Blanton privately, or others such as Dr. T.C. McClure sur-
reptitiously passed him names provided by black servants.13 Possibly
Governor Donnell relayed Ross's list of culprits to Blanton; more certainly,
"Informant TA" did furnish FBI agents with the identities of "agitators" in
the mob.14
While private citizens assisted in the identification of twenty mob mem-
bers, county and state officials knew firsthand those most responsible for
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Wright's apprehension, dragging, and immolation. Blanton, of course, pre-
pared the state grand jury case and, along with Sgt. Melvin Dace and Troopers
John Tandy and Vincent P. Boisaubin of the State Highway Patrol, testified
before it, describing the role of each mob member.15
Ted C , Preston H., and Nigel J. led the pack, the latter declaring its de-
sire to "get the negro" and dismissing Blanton's threat of prosecution. Stan
E., Carl S., Rob K., Sam M., Steve N., Ned B., and Lance W. followed close
behind, the first wave of shock troops that pushed into City Hall and drove
Wright's protectors back. Someone struck Blanton, fracturing his third rib,
and Preston H. repeatedly punched Dace in the stomach. None of those fight-
ing the mob recognized the person who then broke into the women's de-
tention room and hauled Wright out, but Edward Z., Ivan D., Art U., and
Wade L. were seen in the hallway or spilling into the street; their presence as
second, third, and even fourth rearguard units assured front-line assailants
of their mission.16 Once outside, lynchers attached Wright to the Ford driven
by Martin X. and sped toward the Addition in a procession of vehicles, those
closest to the front operated by activists such as Yancey T. and those bring-
ing up the rear by spectators such as Richard D.17 Once the lynchers had laid
Wright on the railroad easement, Kirk V. poured gasoline on him. After Matt
R. failed to set the helpless captive afire, another man—blacks said Lou O.—
stepped from the crowd to flip the match that instantly ignited him.18
A handful of the mob members were victims of circumstance. Martin
X., accompanied by fellow mechanic Ollie I., was driving his father-in-law's
car home from the garage when, in front of City Hall, he was blocked by
lynchers who fixed Wright to his auto and then piled into and on it. Directed
to Sunset, Martin X. became "half scared to death" and alighted from the
automobile—as Ollie I. had done moments sooner—before entering the
black enclave. He stood at the roadside as a lyncher slid behind the steering
wheel and drove on toward the execution site. Only after Wright's killing did
he retrieve the Ford.19
Unlike the two auto mechanics, however, most of those identified were
guilty. Predictably, lynchers told federal agents and—in sworn testimony—
grand jurors otherwise. Ringleaders Nigel J. and Preston H., respectively,
denied having spoken with Blanton or seen, much less struck Dace; they were
at City Hall for a short time, they said, but left before "the negro was taken
out." Ted C , the third leader, became hard to locate. Shock troopers also pled
innocent: Lance W. observed events from his parked car and then departed;
Carl S. entered City Hall but left when ordered out by lawmen; Steve N. was
pushed in by the crowd that apprehended Wright but did not go to Sunset;
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Stan E., Rob K., and Mike A. were nowhere near the siege, though Mike A.
overheard Wright's midmorning confession. Likewise, executioners Kirk V.,
Matt R., and Lou O. said they arrived too late to have set Wright afire.20
Support troops in Wright's apprehension and pilots in his funeral pos-
session followed suit. Edward Z., Ivan D., and Art U. contended that they
were outside during the charge on City Hall. More insistent, Richard D. and
Wade L. swore that they were never in sight of the building when the mob
attacked, a position that Yancey T.—a close friend of Wade L.—would also
have taken had he been summoned by the grand jury.21 All lynchers, regard-
less of their individual roles, testified as blameless spectators and, in effect,
called the county prosecutor and state troopers liars.
Pictures of the lynchers would have undermined their testimony
(though without necessarily bringing indictments from empathetic jurors),
but members of the mob had confiscated the movie camera of one freelance
photographer; another destroyed his own equipment; a third supposedly
preserved his efforts but never shared them with law enforcers. Those re-
sponsible for the violence did not prevent Trooper Boisaubin from snap-
ping the only prints that Blanton deemed worthy of presentation, but those
photos proved inconclusive: individuals were difficult to recognize or stood
among others.22 Since there were no shots of lynchers assaulting officers or
manhandling Wright, the subjects stated alibis with impunity.
Courtroom proof aside, mob members were "just folks."23 Despite black
and white recollections of the presence of "lower- class people" and "out-
siders," Blanton more accurately described them as longtime residents of
Sikeston. They were mostly males, mature, educated, hard-working, and in
some cases churchgoing: normally law-abiding citizens, if "not the promi-
nent people that would make a community function."24 Certainly the twenty
individuals whom Blanton investigated fit this profile.
The lynchers themselves were men. Although white women appeared
at every stage of the violence, even in the circle of death, they were only spec-
tators and their numbers were small.25 Their limited activity revealed the pas-
sive nature and separate spheres demanded of females by the "cult of the
true womanhood" that carried over into the twentieth century, assigning to
males violent license and power to define public events.26 Female presence
also indicated a fear of sexual aggression by black men, an endorsement of
their punishment, and—though less assertively than in the 1930s—"a means
of self-expression" in a patriarchal society.27
No one described the women's characteristics, but the men varied from
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young adult to middle age—from twenty to fifty years old, the median age
nearly thirty-five. In part, this reflected the impact of war; for several months
before the lynching, Scott County youths had been reporting for military
duty.28 Hence the mob leaders and the "six youngsters" who hauled Wright's
body to Sunset were in their mid-twenties and early thirties, while the ex-
ecutioners were nearing the half-century mark. Fully half of the lynchers were
married; at least six had children.29
It is impossible to determine the schooling of all the mob members, but
their occupations indicated a typical, if not advanced, Sikeston education
and middle-class or upper-middle-class status. Three of the lynchers had
earned high school degrees and two received pilot training; information for
the remaining fifteen is unavailable.30 Seven small businessmen and one
manager (most of whom provided food or entertainment to townspeople)
dominated the ranks of the seventeen lynchers with known occupations.
Three craftsmen, mechanics and the like followed, and, surprisingly, pro-
fessionals equaled the number of operatives (i.e., somewhat skilled labor):
two of each in jobs ranging from flight instructor to truck driver. One ser-
vice worker and one sales worker rounded out the group's occupational pro-
file, which clearly boasted substantially greater percentages in the more
affluent categories—especially proprietors and craftsmen—than did county
residents collectively.31 None were laborers; contrary to popular late-nine-
teenth-century perceptions of southern lynchers, Wright's most demonstra-
tive murderers sprang from the ranks of budding entrepreneurs and skilled
and semi-skilled workmen. Indeed, one already had run (unsuccessfully) for
public office, another would succeed as a lawman, and two would become
prominent in Sikeston's postwar economic development.
Though their religious commitment is difficult to assess, few of the
mob's vanguard seemed true believers. None of the known lynchers prac-
ticed Judaism, and only one Catholicism: Richard D., who attended mass
the morning of the lynching.32 If asked their religion, most would have iden-
tified with Protestantism, though only Steve N. appeared on church rolls
(First Baptist), having been baptized several years earlier; Lance W. was not
a recorded member but admitted to frequenting services at the First United
Methodist Church.33 Others surely considered themselves God-fearing, wor-
shiped on occasion, and later in life joined a church. Those who played the
most active roles in killing Wright may have participated in prayer services
occasionally or even regularly, but they appear to have been nominal Chris-
tians rather than "devout church members" who had been baptized or con-
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firmed and served as deacons or committee members.34 And a handful—
led by gambler Lou O., who seemed "a person of immoral character" to later
authorities—possessed little, if any faith.35
Repulsed by these realities, Rev. E.W. Bartley of the First United Meth-
odist Church quipped that if Sikeston's citizens were to be believed as to their
whereabouts during the lynching, every church experienced an attendance
that Sunday "double the size of its largest-ever Easter crowd!" His humor,
biting yet safe, chided members of the mob and their apologists for hypoc-
risy.36 The "spirit of bigotry" that an earlier critic had blamed on an emo-
tional Protestantism, and held responsible for rural mob activity in the
South, seemed much less influential in Sikeston.37
However the twenty lynchers envisioned themselves religiously, most
were longstanding town residents. Sixteen lived in Sikeston, several had done
so for ten years or more. Of the twelve for whom origins are known, eight
came from Sikeston or within fifty-five miles of it, two from Kentucky, and
one each from Tennessee and Texas. Most of the active mob members, in
other words, were scarcely "outsiders" or southern newcomers, though
Blanton admitted that some in the crowd hailed from "nearby communi-
ties," and another witness speculated on the presence of "rednecks."38
In fact, Preston H. had been born in Texas and had arrived recently from
Georgia to instruct cadets at the Missouri Institute of Aeronautics, suppos-
edly one of numerous southerners on a staff that some blamed for the lynch-
ing. He served as a ringleader—inciting others and striking Dace—whose
southern upbringing might well have permitted him to violate community
norms of law and order more easily than could those born and raised in the
area.39 But only one other flight school employee—Kentucky-born mechanic
Carl S.—took an active role in apprehending Wright, and, perhaps fearful
of disciplinary action from the school commander, none of the students at
the air field entered the fray. Instead, twenty-five trainees watched the ac-
tion from across the street.40 And given the area's demography of southerners
from Arkansas-Mississippi and mountaineers from western Kentucky-Ten-
nessee, longstanding residents manifested the racial and violent heritages of
their forebears once Preston H. and two other leaders, one a lifelong area
resident, provided direction.
Two of the three executioners, themselves longtime townsfolk, also bore
one trait very different from leaders or shock troopers. Both over forty and
tradesmen, Kirk V. was intoxicated when he doused Wright with flammable
liquid and Matt R. so drunk that he was unable to light the original match.
When later questioned by federal agents, Kirk V. again "appeared to have been
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drinking." Only one other lyncher, shock trooper Sam M., showed signs of
drinking (perhaps of being an alcoholic). In short, only three of twenty mob
members required libations to fortify themselves before killing in cold blood;
the other seventeen, as well as the crowd that abetted and bore witness to
their murder, needed no such bromide. They acted "sober" and with malice
aforethought.41
Unrepresentative too were the few rank-and-file lynchers with arrest
records or personal vendettas. Rob K. had served a sentence in the state peni-
tentiary for armed robbery; Lou O. appeared before local justices for gam-
bling activities; shortly after the lynching, Stan E. faced a charge of driving
while intoxicated; and Ted C. sought personal revenge for the alleged kill-
ing of his father some time earlier by another black man.42 Rob K.s' social
deviance and Ted C.'s blood vengeance certainly explained their participa-
tion in the mob, particularly the latter's leadership role, but not that of Lou
O., Stan E., or Wright's sixteen other murderers.
Lance W. represented the core of the twenty lynchers: the shock troops
that overwhelmed Wright's protectors and drove him to his death. Born in
a nearby town twenty-eight years earlier, he was one of three children whose
parents owned property, attended church, and advocated hard work, self-
sufficiency, and respectability. He graduated from high school, worked for a
grocer, and soon set out on his own to sell merchandise beyond city and
county lines. Meanwhile, he married and began a family. Already successful
in 1942, Lance W. had built a home in Sikeston's southwest quadrant and
hired blacks for domestic and yard work, never considering them qualified
for his business; he also believed in segregation. A respected entrepreneur,
responsible family man, and regular churchgoer whose local roots reached
back into the previous century, Lance W. epitomized those upper-middle-
class townsfolk caught up in the violence.43
Lance W. was unaware of the early morning bloodshed that Sunday until
he drove downtown to check his mail at the post office before going on to
church. He parked on Center Street, across from City Hall, and learned what
had happened from individuals in the crowd whose numbers soon swelled
to several hundred. Within an hour he found himself pushing at the mu-
nicipal building doors.44 He heard Blanton address the crowd and most likely
participated in the charge that brought Wright to the street; his agitation
clearly set the stage for and helped precipitate the siege. Thereafter, he is said
to have left the scene, collected his family, and joined his parents for Sunday
dinner. When he returned home late that afternoon, he heard "about the
lynching."45
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When questioned by federal agents, Lance W. claimed that he had noth-
ing to do with the mob. He admitted going to City Hall at 10:30 A.M., when
the street contained "very few people" and was open to traffic, but claimed
that he left shortly for the Sabbath meal. He later embellished his story be-
fore the grand jury, saying that he drove someone from the scene to give
Grace Sturgeon a blood transfusion at the hospital, after which he and his
wife (mentioned for the first time) returned to City Hall but never got out
of the car and never saw the troopers or prosecuting attorney. Again, Lance
W. ended his testimony by stating that he departed for the family dinner
before the ruckus that claimed Wright's life began.46
Similar denials came from Wade L., representative of the rear guard
whose numbers proved indispensable to Wright's captors. He had come to
Sikeston at a very young age. Born on a farm southwest of Benton thirty-
five years earlier, he was the oldest of several children, completed high school,
and learned a trade from his father. Although exposed to religion, he ap-
pears not to have been a regular parishioner. Except for a period during
World War I he lived in town; he practiced his trade and earned a modest
income. By 1942 he was operating his own shop and sharing an apartment
with another bachelor. He was a well-thought-of member of the working
class.47
Very early on Sunday morning, Wade L. sat at a local cafe and learned,
in a phone call from his roommate, of the attack on Grace Sturgeon and
Hess Perrigan. He went to the hospital to see how badly Perrigan, a friend,
was wounded and inadvertently walked in on Cleo Wright being doctored.
He left without visiting the lawman, but by early afternoon he had reappeared
in Sunset Addition. He told FBI investigators that he "knew nothing" of the
crowd and "took no part whatsoever in the lynching," admitting only to have
visited the death site "later in the afternoon."48 He too changed his story be-
fore grand jurors, elaborating that he rose at 10:45 A.M., learned of the mob
action from a visitor, and arrived in time to see the burning. In fact, he got
there early enough to talk to Kirk V. before that self-appointed executioner
sloshed gasoline on the victim, and to stand within twenty feet of the cre-
mation. That Wade L. seemed among the first to reach the black commu-
nity, in short, indicated his presence at City Hall when the procession left
with Wright in tow. And his camaraderie with one lyncher and favored van-
tage point evinced much more than the role of a late-arriving curiosity-
seeker, who should have been several rows back. Small wonder federal agents
considered him among "actual participants" or those present at City Hall.49
If shock troopers and rear guardsmen such as Lance W. and Wade L.
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represented a socioeconomic cross section of the townspeople involved (as
opposed to lower-class "nitrogen" in turn-of-the-century southern violence),
spectators reflected similar distinctions. Like those who attacked City Hall,
some were "roughly dressed, and others in their Sabbath best."50 Ranging
from prominent to "middle-run citizens," most came from town—many ar-
riving directly from church services—though their ranks also contained in-
dividuals from outlying areas, such as Morehouse, who heard of Wright's
assault by word of mouth.51 Men dominated, but women, children, and ca-
dets also filled Center Street, rushed to Sunset, and witnessed the execution.
Their behavior varied: many acted like small-town sightseers viewing a big
time "happening"; some whooped it up; a few served as cowardly "mischief
makers" and milled through the gathering, goading others to do their kill-
ing.52
More wittingly than not, spectators, like earlier witnesses to lynch law
activity, "figured prominently in the proceedings." For one thing, their num-
bers rendered impossible any defense of Wright: state troopers never drew
their weapons, in part for fear of shooting bystanders. And it was because
of the congestion inside City Hall and the traffic jam on Center Street that
they failed to reach Sunset ahead of the lynchers and prevent Wright's im-
molation.53 Spectators also encouraged and empowered the lynchers, legiti-
mizing their actions. Sensing their anonymity, they believed themselves
immune from legal reprisal; realizing their oneness of thought, they deemed
themselves righteous—even moral. "If acting individually," recalled Blanton,
"they would have been most reliable." Spectators knew that they could over-
whelm authorities and resolve their rage. However momentarily, they con-
sidered their actions personally beneficial, scarcely irrational.54
In a substantial way, lynchers and spectators succeeded because others
cowered. Clerics and residents who opposed the mob stood clear of its wrath,
presuming themselves outnumbered and fearful of "what their friends would
think."55 Only two individuals stepped forward to assist officials at City Hall.
Jack Johnson, an eighteen-year-old airport employee, accompanied Trooper
Vincent P. Boisaubin and helped "hold out the crowd." More surprising—
given that the ritual of lynching usually included kinsmen of the female vic-
tim—an unidentified man who claimed to be related to the Sturgeons
pleaded with those outside "not to seize Wright."56 More in keeping with tra-
dition, a mob of seventy-five, backed up by several hundred additional per-
sons, easily overran the prosecutor, police chief, three troopers, a teenager,
and a relative.
Throughout the siege at City Hall, the parade to Sunset, and the burn-
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ing of Wright, however, a handful of town elites stood close by. When Blanton
arrived on the scene, attorney Roger A. Bailey, landowner Leo Fisher, and
cleaner Tip Keller positioned themselves off to the side. Once violence
erupted, Bailey retreated home, though he would surface later to condemn
the lynchers. Fisher and Keller joined Blanton and Sergeant Dace in an ef-
fort to "beat the mob to Sunset" and warn black residents off the street.57
Similarly, millionaire Joseph L. Matthews appeared to chase sightseers from
Wright's remains and, afterward, housed a frightened black.58 While these
civic and commercial leaders neither doubted Wright's guilt nor objected
to his death, like elites elsewhere they understood the danger of rampant
violence should the mob turn from one "inner enemy" to the entire black
community.59 They countenanced reestablishing a broken color line but op-
posed a pogrom that would destroy innocent people (including their own
employees), bring outside interference, and prove them incapable of ruling
their own creation. No pogram ever occurred, thanks to action by state
troopers and black residents and, as importantly, the fear of race war on the
part of many whites—both in and beyond the crowd—who considered
Wright's death lesson enough.
No one but the authorities, however, questioned the taking of Wright's
life in such an open display of white savagery. That two or three ringleaders
could organize large-scale support within hours, including that of many
churchgoers and normally law-abiding citizens, revealed a conspiracy that
grew to public proportions and, as quickly, ceased to be secret. Large num-
bers became caught up in the mob hysteria, which unified them further in
the belief that Wright threatened the racial order and their personal safety.60
Enraged both as individuals and as a community, they channeled their an-
ger and calmed their fears by killing Wright for very specific, interrelated,
and racist reasons.
From the moment Perrigan told the night operator that a white woman
had been slashed by a black man, word spread like wildfire. Whites heard
that Wright had attempted to rape or had raped Sturgeon, reports that turned
their world "upside down."61 Like their forebears, they feared this transgres-
sion more than any other, for it challenged the foundation of white su-
premacy: racial purity. Hence they proved susceptible to the rumors that
shaped their violent impulses. Many remembered hearing "nigger raped a
white woman" again and again; it was the single most important reason given
to justify lynching Wright.62 By 9:00 A.M. Sunday, even blacks in Sunset had
heard talk of lynching Wright because of "the nature of the offense," gossip
verified by the lynchers. Lance W. spoke for many who confronted troopers
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at City Hall, asking what they would do "if it had been their wife who had
been mistreated."63 Likewise, numerous individuals who witnessed and en-
dorsed Wright's death repeatedly declared, "That will teach him not [to] fool
with white women."64
That Wright had assaulted Sturgeon in her husband's absence in the
military incited lynchers further and, given the war atmosphere, served as a
"call to colors."65 That ringleader Preston H. trained would-be combat pi-
lots seemed more than coincidental. Again and again Wright's killers declared
their need to protect a neighbor's wife: "If I was away in the army," Steve N.
told Trooper Boisaubin as he struggled to enter City Hall, "I would not want
a black [bastard] to rape my wife, and I am going to do what I can to get
him out."66 His "patriotic fervor" ran even among individuals to whom the
Sturgeons were strangers.67 Some lynchers soon bragged to Jimmy Sturgeon
that they "got revenge" for his mother and that his father "would be proud
of what they had done."68
The lynchers thus revealed a heightened sense of honor, duty, and man-
hood. Raised in a culture shaped by nineteenth-century southern and moun-
tain traditions, despite the passing of years or influence of town living, they
violated Wright as their ancestors would have in order to avenge Sturgeon's
and Sikeston's honor; conscious of their obligation, they showed themselves,
again like their forebears, "men enough to assume the big [community] re-
sponsibilities."69 Several booed Blanton's effort to disperse them, for it was
their "duty to take care of" Wright. Mindful of Sgt. J. Dillard Sturgeon's mili-
tary sacrifice and their own prospects of fighting abroad soon, they lynched
Wright in a tension-filled atmosphere that drew together memories of "black
beasts," real or imagined, and uncertainties of their own and their loved ones'
safety in a world war.70
Mob members found another reason to take Wright's life in his attack
on a lawman, a transgression that historically drew the death penalty for
blacks—and whites—in southern and mountain regions because it weak-
ened respect for authority.71 They deemed Wright's cutting of Perrigan, "a
duly appointed officer of the law," serious in itself but intolerable in combi-
nation with his brutalizing "the wife of a solider." Thus they let down "all
the bars" to secure their manly reputations and, more significantly, their
white world.72
That many lynchers knew both victims intensified their wrath, provided
wide-range "social support," and prevented public opposition to Wright's
death. Everyone in town knew everyone else; even members of the mob who
lived beyond city limits were "not far outsiders."73 Despite clear lines of so-
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cioeconomic hierarchy requiring "your great, great, great grandfather" to
have been born in Sikeston, most townsfolk enjoyed close-knit relation-
ships.74 "Who ever wasn't kin" was probably a longtime resident, and more
recent arrivals, especially northerners, felt some distance but not hostility.75
The Sturgeons, of course, had been well established: J. Dillard was from the
area; Grace had lived in town since 1929.
Significantly, Sergeant Sturgeon was no ordinary citizen. Lou. O., Rich-
ard D., Yancey T., and Wade L. were old friends of his—Wade L. recalling
that he had been raised "in our end of town"—and Mike A. grazed horses
in the pasture opposite the Sturgeon home. No doubt others in the mob had
gone to school with Sarge.76 Still other lynchers and townspeople knew that
he "had been one of the first to volunteer in the Home Guard" and had cared
for the armory, and that he was serving younger members of Company K
as confidant, exemplar, and guardian at the very moment his unprotected
wife fell before an intended rapist's knife. They knew further that two of
Sarge's brothers had begun their service in Company K and that the wife of
one of them, air corps cadet John Sturgeon, had barely escaped her sister-
in-law's fate.77
Members of the mob also empathized with Perrigan, who, as a police
officer, was well known and had befriended some of them even before be-
coming night marshal the previous year. They knew him as a native of Union
City, Tennessee, thirty-seven years old, married, and father of a young daugh-
ter. A former oil mill worker and barber, he lived next door to Sarge and
Grace.78
Given these relationships, and particularly because Sarge symbolized
much more than friend or citizen, lynchers drew ready support as their ac-
tions became a communal event. Some approached Grace's brother Orville
at the hospital, inviting him to join their ranks, but he and younger brother
Harold stayed at their sister's side. Presumably, they also contacted Sarge's
father and the youngest brother, Charles, then living in Blodgett, though
apparently with no more success. Other members of the family, most nota-
bly brothers-in-law of Grace, appeared outside City Hall but did not join
Wright's abductors. Sometime later lynchers proudly offered Grace a sou-
venir of her courageous stand: the red-and-white-striped, celluloid-handled
folding knife that Wright had used to cut her (she demurred). They also
helped financially to bring Sarge to Grace's side.79
Precisely because Sturgeon and Perrigan were known and respected,
lynchers deemed Wright a perfect enemy, "evil that had to be eradicated."80
They viewed his double act of violence—which threatened racial order and
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devastated personal relationships—as a communal and intimate reason for
killing him immediately. Doing so required that they portray Wright as a
stranger rather than the familiar member of the community that he had been
for five years.
It also required that they treat all black Sikestonians as possible threats,
undeserving of the racial etiquette that operated during peaceful moments.
Therefore members of the mob dragged Wright through Sunset and burned
him in full view of black residents, signaling much more than personal rage
or revenge. Calculatingly, they sought to prevent future attacks on other white
women. Steve N., for one, expressed the need to "teach these niggers a les-
son," a phrase assuming that all Sunset males were desirous of raping Sikeston
women.81 Lynchers also reminded white women of their vulnerability be-
fore black beasts and their need for white male protection, reinforcing well-
understood patriarchal beliefs of race and gender in a traditional society.
Those who abducted Wright referred time and again to Sturgeon's having
been "unprotected." In contrast, they said nothing about black women, who
were vulnerable to the white male advances that had historically pushed aside
black male protests.82
Given this racial and sexual tension, lynchers killed a hated enemy who
would have died shortly anyway. So said Dr. EJ. Nienstedt, who stated what
had been obvious to those involved in dragging Wright from deathbed to
funeral possession. They preferred him alive when captured, which he was,
according to several witnesses.83 That he gave at least the appearance of
breathing was necessary for their psyches and an object lesson for black
rogues and white maidens. They frightened many males and females into
believing that rape and lynching—involving them—"might happen again."
Nor were the teachings of lynchers lost on black women shocked by the
bloodshed and worried about their men. Even black wives who had been
sheltered from white male aggression realized the unmistakable message of
indiscriminate "racial hate."84
In part, it was that hatred—and its accompanying fear—that prevented
members of the mob from being identified publicly, much less indicted. Al-
though blacks beyond Sikeston hoped for convictions, those in the area knew
that lynchers such as the Caruthersville vigilantes who had broken up a
Southern Tenant Farmers Union meeting the week before Wright's death
would "never get justice"; like a greased eel, W.M. Tucker of Holland pre-
dicted accurately, "they will slip out." And yet both black outsiders and lo-
cals thought that state and federal authorities might impose punishment, if
only on lawmen who allegedly assisted the lynchers.85
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Initially, Governor Donnell received numerous complaints that state
troopers had led the death motorcade and had made no effort to identify
lynchers or execution witnesses. He heard similar versions of the same story
from delegates of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, officers of the United States Negro Democrats of Missouri, and mem-
bers of the Butler County Negro Citizens Committee.86 Clearly, the charge
emanated from Rev. J.B. Ross, who gathered information from Sunset resi-
dents and within twenty-four hours phoned it to the chief executive: Ser-
geant Dace drove patrol car 84, "led the parade," and told Rev. Kater E. Crump
to get off the streets because "they were going to burn the nigger."87
That Ross passed the same information on to Sidney R. Redmond, who
in turn spread it to black activists and white liberals throughout the state,
explained Donnell's inundation with near-identical charges from such a wide
variety of organizations and citizens. The pastor, of course, reported the ex-
periences of those who had been in the street and contended that "a state
police car was in front [of the procession]."88 Since Ross and his informants
had not seen Dace, Boisaubin, and Tandy struggling to protect Wright at City
Hall or entering Sunset by an alternative route, they assumed that the offic-
ers were escorting the mob. Hearing that Dace was looking for him almost
immediately after his call to the governor, Ross "got out of town." He sur-
faced in St. Louis and repeated his charges before the NAACP mass rally a
week later, logically believing, as did most blacks in Sikeston, that highway
patrolmen had played the traditional role of coconspirators in southern vio-
lence.89
In direct contrast, within hours of having observed the defense of City
Hall and the race to warn Sunset residents, white elites praised Dace and his
fellow officers for doing "everything in their power to prevent the mob vio-
lence." The city council's resolution prompted similar action by the Ameri-
can Legion, Lions Club, and Kiwanis Club. Ralph E. Bailey, well-known
attorney, Republican Party member, and former U.S. congressman, presented
the declaration to councilmen and visited the governor in Jefferson City. He
represented "a large number of businessmen and civic leaders" who "wanted
the world to know" of their opposition to lynching and reaffirmed wide-
spread local support for the highway patrolmen.90
Caught between the biracial protest from St. Louis and Kansas City re-
formers and the counteroffensive of civic and commercial elites in Sikeston,
Donnell weighed the statements of Dace and his superiors. One week after
Wright's death he heard "a brief oral report" from Dace, who also presented
his official written account to Highway Patrol Superintendent M. Stanley
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Ginn. So did Sgt. O.L. Wallis of Troop E, Dace's supportive commanding
officer. Within hours, Donnell knew that Ginn had exonerated Dace, Tandy,
and Boisaubin: they had done "all they could do to prevent the lynching."
But he knew, too, that Reverend Ross held to his story and that NAACP rally
participants were criticizing Ginn's report.91 As late as March, and unques-
tionably because of the state grand jury's failure to indict a single lyncher,
Donnell received a request from the St. Louis association to remove Dace
from his post. He replied that according to the evidence the trooper had done
"everything within his power" to shield Wright, and asked for evidence that
would justify suspending him.92 None was forthcoming.
In fact, Dace emerged as one of the area's most reputable lawmen. Born
May 27, 1907, in Sullivan, 125 miles northwest of Sikeston, one of six chil-
dren, he had served as an original member of the Highway Patrol in 1931.
He spent his entire enlistment with Troop E, headquartered at Poplar Bluff,
and patrolled the Sikeston area. He married Ann Childress of nearby Bertand,
settled in the vicinity, joined the First Baptist Church of Sikeston, and be-
came a highly respected member of the community.93
Very early on January 25, when someone beckoned Dace to "investigate
a serious crime" at Kathleen Avenue, he arrived shortly after 1:00 A.M., learned
of Grace Sturgeon's cutting, searched unsuccessfully for her assailant, and
proceeded to the hospital. He was there when Perrigan and Wright under-
went surgery, and he spoke at length with Jesse Whittley, Roy Beck, and
Laverne Sturgeon. He did not disturb Grace Sturgeon but later was the first
lawman to visit her and offer his assistance. He departed for home at 4:30
A.M., reported the incident to Troop E headquarters, and excused himself
from regular duty.94
Dace did not sleep in, however, for Sergeant Wallis phoned him five
hours later to ask if he had shot Cleo Wright. After correcting this rumor,
Dace decided to pursue a statement made at the hospital by Wright's in-laws
that their daughter had "expected something like this would happen." En
route to Sunset Addition at 10:30 A.M., he saw the crowd outside City Hall
and thought that Wright must have died. Finding it necessary to chase
would-be lynchers out of the building, he called for reinforcements and con-
tacted city officials. He, Tandy, Boisaubin, and Kendall kept the mob at bay
for the next hour until, along with Blanton they were overrun. Following
the lynchers out, mindful of their excited "state of mind" and repeated in-
tentions to burn Wright in Sunset, Dace instructed fellow troopers to warn
blacks off the streets.
Since the patrol cars faced east, troopers entered the black community
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Sgt. Melvin Dace examines the knife
used in the assault on Grace Sturgeon.
Courtesy of Michael L. Jensen.
from a different direction than the lynchers and chased residents inside.
Ultimately, Dace and his officers encountered several automobiles causing
them to stop, while some 200 yards away Wright met his death. Afterward,
Tandy provided Dace with the license number of the car that dragged Wright,
which he gave to the county prosecutor, along with names of those he rec-
ognized in the mob. In subsequent weeks he assisted Blanton's investigation
and testified at the state grand jury.
Dace's and Wallis's lynching reports served their best interests, as did
Donnell's assigning Superintendent Ginn to investigate his own agency's
personnel. Yet Dace was innocent of having abetted the lynchers. No other
lawman responded so swiftly or effectively to the assault on Sturgeon; no
other lawman moved so quickly to protect Wright and then to prevent wide-
spread racial slaughter; no other lawman contributed as much to the effort
to bring the lynchers to justice.
In truth, the charge against Dace revealed the limits of eyewitness ac-
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counts and the impact of historical memory. Certainly blacks in Sunset ob-
served among oncoming vehicles a state patrol car bearing the number 84
whose occupants, they said, warned Pastor Crump off the street. Seeing be-
hind it "the truck dragging Cleo's body," and given the commotion, fear of
the moment, and nightrider memories in black life and folklore, they real-
istically judged the troopers to be part of the mob.95
Still, either black spectators or Reverend Ross confused decisive points.
Specifically, only two patrol cars beat the mob to Sunset Addition: number
31 was driven by Dace and carried Blanton, Fisher, Keller, Bumbarger, and
Wilcox; number 84 was operated by Trooper John N. Greim, who had just
arrived from Dexter and had Tandy with him.96 Thus Dace neither drove
the automobile that blacks said led the mob nor chased Crump off the street;
small wonder that he sought out Ross upon hearing these false accusations.
Greim was the driver who told "a negro preacher to help get the people in-
side" (though he may well have used the term "nigger") but did not take the
time to explain "the whole affair" to Crump. Later the cleric verified their
conversation, without mentioning the mob.97
Perhaps, then, Greim appeared to lead the mob. He followed Dace into
the Addition, turned off after several blocks, and met the "procession com-
ing from the south." He stopped and waited for it to approach, turn right,
and proceed ahead of the patrol car; he remained parked about fifty yards
away.98 It is likely that his and Dace's vehicles came through the neighbor-
hood so close in time to those of the lynchers, all with horns blaring and
occupants yelling, that the order and relationship of one vehicle to another
were too confusing to determine accurately. In this calamitous atmosphere,
patrol car numbers, drivers, and anecdotes became interchangeable.
Moreover, a Ford sedan, not a truck (as indicated by one witness) pulled
Wright. And no evidence exists to support the charge that two hours before
the lynching "a city policeman and a state patrolman" drove through the
community, ordering blacks inside because "we're going to have a little fun."99
This accusation did not come from Ross and was not among the allegations
made by organized protesters, but it indicated the state of black thinking
and, like most rumors, contained elements of truth.
From the perspective of Sunset residents, of course, it mattered little who
drove what; for them the issue was state-sanctioned trooper involvement in
extralegal violence against black people. But Dace and his officers had not
given Wright over to the mob; they had fought to protect him. As clearly,
certain that his life was lost from the moment lynchers grabbed him, they
concentrated thereafter on using "every drastic method" to protect others.
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For this reason, Dace ordered his men to alert Sunset residents rather than
attempt a bloody rescue of Wright; for this reason, Greim made no effort to
interfere with the lynchers (so long as their death parade ignored other
blacks). Trooper presence in Sunset before, during, and after Wright's kill-
ing limited the bloodshed to a singular act and stemmed the possibility of
its becoming a racial pogrom.100
Dace and his troopers were well aware of the mob's fury. They decided
against drawing their weapons at City Hall out of genuine concern about
injuring those trying to help them—though perhaps, too, they hesitated to
fire on familiar faces, on persons without "sticks or guns," and in cramped
quarters where blood would have been spilled indiscriminately.101 And, given
the lynchers' determination to take Wright, the troopers and others sensed
that firing into the crowd would spark "more serious trouble": possibly the
loss of their own lives and a full-blown race riot. As Jesse Whittley said,
Sikeston men had come to get Wright "one way or the other."102 In short,
bearing only four sidearms (including the police chief's) and facing hun-
dreds of people, the officers lacked sufficient numbers and firepower to pro-
tect themselves, much less Wright.
The responsibility for his inadequate protection lay elsewhere, a fact
acknowledged by grand jurors and federal attorneys. The state jury mem-
bers complimented the highway patrolmen, and the federal jury declared
that Dace and the other troopers had done "much more than the letter of
their duties required."103 Most significantly, Justice Department lawyers, sift-
ing the facts for evidence of violations by lawmen, determined that state
policemen did "everything within reason" to protect Wright and, given the
presence of "friendly people," they had "exercised reasonable judgment in
not shooting."104 In the opinion of Judge James C. McDowell, Dace may have
been "the best law enforcing officer in southeast Missouri." Now and again
his community and racial loyalties surfaced, as when he smugly told a black
reporter from St. Louis that he did not have to identify anyone in the mob
unless he wanted to.105 And when ordered by superiors to stay clear of spe-
cific events (such as the Caruthersville clashes between unionists and plant-
ers), he no doubt obeyed. Still, his integrity and commitment to the law
shone through on this occasion.106 Unlike the inexperienced Perrigan, whose
amateurish search of Wright nearly cost him his life, Dace took full mea-
sure of the mob, applied standard police procedures, and endeavored to save
Wright. He lived up to his oath.
The same could not be said of Sheriff John Hobbs, who was criticized
by the NAACP-sponsored delegation for "dereliction of duty."107 He observed
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the murder of Wright in Sunset Addition and, charged delegates who sought
his suspension, did nothing to prevent it. He took too long to reach Sikeston
once he knew the mob was gathering, contended others, including some
townspeople. Since he served as an elected official of Scott County, however,
he stood beyond gubernatorial jurisdiction.108
Little came of these complaints. Hobbs represented the provincialism
of his origins. He was born in Cape Girardeau County, son of Joseph V.
Hobbs and Frances Brooks, but had spent much of his life in northern Scott
County. He served as Chaffee chief of police for fourteen years before be-
coming deputy sheriff in 1938 and sheriff in 1940. He and his wife, Nona
Mae Heeb, making their home in Chaffee, raised two daughters and a foster
son. At the time of the lynching, Hobbs was nearing his fifty-third birthday
and understood the northern, self-sufficient farming part of the county, with
its close-knit, all white, mostly German and Dutch families; like them, he
was suspicious of outsiders. He related less well to the southern, plantation
economy of the delta region that boasted equally tight though less ethnic
families, relied on large numbers of black sharecroppers, and contained the
commercial center of Sikeston, which marked the southernmost tip of the
county and, in effect, the northernmost point of the delta. In short, Hobbs's
loyalties lay above the county seat at Benton. For all practical purposes, he
and Sikeston police officials protected separate turf and rarely cooperated
with one another.109
Against this backdrop, Hobbs received Dace's call for help at 11:00 A.M.
on January 25. He arrived at City Hall forty-five minutes later with his deputy
sheriff, he said, only to find that "the crowd had just taken the Negro." He
and Jim Robert then drove toward Sunset, observed "heavy smoke rising,"
and found hundreds of people around a burnt body. Hobbs doubted that
those in the audience were members of the lynch mob, and he recognized
no one.110 He was not among those who patrolled the black community that
evening, but in the weeks that followed he reportedly assisted the county
prosecutor's investigation. Most significantly, it was he who selected the ju-
rors to hear Blanton's case and also testified before them.111
Hobbs acted deliberately but not urgently. When he took Dace's May-
day call in Benton, he deemed it "impossible to leave" without someone in
charge of the county jail, which contained prisoners. Since members of his
own family were attending a funeral and were therefore unavailable to spell
him as turnkey, he contacted deputies. Lester Miller, living near by, came
quickly to secure the lockup, but Jim Robert needed time to dress and drive
eight miles from Kelso to Benton, where Hobbs waited. Together, they trav-
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eled the eighteen miles over "paved highway" to the Sikeston City Hall, ar-
riving minutes too late to help Dace fend off the mob. Waiting for Robert
cost Hobbs precious time, probably much more than the forty-five minutes
that he estimated between the 11:00 A.M. SOS and his alleged 11:45 A.M. ap-
pearance in Sikeston.112 In fact, if Blanton came to City Hall at 11:35 A.M.
and Trooper Greim pulled up ten minutes or more later, as they each told
federal agents, Hobbs should have showed up just before or right as the mob
apprehended Wright.113 Trooper Tandy recalled that the patrolmen held the
crowd off "until about 11:45 A.M.," and dragging Wright from his cell to the
street obviously required another five or ten minutes. Assistant Police Chief
Wallace, who checked his watch upon entering the building at 12:07 P.M., said
the "crowd was gone" by then.114 That Hobbs approached an empty City Hall
and quiet Center Street indicated that he must have arrived at noon or later,
rather than a quarter to the hour.
Hobbs's earlier arrival might have prevented Wright's apprehension
(though that is problematic), but he took his time getting to Sikeston. Within
five minutes of Dace's call he had contacted both deputies and knew them
to be on their way in a matter of minutes; had he departed Benton immedi-
ately, at the very latest he would have arrived with Blanton, bolstered the
ranks of lawmen, and created more difficulty for the lynchers—particularly
if he had acted as forcefully as three years earlier when he "seized" a black
man from an Oran crowd endeavoring to run "Negroes out of town."115
But this time Hobbs came late and, advancing to the execution site, acted
more as a spectator than a lawman. Nor did he contribute much to either
preparing the state case or testifying against the lynchers. Dace, not Hobbs,
proved "very helpful" to Blanton's investigation, and jurors heard Hobbs say
that "he couldn't identify any of the people . . . around the body."116 In part,
this signified his racial beliefs: namely, that Wright—unlike the Oran black,
who, he believed, was innocent of wrongdoing—had assaulted the white
woman. Hobbs, who had permitted Wright to play baseball while a county
prisoner, may also have personalized Wright's gross transgression. Conse-
quently, given the sheriff's commitment to the white community, he would
hurt no one in an effort to keep the mob "from getting that nigger." All things
considered, he—like his mountain and southern counterparts—viewed the
mob as having carried out "the spirit of formal law."117 That Hobbs feuded
with city police, who on this occasion failed to contact him about the pre-
vious evening's events, made his delay more predictable.
Whatever the sheriff's intentions, however, policemen more directly re-
sponsible for Wright's well-being drew the most attention. NAACP investi-
Burial 129
gators visiting Sikeston shortly after the lynching noted the absence of "a
strong protective local police" and the need to probe this issue.118 More sig-
nificant, state troopers in defending their own actions had brought into
question the behavior of Police Chief Kendall and Assistant Police Chief
Wallace. Dace reported that when he arrived at 10:30 A.M. and found would-
be lynchers attempting to break into Wright's quarters, no policeman was
in the building; that thereafter only Kendall assisted in the unsuccessful ef-
fort to fend off the mob; that at no time was the prisoner "in the custody of
the Missouri Highway Patrol." In exonerating Dace, Superintendent Ginn
emphasized these points, and news stories embellished both their presenta-
tions.119 Mindful of Japan's and Germany's military advances at the time, a
local editor joked grimly: "Sikeston officers protected Cleo Wright about as
well as our Army and Navy have been protecting American lives and pos-
sessions the past few weeks."120
Justice Department officials were not laughing. They suspected Sikeston
police of having "wilfully denied" Wright the equal protection and due pro-
cess that might have saved his life. They pressed superiors for a full inquiry
by the FBI, and subsequently a grand jury focused solely on Kendall and
Wallace. Beyond the seminal issue of protecting a prisoner, they questioned
whether the police chief and his assistant had taken seriously the earliest
threats against Wright and why they placed him in the insecure women's
detention room.121
Unlike federal attorneys, Sikeston peace officers sprang from the local
region and reflected its personal, pragmatic approach to justice. The police
chief was born in 1877 to CD. and Amanda Kendall and had lived his en-
tire life in town. Educated in its public schools and married to one of its
own, Lou LaGrange, he had fathered three daughters and worked at Farm-
ers' Supply Company before becoming a patrolman in 1924. He completed
the term of Joe Randol two years later, then was elected police chief in his
own right. A very popular lawman for the next sixteen years, he won reelec-
tion easily; for example, in 1940 he received 2,800 votes against no opposi-
tion.122 "A fine old gentleman" who often tended his garden on election day,
he was "an honorable man" who policed little and treated everyone, regard-
less of race, respectfully.123
Kendall knew most townsfolk and their children and often patrolled
afoot and unarmed. Gray-haired, blue-eyed, and kind-looking, yet 6'2" and
weighing 225 pounds, he tried to resolve differences through personal di-
plomacy; he arrested very few transgressors, preferring to look the other way
when blacks gambled or to hold them only overnight. Similarly, he toured
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downtown white bars, coaxed heavy drinkers to call it an evening, and es-
corted home those too drunk to make their own way. In 1942 he was near-
ing his sixty-fifth birthday and lived alone with his wife, their daughters
already having married.124
Wallace, younger but somewhat similar in background and build, came
from Fairdealing, southwest of Poplar Bluff. He was born in 1910, one of
several children of James Franklin Wallace and Ida Mae Smith. He moved
into the Bootheel sometime before his twentieth birthday, married Elsie Hale
at Lilbourn, and soon became the parent of four children. Like Kendall, who
probably recommended him for the position in June 1940, Wallace related
well to many residents, including those in the Addition. Yet as an outsider,
and a lawman for less than two years, he lacked the popularity of his men-
tor. He received mixed evaluations from townspeople, some recalling him
as "much more vigorous" than the police chief and others as less than even-
handed.125 At thirty-one years old and physically fit, he stood 5' 10", weighed
232 pounds, and looked every bit the law enforcer.
For both policemen, January 25, 1942, proved fateful. When Kendall
came on duty that morning, he learned of Wright's attacks while patrolling
the streets, none of his officers having reported them. He went to City Hall
at 9:00 A.M. to find a  hundred people outside and a few inside, though "ev-
eryone was quiet" and no one approached Wright's chamber. As the crowd
swelled, he claimed to have notified Sheriff Hobbs an hour later and, with
the assistance of Sergeant Dace, cleared the building. Throughout the or-
deal that followed he neither called officers Roy Beck and Grover Lewis (be-
cause "they had worked all night") nor considered moving Wright from the
detention room to a jail cell. Instead, along with Troopers Dace, Tandy, and
Boisaubin, Kendall held off the ever growing mob, only to lose his prisoner
shortly after Blanton arrived at 11:30 A.M. He then stayed in his office rather
than chase lynchers to Sunset, finally going home for lunch some two hours
later.126
By comparison, Wallace began work at 6:00 A.M. and learned of the early
morning bloodshed from Beck and Lewis, whom he met at the bus station.127
He drove with them to Wright's house and tried to talk to him. Then he re-
turned downtown, and his fellow officers went off duty. Wallace soon reap-
peared in Sunset at the request of Wright's in-laws, who asked that he be
taken away. The assistant chief retrieved an ambulance and then, making
his third trip to the black community, brought Wright to City Hall some-
time after 9:30 A.M.; he placed him alone in the women's detention room,
believing him close to death. Within half an hour, he, Milem Limbaugh, and
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Milburn Arbaugh heard Wright confess to cutting Grace Sturgeon. There-
after, Wallace continued his "regular police duty," returned to City Hall at
1 1 : 1 5 A.M., spoke with Kendall, Dace, and Boisaubin, "went to the toilet," took
a call "requesting settlement of a trivial dispute among neighbors," and sup-
posedly left the building to resolve it at 11:35 A.M.128 He considered the three
or four hundred people outside well behaved and unthreatening. When he
returned a little past noon, their absence initially made him think that "the
Negro had died." When he found the building empty and its detention door
broken, he drove to Sunset, observed the crowd from afar, and returned
quickly to town. Later he made his fifth trip to the Addition and helped load
Wright's remains into a truck.
In the aftermath, both policemen claimed not to have recognized any-
one at City Hall or, in Wallace's case, Sunset. Wallace also contended that he
had not contacted the highway patrol or the sheriff before Wright's burning
because he had no idea "anything was going to happen." And once federal
intentions to prosecute local lawmen became apparent, Kendall dodged FBI
agents by saying that "he was very busy." By that time, assistant and chief
were the sole targets of the U.S. Justice Department.129
From its legal perspective, Kendall deserved prosecution for conduct that
violated his prisoner's civil rights.130 Though the chief did endeavor to keep
the crowd back after Dace's midmorning arrival, he seemed to have done
nothing before then. Indeed, despite his own recollection, he appeared to
have been elsewhere when the state trooper entered the premises to find
numerous individuals "running in and out" and others attempting to break
into Wright's room; Kendall either left the building open to would-be lynch-
ers between 9:00 and 10:30 A.M. or he was out of Dace's sight.131 Nor did he
initiate the effort to clear City Hall and call for more help, reacting instead
to the trooper's leadership. In fact, his claim of having called Sheriff Hobbs
at 10:00 A.M. was not confirmed by the phone records. And his contention
of having let Beck and Lewis sleep and left Wallace unsupervised because
their services were unnecessary sounded incredible, for he witnessed Dace's
calls for additional lawmen and watched as the mob grew in size, berated
lawmen, and pushed at the doors in a steady escalation of violence.132
Moreover, Kendall provided little help at City Hall. He stood around
rather than engage the lyncher onslaught. And, according to Dace, he de-
nied having keys to lock the front doors of the building and keep out the
crowd, or to open the detention room and jails for the purpose of transfer-
ring Wright from a chamber easily entered to a cell of impenetrable iron bars.
(Kendall subsequently denied that the subject of moving Wright ever came
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up, though he did possess keys to the women's detention and the cells.)133
He neither chased after the lynchers nor alerted Sunset residents; perhaps
most disturbing, as a lifelong resident and chief for eighteen years he could
identify no one in the very mob that he faced for two hours!
Even more grievously than Kendall, Wallace disregarded Wright's civil
rights. He too saw the crowd enlarge and grow ugly between 9:30 A.M., when
he placed Wright in the women's room, and two hours later when lynchers
dragged him out. Between those events, he, Limbaugh, and Arbaugh heard
Wright's confession with at least one lyncher, Mike A., present, and thereaf-
ter he walked past those who spoke of killing Wright. Yet when Wallace ap-
peared at City Hall, he observed "nothing unusual," he said—not even
minutes before the mob broke through the police line.134 He entered the
building "only once" and left while other officers confronted the crowd that
he judged peaceful, recalled Dace; he neither spoke with the chief that morn-
ing nor sought his permission to leave on an official call as members of the
mob were on the verge of their final charge, remembered Kendall.135 Nor did
Wallace's claim of departing to investigate a dog disturbance jibe with the
statements of participants who remembered that as having occurred on an-
other day. Justice Department lawyers believed that he used the incident as
an "excuse" to avoid the clash with lynchers and went home to eat lunch.136
And his afternoon drive to Sunset, only to retreat from the lingering crowd
and return to town, hardly seemed fitting for an assistant police chief.
With equal irresponsibility, Kendall failed to treat seriously the possi-
bility of mob violence. Federal agents, as well as one area lawman, theorized
that Sikeston police, angered by the attack on Hess Perrigan, took Wright to
his own home so that he could be apprehended more easily by lynchers, but
Dace and Wright's wife, among others, dismissed such thinking as "ridicu-
lous."137 Nevertheless, Beck and Lewis, who first delivered Wright to his wife,
gave FBI operatives the impression of being "unconcerned" and "indiffer-
ent"; despite admonishing troubled blacks to notify them "immediately" if
an attempt was made to molest Wright, they went off duty.138 Kendall, of
course, knew nothing of these happenings, but once on duty he must have
heard threats among townsfolk abuzz with talk of lynch law. Not a conspira-
tor himself, he did nothing to distract would-be lynchers from their con-
spiracy.
If Kendall blinked when staring into the eyes of lynchers, Wallace, at the
very least, looked the other way.13' He failed to tell bureau investigators that
when he brought Wright to City Hall at 9:00 A.M., blacks had already ex-
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pressed concern over talk "about getting him."140 Later, in fact, probably af-
ter having heard Wright's confession, he told Paul Bumbarger about the at-
tacks on Sturgeon and Perrigan, how upset people were, and "what was going
to happen." He seemed to have been informed by the lynchers of their plans
to mob Wright—or so the Standard reporter guessed.141 That would explain
his absence from the battle line of lawmen who clashed with the very indi-
viduals who had confided in him. Though not an active member of the mob,
he did its bidding by denying Wright one more protector. Thereafter, he
served as unofficial police spokesman, feeding information to the press that
verified Wright's guilt—his prison record, stalking of Sturgeon, intention to
rape her—and, intentionally or not, giving the impression that he had played
a significant part in the police action.142
The assistant chief of police did not, however, place Wright in the
women's room in order to make him more accessible to the mob members
who so easily smashed its wooden panel door. More likely, he believed that
Wright was dying and would be more comfortable alone, on a mattress-cov-
ered cot in the women's room, than on a steel bunk in a jail cell occupied by
other prisoners. In this he was supported by Kendall, who never thought of
moving Wright because he "was in bad shape"; and his stretcher would hardly
fit through a cell door.143 The police chief's latter point was verified by FBI
agents, who measured the ambulance cot and the entrance.144
Perhaps to deflect attention from himself, Wallace told bureau investi-
gators that Wright "was being held for the Sheriff." His remark took on added
intrigue when Hobbs informed the same questioners that Wright should
have been removed to Scott County Jail the moment he had been caught,
implying that his lynching could have been prevented.145 These comments
lost their potential explosiveness, however, when Mayor George W. Presnell,
himself a physician, opined that moving the badly wounded Wright to
Benton "would have proved instantly fatal." More self-serving for his own
reputation and that of Sikeston police, he added that under the circumstances
Wright received "appropriate protection."146
Beyond conspiracy and protection issues, police activity sparked fed-
eral inquiry into charges of noncooperation, corruption, and inefficiency.
Neither Kendall nor his officers had contacted Hobbs—or, more surprising,
Blanton—about Wright's violence; that was left for Dace to do long after the
lynchers had gathered. Given the failure of city police to call the sheriff, their
later claim to have been holding Wright for transfer to the county jail proved
disingenuous and substantiated the lack of cooperation between lawmen.
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That Kendall did not even speak to Hobbs was a personal manifestation of
the "definite friction" that Blanton—himself a county official aligned with
Hobbs—noted between city police and county peace officers.147
Such friction, involving territorial lines, partly explained Hobbs's dila-
tory response to the lynching. As significantly, Kendall's and Hobbs's rivalry
stemmed from competition over prisoners and spoils. When Sikeston po-
licemen arrested a felon, for example, they would bring him before Justice
of the Peace Brown Jewell, who reduced the charge to a misdemeanor and
imposed a fine payable to the City of Sikeston instead of the sheriff's office.
Essentially, then, Kendall and Brown kept major criminals, normally under
county jurisdiction, in their bailiwick and denied the sheriff fees that could
total meaningful sums and affect his livelihood. Their act of self-aggrandize-
ment also sharpened the feud and likely affronted Hobbs's self-respect.148
It was probably because of this offense that Hobbs charged Sikeston
policemen with "receiving money" from black gamblers for permitting crap
games in the Addition. He told FBI agents about this (unsubstantiated) cor-
ruption within a month of the lynching. However unwittingly, he forced
bureau personnel to probe deeper, partly because special prosecutor Jacob
M. Lashly sought leverage in the federal case against local lawmen.149 Inves-
tigators found few sources believing, much less corroborating, the rumor
of such wrongdoing. Most of those interrogated—including Councilman
Matthews and an unnamed informant—considered the allegation specious,
as did Dace and Blanton.150 Hobbs's hearsay about local police receiving
bribes found one black resident who named Perrigan and Bartlett but of-
fered no evidence, and years later other Sunset inhabitants disagreed, again
without proof either way, as to whether Kendall and Wallace "were on the
take."151
In truth, Kendall and his officers displayed inefficiency rather than cor-
ruption. Few ever questioned the police chief's honesty, but almost every-
one considered him and his staff woefully inept: Dace said "untrained." Less
objectively, a former department member and present deputy sheriff labeled
them "the worst police force in the country."152 Kendall drew most of the
criticism. He winked at gambling in Sunset, never ordering Bartlett to close
it down and even informing one operator that he was not violating the law.
He heard complaints about white streetwalkers operating out of downtown
cafes, and allegedly infecting air cadets with venereal disease, but refused to
roust them: "Those prostitutes work as hard for their money as we do for
ours."153 An exasperated Blanton had found it necessary to rely on the
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sheriff's office to raid Sunset gambling houses. Council members had re-
duced the police chief's salary to "practically nothing" to dissuade him from
seeking reelection in 1940.154 Yet he ran again without opposition, ever popu-
lar with black residents, who purportedly had swung close elections in his
favor.155
However honest, Kendall's approach to law enforcement boded ill for a
major crisis. Having very little crime in Sikeston, he "relaxed in his duties as
policeman," spending more time in personal conversation and touring ca-
fes and bars. He made very few arrests, seemingly cared little about enforc-
ing the law, and sometimes ignored calls by simply waiting for another officer
to pick up the telephone. He kept no records and lacked a communication
system; those needing a patrolman called the town operator, who signaled
officers via the red light to contact her.156
Thus Kendall's department proved wholly inadequate to handle the
lynching; like him, his officers were untrained, lacking in experience, and
set in their ways. Collectively, Kendall, Lewis, Beck, Perrigan, and Wallace
struck a median age of fifty-two years and boasted little if any knowledge of
handling violence-prone criminals or controlling crowds. Hence, Perrigan
failed to search Wright adequately, and no officer informed Kendall of the
crisis or of black fears that a lynching might occur. Those employed by
Kendall, himself neither "an aggressive" officer nor a leader, responded ac-
cordingly: Beck and Lewis retired from duty, and Wallace dissembled be-
fore the mob.157 They policed the way they had been taught, as individuals
engaged in personal diplomacy rather than a unit authorized to use force;
none understood a concept so alien to Kendall's example of law enforcement.
Given these circumstances, little could be expected of Henry Bartlett.
He had been hired in May 1940 as the department's sixth man and lone black
officer, specifically assigned to police Sunset Addition. He received $30 per
month ($70 less than his white counterparts), worked part time as a cook
downtown, and served primarily as a liaison between blacks and the larger
community.158 When approached by Lewis early Sunday morning, he di-
rected the officer to Wright's home and then accompanied Wright's in-laws
to the hospital. He retired at 6:00 A.M., only to be awakened by someone fear-
ing mob rule and wanting the wounded prisoner moved from his own home.
Bartlett, like Beck and Lewis later, dismissed the plaintiff and "went back to
sleep." He became very frightened thereafter and, like Wallace, kept out of
sight: he never appeared at City Hall to help hold off the mob, never joined
the ranks of black homeowners and white lawmen who protected Sunset
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that night. As the community's duly appointed peace officer, he was ridi-
culed later for "hiding his ass."159 In reality, he followed the lead of most white
policemen and many black denizens.
Bartlett aside, Kendall and Wallace were the most irresponsible local
policemen. Both officers believed Wright guilty and dying, Wallace having
heard his midmorning confession and Kendall his weakening groans; their
resolve, like Wright's life signs, diminished as lyncher intensity grew.160 Com-
munity loyalty overwhelmed their oath of office, partly because the latter
emanated from the very people who now challenged them and partly be-
cause the personal approach of policing now made them vulnerable. Kendall
and Wallace walked through the crowd and conversed with those who had
come to expect lighthanded and, from their perspective, reasonable police
behavior. Instead of persuading lynchers to desist, they found themselves
lobbied and, in effect, threatened; instead of serving to pacify opposing in-
dividuals, they found themselves having to choose sides. They recognized
how futile and powerless their position had become in the face of a tyran-
nical majority, whose emotionalism and numbers made police opposition
uncertain—and dangerous.161
Clearly, Wallace proved the more vulnerable to communal pressure.
Perhaps the assistant chief initially attempted to dissuade the lynchers who
approached him; at least he never said that Wright deserved killing, and he
did express frustration over his inability to stop the inevitable. Kendall held
closer to his sense of duty, refusing to abandon his post, and manifested even
clearer signs of exasperation and regret, telling federal agents that he had
done all he could—"all a mule can do"— to keep the mob from Wright.162
Police chief and assistant acted in legally distinct ways, however. Kendall
failed to protect the prisoner adequately; Wallace, in making absolutely no
effort to shield Wright, committed "wilful 'inaction.'"163
Although the grand jury refused to indict either peace officer, Kendall
and Wallace surely felt the strain of federal prosecution and—beyond
Sikeston—public criticism. They and thirteen other county residents en-
dured grilling that, according to one observer, lacked only "a foot or two of
rubber hose" from being the "third degree."164 Whatever the exaggeration of
that quip, the police chief and his assistant received the harshest treatment
among witnesses facing federal prosecutors, and they experienced greater
anxiety over possible indictment than the lynchers brought before state at-
torneys. Kendall, in fact, suffered a "very mild" stroke shortly after the in-
quiry, and within two years he retired.165 That Wallace succeeded Kendall as
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police chief indicated their popularity in a community believing itself un-
der siege by outsiders.
In spite of the federal grand jury, which chided local policemen for the
lynching (and, ironically, evaluated their department as "no stronger and
probably no weaker" than those of similar communities), Sikeston leaders
and voters supported Kendall and Wallace from the moment of Wright's kill-
ing.166 Four days later newsman Clint H. Denman publicly commended
Kendall and the troopers for having done "their full duty." Shortly thereaf-
ter, mayor and council members adopted Ralph E. Bailey's resolution, which
expanded appreciation to the chief's subordinates (and the prosecuting at-
torney) stating that they "did everything in their power to prevent the mob
violence." City officials, of course, spoke for several prominent citizens, in-
cluding Denman, who responded to the "unfortunate publicity" given their
city by condemning lynch law, even while protecting the reputations of lo-
cal lawmen.167 They also raised the chief's salary from $100 to $125 per
month and, two weeks later, that of all white patrolmen by 10 percent.168
Wallace, Lewis, Beck, and Perrigan received their increases effective
March 1; Kendall waited until the April 7 election for his. The delay reflected
municipal ordinance more than displeasure with the police chief; in the na-
tional spotlight his stand against the lynchers, however lame, had protected
the city's reputation. And yet, a month after he again won reelection with-
out opposition, the council increased his assistant's salary to the level of his
own.169 That Kendall received votes similar in number and distribution to
those of all other unopposed citywide candidates indicated his popularity
among townspeople. But that he did so in an election characterized by the
smallest turnout in recent years reflected not only the absence of service-
men away but public lack of interest and at least some voter disapproval.170
Whether constituents ignored the polls as an unspoken antilynching pro-
test is difficult to determine, but Kendall's supporters—like those of the
mayor, city collector, police judge, treasurer, and assessor—surely revealed
public support for the handling of Wright's death. In that sense, Kendall re-
ceived community payback for having permitted some residents to kill
Wright and others to save face for failing to protect him.
Kendall finally lost a three-man race in 1944, outpolled two to one by
Wallace, who handled Beck even more easily. His defeat indicated problems
of age and health rather than delayed voter opposition to the lynching or a
change set in motion by war. Moreover, Kendall, Wallace, and Beck drew as
many votes collectively as did all major offices—none of which were con-
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tested—and again few constituents turned out, signifying that the immedi-
ate postlynching election reflected war-induced trends rather than a divided
electorate: one supportive, the other silent.171 Indeed, in the first election after
the war, which Wallace won handily, voter numbers returned to prewar stan-
dards.172
Not as strange as it appeared, town residents—lynchers and their op-
ponents alike—returned David E. Blanton to office. Despite his opposition
to Wright's death and effort to indict the lynchers, he was never snubbed
but did find himself at odds with half of Sikeston and their most vociferous
spokesman: his own father.173 In fact, if any two people seemed representa-
tive of contesting factions throughout the lynching episode, it was the
Blantons.
6 The Blantons
Father and son of one of the locale's most famous families, Charles L. and
David E. Blanton found themselves on opposite sides in the matter of
Wright's lynching, symbolizing much larger issues of race relations and com-
munity development. Their differences revealed the impact of global war
on a traditional society whose national government's fight for survival and
democracy abroad necessitated social order and racial justice at home. As
lynchers, policemen, and the elder Blanton acted in a world that was being
lost, the younger Blanton—representative of civic and commercial elites—
operated in its modern sequel.1
C.L. Blanton publicized the mobbing of Wright as "deserved" and sup-
ported those responsible for his death.2 His position, representing more than
that of a racist editor seeking personal notoriety and commercial gain, sprang
as much from southern influences and traditional beliefs that mirrored the
thinking, if not the lives, of many white townsfolk.
Born September 18, 1863, in Howard County, Missouri, C.L. was one
of several children of Mary Harriet Young and Benjamin F. Blanton. Though
the origins of his Scottish-Danish parents remain obscure, Benjamin, one
of many residents who opposed Missouri unionism during the Civil War,
had fought for the Confederate army. He then returned to Missouri's "Little
Dixie"—so called because of the area's settlement by migrants from the up-
per South—and established the Monroe County Appeal at Paris, in Monroe
County. Given his background, war activity, and publishing venture, he raised
C.L. as "a true southerner" in racial attitudes, states' rights beliefs, and Demo-
cratic Party politics. He also taught him the newspaper business.3
As a young man, C.L. Blanton ventured to Washington, D.C., where—
perhaps a result of Benjamin's political contacts—he worked for several years
in the Government Printing Office and the Treasury Department before re-
turning home to assist his father. Meantime he courted Mary Agnes Cullen,
daughter of a federal employee from Nashville, Tennessee. He married her
in 1890 and began a family with the birth of Harry Cullen a year later. Soon
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he moved them back to the national capital and returned to the Treasury
Department, where he remained for sixteen years.
Following residence in Paris, Missouri, from 1909 to 1913, when he en-
tered newspaper publishing anew, C.L. struck out on his own. He borrowed
$500, purchased the Standard from Fred, George, and Harry Naeter of Cape
Girardeau, and brought his wife and their eight children into Sikeston. He
published the first issue on March 1,1913, a four-page weekly that super-
seded the five-year-old Hornet. Thereafter, with the assistance of Mary Agnes
and their third child, Charles Lee Jr., he slowly built the area's most profit-
able and influential newspaper. Increasingly he relied on the advertising skill
of Charles Jr., who had learned printing from grandfather Benjamin, at-
tended the University of Illinois, and served in World War I; similar in tem-
perament, father and son complemented one another and, in 1927, made
the Standard a semiweekly. By 1942 C.L. boasted 2,069 subscribers, numer-
ous advertisers, and a reputation for irreverent, fearless, and entertaining
viewpoints that sprang from his father's direct though more tactful style.4
C.L.'s fame came as the "Pole Cat" editor, a sobriquet that grew out of
his rivalry with Clinton H. Denman of the Republican Herald. He disagreed
with his somewhat younger, better educated, more deeply religious coun-
terpart on almost everything. He associated with people and things south-
ern; Denman, who was born approximately fifty miles northeast of Sikeston
to a Yankee preacher, served in the Spanish American War, earned a college
degree, and appeared more cosmopolitan (though no less committed lo-
cally). C.L. wrote, said Paul Bumbarger, "to tilt windmills and create sensa-
tions" lest townsfolk forget his iconodasm, while Denman composed serious
editorials reflecting his position as a Sunday School teacher, Boy Scout Coun-
cil president, and Lions and Kiwanis charter member. C.L. joined few orga-
nizations and celebrated heritage; Denman, past president of the Missouri
Press Association and prominent member of the First United Methodist
Church, played "an important role in the civic, intellectual and moral
progress of the city."5
When Denman publicly remarked in 1936 that Blanton's writings
"smelled to high heaven as a polecat would," C.L. delighted in the mock; he
retitled his column "The P.C. Editor Says," featured a skunk on its masthead,
and hung the hide of one by his desk. He became "the Pole Cat": sharp-
tongued, satirical, inimitable. Musing as he operated the two-cylinder press,
he would stop it to scribble ideas with pencil stubs and, with gleaming eyes
and chuckling voice, read them aloud. Still, he trained cub reporters such as
Art L. Wallhausen to be objective and "leave the funny stuff to me," believ-
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C.L. Bknton, the "Pole Cat," in his newspaper office, in 1942.
Courtesy of Michael L. Jensen
ing that publishers, for all their individualism, must serve the community.6
C.L., of course, cherished editorializing, and relied on Charles Jr. to
pacify advertisers alienated by the Pole Cat. His copy revealed an unrecon-
structed southerner.7 He opposed the Scott County Milling Company strike
in 1941, accusing "union boys" of deception, and two years later encouraged
anyone who caught a tire thief to "shoot him like he was a mad dog."8 Re-
acting most explosively to assaults on the racial status quo, he endorsed the
"swift and impressive" lynchings of alleged black rapists at Charleston in 1924
and Braggadocio in 1927, and advocated "horsewhipping" the primary black
organizer and chief white sympathizer of the roadside demonstration cen-
tered at Sikeston in 1939. Employing similar rhetorical violence, he offered
to duel those who called him a liar or threatened his honor, reminding them
of his office hours and desk drawer pistol.9
Yet just as surely Blanton embraced a more complicated, seemingly in-
consistent concept of race that turned on paternalism and etiquette. He
welcomed blacks into the Bootheel as it shifted to a cotton cultivation in
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the early 1920s but quickly became alienated by their challenge to the color
line in religious revivals and local elections. He donated enough pews to fill
the Second Baptist Colored Church, reflecting commitments to white phi-
lanthropy and racial segregation.10 Yet despite his support of preachers such
as S.D. Woods, whose efforts supposedly curbed asocial and criminal ten-
dencies among blacks, the Pole Cat ridiculed black ministers: there was the
parson who, dining with a deacon and asked if he desired some corn, "in-
advertently passed his glass instead of his plate." He predicted that Joe Louis
would beat Buddy Baer to retain the heavyweight championship yet regu-
larly belittled blacks. He told of the first-time airline traveler who, upon
noticing "what appeared to be the same gasoline truck" refueling the plane
at every stop, exclaimed that it was "keeping right up with us!"11 The Pole
Cat realized that his column served to control both races, blacks themselves
admitting that if you stomped your feet around him "you'd see it in the pa-
per the next day!"12
As Sikeston entered the war years, Blanton sounded the trumpet of pa-
triotism and linked it to white supremacy. He referred to "brown bellied Japs,"
called hero-turned-isolationist Charles Lindbergh a "son-of-a-bitch," and
advocated the arrest of anyone calling a strike.13 Contradictorily, he opposed
economic advances for area workers, regardless of race, but endorsed the
hiring of 3,000 "competent and willing" blacks by a St. Louis munitions
plant.14 Well into 1942 he played on war exigencies to speak out against union
efforts and praise patriotic displays among area blacks, such as the Pinkhook
School drum and bugle corps that marched in Charleston to demonstrate
"national solidarity." He also expressed concern that the Ethiopian Pacific
Movement in that neighboring city was becoming "quite serious" again. Ever
the humorist, however, he could not refrain from reporting how he "bit"
when asked the location of "no man's land," only to be told that instead of a
strategic military position, it was "the opposite side of an old maid's bed"!15
Seventy-eight years old at the time of Wright's lynching, C.L. Blanton
loomed much larger than his nearly 5'9", 170-pound frame. He strolled about
town, sporting a gray suit and doffing a gray derby, a smile on his face, a
twinkle in his eye, and a firm grip in his handshake. White-haired and mus-
tached, more often than not called "Colonel"—the honorary rank bestowed
upon him by Governor Lloyd C. Stark and befitting his self-image—he en-
joyed widespread community respect. He lived on Tanner Street in a home
purchased nearly thirty years earlier, remodeled according to architectural
styles "found in the old south," and kept up by black dayworkers.16 Once a
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lady's man, he delighted in escorting "young gals" from his office to a nearby
drugstore for a refreshment, collecting "calendar photographs of scantily clad
feminine flesh for the 'art gallery' in the press room," and printing jokes that
some readers considered vulgar. Once a drinker, though never a smoker, he
took pleasure in giving young children nickels and dimes saved from no
longer indulging in alcohol. Chivalrous and kind, though hardly religious
despite membership in the First Baptist Church, he seemed every bit the
southern patriarch.17
Above all, C.L. Blanton counted his family first. He boasted of his
children's successes, noting that many of them graced public payrolls: Harry
a federal attorney, Milton a government economist, J. Benjamin a state public
service commissioner, David a county prosecutor, Catherine a former sec-
retary to U.S. Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi. And Mary's husband
worked for the Department of the Interior, leaving only Edna's husband and
Charles Jr. in the private sector. An astute party loyalist, the elder Blanton
connected his family "from the smallest to the highest level of Democratic
politics." Only Charles and David remained in town, but C.L. and Mary
Agnes kept abreast of all their children's welfare. During World War II, for
example, they visited Charles who spent months in the Mt. Vernon Sani-
tarium. Those absences were the reason C.L. permitted Paul Bumbarger to
ghostwrite an occasional Pole Cat column.18
Close-knit and loving, the Blanton children grew up in a surprisingly
tolerant home; David in particular developed a very independent personal-
ity. Born in Falls Church, Virginia, on October 17, 1908, the fifth son and
last Blanton child, he moved with the family to Paris and then, at age four
and a half, to Sikeston. He remembered growing up in "a good place." De-
spite the town's cultural "sparseness" and racial segregation, he experienced
"lots of fun" and very little racial friction. He worked as a salesman for
Buckner-Ragsdale Company, graduated from Sikeston High School, and put
himself through the University of Missouri at Columbia in five years by earn-
ing commissions in another clothing store. On his own, in part because of
the family's large size and limited income, he managed to save $1,000, ob-
tain a university loan, and borrow from other sources to enter Harvard Law
School.19
David returned to Sikeston and in 1934 began a successful legal prac-
tice. Small-framed, blue-eyed, dark blond, and handsome, he married Mary
Anna Hearne of Poplar Bluff in June 1940, and that November he ran suc-
cessfully for Scott County prosecuting attorney. During his first term of of-
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fice he set a record for revenues acquired through fines and fees. He also
enjoyed life on North Park Avenue with Mary and the first of their two chil-
dren, David Jr.20
Several family members influenced David's upbringing, most obviously
his father. From C.L. he learned the value of hard work, self-reliance, and
individualism, especially standing up for one's principles. He also acquired,
as did all Blantons, a commitment to Democratic Party politics and a strong
sense of community. Significantly, though, he did not embrace his father's
feelings toward "colored people." Their differences on this issue loomed large,
blacks recalling that the "ole man had a hard time" and describing his son
as "a nice person."21 Nor did David display C.L.'s egotism, possibly consid-
ering it a countermodel and, in part, a reason to have left Sikeston long
enough to prove himself.
David benefited from the influence of his mother as well. He heard about
the Union side of the family from her, her father having served as a captain
in the Civil War. He learned religious tolerance and the meaning of faith
through her Irish Catholicism and active role in St. Francis Xavier Church,
which offset his father's nominal Baptist membership and irreverence.
(Though baptized a Catholic, as were all the children, he embraced neither
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parent's religion; instead, in deference to his bride, he eventually became a
deacon in the First Presbyterian Church.) Both parents set the house rules,
but David considered his mother more responsible for raising the children
and instilling in them "exceptionally fine" values; she was "the family main-
stay" who provided stability. Nine years younger and less flamboyant than
her husband, Mary Agnes nevertheless ran the home, if not the newspaper,
and held her own in the marriage, albeit probably less outspokenly than she
did at church.22
David also looked to his siblings for life's cues. Raised "in a country
town," the youngest of eight brothers and sisters, he learned early to fend
for himself—a lesson that reinforced C.L.'s work ethic, combative nature, and
independence and Mary Agnes's tolerance and caring. Unlike Charles, who
followed the Colonel, he modeled himself after Harry, who seemed more
like Mary Agnes and even embraced her Catholicism. David "very much"
admired his eldest brother; despite their seventeen years difference, Harry
reinforced David's schoolboy desire to become a lawyer and, in uncanny
similarity, lived a scenario that the younger brother's would parallel. Harry
had stayed behind when the family returned to Paris in 1909, supported him-
self by selling newspapers in Falls Church, and completed high school in
Georgetown; he had worked full time in the Riggs National Bank in Wash-
ington, D.C., while earning a law degree from Georgetown University; then,
joining the family in Sikeston, he became city attorney and Scott County
prosecuting attorney before entering military service in World War I. After
the war he returned home, opened a practice, and served the county Demo-
cratic Party, which resulted in his appointment as U.S. attorney for the East-
ern District after assisting Champ Clark's 1932 election to the U.S. Senate.23
So David chose Harry's profession and sought an eastern law degree.
Perhaps he also went east thinking that he "needed a change" culturally and
to fulfill his own expectations.24 Then, after he returned to Sikeston and be-
came county prosecutor, a major crisis brought him and Harry together as
legal peers and in direct opposition to their father: the face-off of modern
and traditional Blantons.
Critics made little distinction between Blantons, ultimately condemn-
ing the sons for the viewpoints on lynching espoused by their father. Within
hours of Wright's death they questioned David's integrity. Their complaints
alleged that he refused to identify mob members after facing them at City
Hall and leading them through Sunset Addition. "When a man speaks to a
group of men, a number of whom he surely has addressed during his many
. . . campaign speeches, and then cannot recognize them," argued one promi-
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nent businessman of Kansas City, he must suffer from "very bad memory"
or very poor eyesight; in either case, he "put his politics in a safe place." Hence
NAACP-sponsored delegates meeting with Governor Donnell, including the
letter writer, requested that a special prosecutor replace Blanton.25
Blanton's detractors had prejudged him, partly because of his initial press
remarks. The Monday after Wright's death the county prosecutor called for
a grand jury investigation, yet contended that he and others could not iden-
tify the lynchers. That he had encountered unmasked lynchers, including
individuals "familiar to him," and ordered no arrests while promising "a vig-
orous investigation" made little sense to at least one irate St. Louisan, who
complained to Donnell.26 On Tuesday, Blanton next reported "little head-
way," interpreting the few tips given him as an indication that "the people
seem to be well satisfied." Within twenty-four hours he found himself
drubbed by liberal editors who misconstrued his words and resented the
suggestion that Sikestonians, much less all Missourians, appeared content
with letting the inquiry fail.27
Whatever Blanton's intentions, his father's column, also published on
Tuesday, reinforced the thinking of some critics. The Pole Cat dubbed Wright
a knife-wielding ex-convict and his mobbing "unfortunate" but "deserved,"
the work of dutiful men protecting the wives of "soldier boys" and warning
"night prowlers to leave the community"; the elder Blanton's assurances that
law-abiding blacks would be given "protection" seemed less noteworthy. Al-
though some editors noted that the son should not be held accountable for
his father's views, they seized on the P.C. column as a reason to suggest that
the prosecutor demonstrate his own integrity by welcoming "the outside
unprejudiced help" offered by the governor.28
"Knowing local authorities" in Missouri, however, St. Louis NAACP crit-
ics lacked faith that Democrat Blanton—or even Republican Donnell—in-
tended to undertake "a real investigation." Regardless of the younger Blanton's
sincerity, which association investigators acknowledged, or his father's typical
southern reaction, which David as surely did not share, they believed that
only a federal antilynch law would bring justice.29 Even after an assistant state
attorney general joined Blanton in the grand jury investigation, association
members—black and white—doubted his ability to prosecute "those friends
who elected him to office."30
Editors, in turn, flayed away at "the Blanton Clan," so-called by a black
Chicagoan who printed a list of family members on the public payroll, in-
dicating that it would "take unusual influence to secure anything like a pros-
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ecution in the Sikeston case." He doubted that even the FBI's participation
could prove decisive in the face of the Colonel's tribe, itself typical of pro-
tagonists in other lynchings. He too deemed federal law "the only remedy
to discourage lynching."31 Following the failure of the state case, one St. Louis
journalist wondered anew if—under oath—Blanton had told the truth about
mob leaders "with whom he comes into contact almost daily."32 In short,
many critics lacked faith in county and state officials, whatever their names,
pedigree, or party affiliation. And their preconceived notions of law enforce-
ment, given the history of racial violence, necessitated reproaching the
county prosecutor before, while, and after he played his hand.
David E. Blanton deserved better. Unhesitatingly, he proposed the state
grand jury to Donnell on the evening of Wright's death and, once that was
endorsed, informed the press that "a vigorous investigation" would serve
public interest better than an inquest. In the same conversation he denied
knowing any of the mob leaders and made the "little headway" reference that
drew withering criticism.33 Clearly, he could have named some of the lynchers
and apparently said otherwise in order to protect his inquiry and himself;
rather than try individuals in the newspapers or feel even greater personal
pressure, he spoke less than truthfully on the identity of killers and, con-
versely, too candidly on the lack of cooperation from townspeople. Caught
between external and internal forces, which included his father, David found
addressing reporters problematic. Nor did he know how much Donnell
wanted said or who should say it.
From that moment until Donnell met the black delegation on Thurs-
day, however, Blanton claimed "some progress" and informed the governor
of his entire strategy from investigation to grand jury presentment. He an-
ticipated every major obstacle, requesting continual state assistance: troop-
ers for the inquiry and an attorney general for "the trial proper." He explained
the latter appeal in legal terms, realizing that he himself would testify and
therefore needed someone to question him. Stung by public criticism, he
later admitted seeking "outside help" to stem the "whitewashing" accusations.
Finally, he reported plans to confer with Judge J.C. McDowell about calling
a grand jury.34 Within two days, Blanton informed Donnell that, unsatisfac-
tory resident cooperation notwithstanding, he and the troopers had identi-
fied some of the lynchers and would provide testimony before the jury that
McDowell agreed to convene in March. He requested a conference with the
governor and State Attorney General Roy A. McKittrick, reiterating his need
for someone with "actual practical trial experience in criminal work." This
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important case, he asserted, sounding very unlike his father or other apolo-
gists, should leave no stone unturned in bringing "the guilty parties to the
bar of justice."35
Thus, between his first encounter with the press and his reports to
Donnell, Blanton changed his approach from pessimism to smooth-spoken
optimism. He enabled Donnell to tell black protesters on January 29 that
progress was under way and on the same day he told newsmen that the "veil
of silence" had lifted, that several lynchers were now known, that photo-
graphic evidence was available, that a grand jury was forthcoming, that the
charge would be murder.36 In short, the county prosecutor played to his crit-
ics, albeit not dishonestly, and wisely declined to comment on the Pole Cat's
editorial policy.
The Blanton-Donnell-McKittrick summit occurred on February 9. Af-
terward, the prosecutor repeated for the press that the probe was "progress-
ing satisfactorily," and the governor revealed that the state attorney general's
assistance was under consideration—odd phrasing, since days earlier
Donnell had publicized the parley and given assurances that McKittrick
would cooperate.37 In fact, Blanton wanted state assistance and Donnell
wanted to give it, but McKittrick balked, no doubt still smarting because the
Democrats had both lost the 1940 election to Donnell and failed in their
challenge to his victory. Blanton, who offered to let McKittrick lead the pros-
ecution in Benton, thought the attorney general feared that the volatile lynch-
ing case would jeopardize his chance for the U.S. Senate nomination and
wanted no part in it. Instead, within a week, Blanton received the aid of As-
sistant Attorney General Harry Kay, the result of a partnership between a
Democratic prosecutor and Republican executive.38
Political irony aside, Blanton and Donnell understood the need for
mutual reliance and came to admire each other. They agreed immediately
that lynchers should face prosecution, the governor firmly supporting
Blanton in the face of statewide criticism. He assured NAACP officials and
black editors that the prosecutor would undertake "a through investigation"
and "act vigorously and promptly."39 He refused to prejudge Blanton, despite
mounting pressure and partisan opinion that the prosecutor's father not only
supported the lynching but in 1940 had opposed the governor's seating. He
awaited Blanton's own reports, appreciative of their quick arrival, decisive
strategy, and political sensitivity. Two weeks after the lynching, Donnell again
defended Blanton, this time to protesting black ministers, and predicted that
the grand jury case would be "adequately presented."40
Prosecutor and governor kept in contact, though Blanton received a free
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hand even as federal agents began their own investigation the day after his
meeting with Donnell and McKittrick. Occasionally, Blanton responded to
a gubernatorial concern—such as the suggestion of the National Federation
for Constitutional Liberties that a reward be offered for information on the
lynchers—but for the most part he prepared his own case. He received a copy
of the FBI report and permission for a bureau investigator to testify at the
grand jury, doubtless through Donnell's intercession and Kay's recommen-
dation.41 Their very best efforts notwithstanding, grand jurors indicted no
one, and only then did Blanton and Donnell part company. They remained
friendly, the county prosecutor giving assurances of his continued interest
in the case and the governor meeting with McKittrick and Kay to consider
his options.42
Donnell also agreed to confer with fellow Republican and Sikeston pub-
lisher Clint H. Denman, who suggested pressing the case further in crimi-
nal court through the testimony of Sergeant Dace (rather than Blanton,
whose father would oppose such a maneuver). Donnell considered Denman's
desire for justice under state aegis but neither acted on his recommenda-
tion nor indicated a willingness to deal Blanton out of future legal proceed-
ings.43 He found himself preempted by U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle,
who announced one day after the state grand jury decision—and in advance
of Blanton's and Denman's letters—that the FBI investigation would con-
tinue. Donnell offered state aid but refused, under the advice of McKittrick,
Biddle's request for Kay's grand jury notes; and, despite that states' rights-
political rendering, he learned of the U.S. attorney general's decision to bring
the case before a federal grand jury.44 Perhaps Donnell delayed meeting with
Denman for two months in order to be sure of the federal government's
plans; as likely, he realized that the newsman's idea would require placing
his governorship, public servants like Sergeant Dace, and the Republican
Party under enormous and (in the wake of Biddle's decision) unnecessary
pressure.45
Though Donnell and Blanton lowered their profile, the prosecutor re-
mained tied to the case. Publicly, he drew criticism for the state grand jury
proceeding, one black editor likening him to "Pilate of old" and predicting
failure even before the verdict was rendered. Increasingly, he became iden-
tified as the brother of U.S. Attorney Harry C. Blanton, who, the same news-
man quickly suggested, should withdraw from any federal involvement.46 Just
as his father's sins had dogged David throughout the state prosecution, they
now provided critics with reason to deny Harry participation in a national
case. David's own efforts to defuse objections to his local ties by requesting
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state assistance never succeeded among most protesters, who, well in advance
of the Scott County defeat, began pushing federal attorneys for a more force-
ful and independent prosecution.
Most influential were NAACP officials, who defined the federal case that
appointed a special prosecutor rather than permit Harry Blanton to perform
his duties as ranking attorney of the Eastern District. St. Louis branch presi-
dent Sidney R. Redmond had raised questions about David E. Blanton with
national executive secretary Walter White almost immediately after the
lynching occurred.47 He failed to dislodge Blanton from the state case, but
White and staff members regarded local charges against the county pros-
ecutor as gospel. Hence, in releasing their lynching report on February 13,
investigators Mary and L. Benoist Tompkins opined that Blanton would
"hardly sacrifice both his career and personal friends" for a verdict, and
Thurgood Marshall, writing to Biddle's assistant as the county proceeding
began on March 9, pressed for "a representative from your office" to present
the anticipated federal case. The NAACP special counsel noted that Harry
was David's brother, information provided him by St. Louis County branch
president E.T. Summytt; he also assumed (wrongly) that David had been
involved "in the particular crime being investigated" and (again wrongly)
that the FBI inquiry "already revealed" this.48 Though he did not reiterate
Summytt's frantic opinion that "our only chance" to convict members of the
mob lay in a federal grand jury—itself "not so good" because of the kinship
factor—he believed it.49
Marshall and other association insiders must have been surprised when
the Justice Department appointed a private citizen as special assistant to the
attorney general. The federal officials did so quickly, partly because of
NAACP-generated pressure and partly because of their own desire for suc-
cess. In fact, shortly after receiving Marshall's request and news of the state
grand jury's result, Biddle's assistant remarked that the Chicago Sunday Bee's
editorial on "Lynching and the Blanton Clan" provided "an interesting back-
ground" to the lynching and judged "a prompt presentment" before federal
jurors "advisable."50
Having decided upon a special prosecutor by March 12, if not earlier,
Justice Department higher-ups sought grand jury information from Harry
Blanton without revealing their decision to limit his involvement in the fed-
eral case. He duly advised them of the grand jury calendar in the Eastern
District, which usually convened twice each year, once for the northern
division in Hannibal and again for the southeastern division in Cape
Girardeau; the latter included Sikeston and would be empaneled in early
The Blantons 151
May.51 He soon forwarded a copy of Kay's grand jury notes and a set of sum-
maries about the lynching gleaned from "various reports and hearsay re-
marks" that required corroboration "by statements in the F.B.I, report." On
March 20, Harry also recommended that the federal proceeding be held over
for the next regular session so as to delay its decision until October and per-
mit the cooling off of "a good deal of... hot blood." Unhesitatingly, he stood
ready to press the case if higher-ups deemed the civil rights statutes appli-
cable.52
Harry Blanton repeated his willingness "to go along with the Depart-
ment in whichever direction it wants to travel," requesting further informa-
tion on the judicial theory and forwarding more data for the case. He asked
for a brief and, with a seasoned prosecutor's eye toward a U.S. Supreme Court
hearing, recommended that the indictment include only that which could
be proved. He suggested anew that the grand jury be empaneled from the
entire Eastern District rather than just its southeastern division, thereby
drawing jurors from well outside the lynching vicinity. He clarified mate-
rial regarding the layout of the Sikeston City Hall and reported both the St.
Louis woman's allegation that Wright had raped her and Sergeant Dace's
charge that Cleo had sought intimacy with another Sikeston white woman.53
Not until early April did Blanton discover that although superiors had ben-
efited from his suggestions, Jacob Lashly would represent the government.
Thenceforth he played an insignificant role in the proceeding, occasionally
being called upon to arrange the panel date, comment on new information,
and consider extending the session (as jurors labored over their decision).54
Before the grand jury reconvened on July 30 to file its official report,
however, he defended himself and his office against public criticism and fo-
cused attention on Lashly and Biddle's office. Angered by a Post-Dispatch
editorial on a lynching in Texarkana the previous day, which raised ques-
tions about the federal inquiry into Wright's murder, Harry Blanton fired
off a letter to the editor. He took umbrage at the contention that his office
was letting "dust accumulate on the Sikeston Lynching Case." He informed
the editor that even though he had expressed his "willingness to handle this
matter," the Justice Department, "for reasons best known to it," had placed
the Sikeston lynching in the special prosecutor's hands; thus, no material
existed in his office to gather dust.55 He also informed Biddle's assistant of
his complaint and passed along copies of his letter, the editorial "An Unfor-
gettable Crime," and a letter to the editor from Florence A. Mosely, who ques-
tioned whether Justice Department personnel were capable of coping with
lynch law or were, possibly, the friends of Wright's killers; the St. Louis citi-
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zen wondered what the attorney general had to say.56 As if to underscore his
displeasure, Blanton never directly alerted Lashly to the editorial or his re-
sponse to it, but he did send Biddle's assistant a Post-Dispatch cartoon cap-
tioned "Unfinished Business": it depicted a lynching tree along a lonely road
on which a rope tied with a hangman's noose spelled out "Sikeston."57 Con-
scientiously, he also continued to report developments in the federal case,
most notably that some jurors were "very insistent" in wanting to explain
their action publicly and to provide press comment on their formal verdict,
which had failed to remove, in one editor's words, "the shameful blot on this
state."58
Still, Blanton's resentment continued, from Lashly's appointment on
April 11 through the federal jury's final action on July 30. That President
Franklin D. Roosevelt renominated him for another four-year term within
forty-eight hours of deciding on a special prosecutor appeared more than
coincidental, although given his record he surely deserved such consider-
ation, political maneuver or not.59 Nevertheless, he smarted over his shabby
treatment, made even more humiliating by Justice Department deception
and Lashly's arrogance. Even before Biddle decided to use an independent
attorney, J. Edgar Hoover had instructed FBI agents not to provide copies
of their lynching reports to Harry Blanton, whose summaries of Wright's
death were thus based on hearsay evidence because no one made bureau
findings available to him until late June—fully four months after comple-
tion of the first of several probes.60
Blanton in fact learned from the local press, rather than Justice Depart-
ment officials, of Lashly's "discreet" visit to Sikeston, high-powered confer-
ence in Washington, and subsequent appointment. He heard from neither
Lashly nor his special assistant, Irwin L. Langbein, until nearly two weeks
later. Their meeting did not go well, as a proud Blanton indicated his dis-
pleasure with the department's tactics and his intention to stay out of the
case. He was angered by Lashly's contention that he, the district attorney,
should select the jury, perhaps wrongly believing that the special prosecu-
tor expected him to handpick jurors; he must have cringed when Lashly re-
vealed that he "had never been before a Grand Jury" and that therefore the
district attorney's participation was imperative. Blanton challenged the as-
signment—though probably not because he was scheduled to represent the
government in a fraud case elsewhere on the date that the grand jury would
hear the lynching presentment in St. Louis.61
An embittered Blanton soon acted out of character and biased FBI of-
ficials against Lashly. To one agent he described the special prosecutor as an
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overbearing "publicity seeker" capable of doing "anything to pass the buck."
He added that the St. Louis lawyer had referred to the bureau's initial report
as "rather sloppy" and ordered "further investigation."62 His comments
alarmed agency personnel, who moved to protect themselves should Lashly
fail to secure indictments and seek to blame others—"possibly the Bureau"
(the latter never occurred). In fact, federal investigators too deemed Lashly's
efforts a self-serving "political proposition to satisfy the negroes."63
Clearly, Blanton did not like the situation a "damn bit" and assisted
Lashly and Langbein in only indirect ways.64 Despite the Justice Department's
original press release announcing Lashly's appointment, which stated that
Blanton would "join with" the federal attorney to present the case, he agreed
to present only routine matters to the grand jury before turning the pro-
ceedings over to Lashly and soon reminded the special prosecutor that the
investigation would be "solely in your charge."65
Careful consideration should have been given to Blanton, but federal
officials bungled the issue. Instead of using the district attorney as one of
the best sources to set lynch law precedent, they drove him from the case.
They did not even follow up on some of his reports: for example, Justice
Department attorneys did not investigate the allegation that Wright had been
a rapist before his attempt on Grace Sturgeon until the grand jury proceed-
ing had reached its midpoint.66 They bowed to political pressure without
taking full stock of internal and courtroom realities. In effect, the U.S. at-
torney general's office created "the Blanton problem."67
The Blanton brothers, of course, proved loyal to each other, and if given
the chance Harry would have endeavored to punish those responsible for
the lynching in their father's town. Before the Lashly appointment they both
defied state and local censures. David provided—in spite of McKittrick's le-
gal ruling—the copy of Kay's grand jury notes that found its way into the
hands of federal lawyers. Harry prepared himself—in spite of Sikeston's com-
munal mores—to prosecute lawmen he knew personally.68 Even after learn-
ing of the special prosecutor's appointment, neither sibling flinched. David
participated with Lashly in an "in-depth discussion" of the state case and
testified before the federal grand jury; Harry, however grudgingly, managed
the government's grand jury calendar and stayed in touch with jurors.69
More than in challenging townspeople and officials, Harry and David
showed greatest courage in defying the Pole Cat. Georgetown- and Harvard-
trained, they embraced the "duties and obligations" of their profession and
viewed the lynching as incompatible with law enforcement.70 And despite
personal prejudices, which very rarely surfaced (as when Harry referred to
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"darkies" in an official report on black subversive activity),71 they believed
in the letter of the law and its evenhanded, if racially separate, application.
Just as racial peace required paternalism, social order necessitated curbing
vigilante justice.
Harry and especially David, the more prodigal son, differed with their
father on this critical point. Whereas his father stood in the crowd at City
Hall, David endeavored to disperse it; whereas his father criticized him by
asking why officials neither called out the guard nor used hoses to turn back
the mob, David absorbed the curses and blows of its members; whereas his
father refused to identify any participants, David named them; whereas his
father defended lynchers for protecting white womenfolk, David prosecuted
them; whereas his father excused offenders as righteous southerners with
"hot blood flowing through.. . [their] veins," David held them deserving of
"some penitentiary time"; whereas his father congratulated state grand ju-
rors, David believed that indictments should have been forthcoming; whereas
his father preferred that "the incident die, until some other Negro attempts
another such brutal crime" prompting "swift action," David cooperated in
the federal case; whereas his father felt no humiliation over the mobbing,
David considered it "a bad thing."72
C.L. Blanton remained the unreconstructed southerner, combining rac-
ist threats with kindly gestures: the Pole Cat both warned blacks to stay off
downtown streets after dark and sent Grace Sturgeon her first bouquet of
flowers.73 But he also believed, as did David, that punishment for a white
man "would have been no less certain or severe."74 And paramountly, again
like David, he opposed outsiders who criticized the town and all its residents
for the death of Cleo Wright. For different reasons and in different idioms,
then, father and son spoke the same language. As early as his second report
to the governor, on January 30, David expressed the "sincere hope" of local
law enforcement officials that individuals "far removed from this case" would
stop conducting themselves "so as to hamper our work." On the same day,
his father predicted that black agitation statewide would create difficulties
for Sunset residents who wanted to forget the episode. Hence the Pole Cat
invited those organizations looking for trouble into Sikeston, where they
would find "plenty of it."75
More than on any other event, David's concern for law enforcement and
C.L.'s insistence on social control, personal respect, and community repu-
tation focused on the NAACP mass meeting in St. Louis on February 1. They
resented most the rally speakers. The Pole Cat advised Mayor William Lee
Becker, who condemned the lynching as "class hatred" and urged further
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protest, to "clean up your own back yard," where "four negro bucks" had re-
cently assaulted a thirteen-year-old white girl and remained untried. The Pole
Cat wondered how Fannie Cook, who loved "the colored man," would feel
"if some husky black... crawl [ed] into her virtuous couch some night." The
Pole Cat warned Rev. J.B. Ross, who accused Sergeant Dace of leading the
mob into Sunset, that he was inciting "many whites to buy fire arms to pro-
tect their homes" and predicted that the cleric would not return. To Frank
S. Bledsoe's joy that Wright was resting "where even the 'Pole-Cat Editor'
cannot help him," the Pole Cat responded that he did not "give a damn" how
much he was ripped "up the back," as everyone knew where he stood.76
While his father traded in public diatribe, David expressed his frustra-
tion privately and long after the fact. He advised Governor Donnell against
offering a reward because the action of such organizations as the National
Federation for Constitutional Liberties, metropolitan newspapers, and
Mayor Becker produced "a telling effect oh an orderly process of law enforce-
ment in Southeast Missouri."77 In the crossfire of outside criticism and lo-
cal countercharge, David found securing witnesses for the state impossible;
as townspeople adopted a siege mentality—us against them—he "couldn't
round up anyone to come in and point the finger." He lamented interfer-
ence from the black press of St. Louis, especially journalist Willie B. Harmon,
who made forceful but unsubstantiated comments.78 David understood cor-
rectly the adverse impact of outside criticism on white witnesses but re-
mained silent on the similar impact of his own father's harangues on
residents of both races; he apparently failed to realize that Harmon's claim
of ignorance regarding the names of her sources served to protect Sunset
residents, which left the legal proceeding to white viewpoints.
Though the Pole Cat railed at outsiders—"half-assed preachers" and "a
bunch of niggers" from St. Louis who "might be barbecued as was Wright"—
he and David endured the ordeal without exchanging harsh words publicly.79
Their professional and personality differences dovetailed rather than clashed.
The father, an editor with a public ego and tendency to hyperbole, measured
success in commercial terms and notoriety: "If you can't compliment us, give
us hell, as it is publicity."80 David, an attorney "low on ego" yet full of self-
confidence, embraced diligent research, measured judgments, and total con-
fidentiality as the keys to courtroom victory. Clearly, father and son
understood that one "ran the newspaper" and the other "the law office."81
So the Pole Cat followed his inclinations in the steady, relentless, and
gleeful scribbling of unreconstructed columns. He pridefully announced that
Standard coverage of the lynching sold eight hundred extra copies and that
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area weeklies and semiweeklies used its story—written by Paul Bumbarger—
rather than one from the metropolitan press. He opened his paper to letter
writers who endorsed the lynching. He emerged as the bastion against out-
side criticism, bragging that the Pole Cat smelled "just as bad to some people
as if he was the real article."82 When he received a request from New York
City's PM for an "uncommon viewpoint" of the lynching, Bumbarger pro-
ceeded to ghostwrite it. He considered it "quite an honor" to be written up
in Collier's magazine and, if he had known, mocked in a St. Louis Argus car-
toon several months later.83 In interviews with Associated Press reporters and
mention in news stories nationwide, C.L.'s response to the violence enhanced
his public persona.
In advance of his father's new-found notoriety, David entered the cru-
cible as prosecuting attorney. The strategy he devised at City Hall had back-
fired: he addressed the crowd in hopes of dispersing it; he pleaded with
members of the mob to "allow the law to take its course" and threatened them
with prosecution, only to hear boos and cries to get Wright.84 In the rush
that followed David sustained a broken rib, and in the aftermath he got criti-
cism from several quarters: Police Chief Kendall, an FBI informant, a lyncher,
and a spectator, among others, referred to the prosecuting attorney's gam-
bit as "an error in judgment."85 Knowing the sources, he later dismissed lam-
basting that must have stung at the time.86 Like his father, though in more
frightening circumstances, he spoke plainly, gave no quarter, and upheld
principles of law.
Although friends and employees never witnessed the family's disagree-
ment over Wright's death, the Blantons discussed it privately. C.L. admitted
that within days of the incident his family tried to dissuade him from com-
menting on the lynching "because of David's position," adding that he would
nevertheless print what he thought was right; like his son, he had "a duty to
perform."87 He sometimes chafed when family members failed to approve
"what he wrote and what he did"; at other times, he disagreed with the views
of his lawyer sons, who marched to "a different drum."88
Although his keeping the lynching alive in print made their jobs more
difficult, C.L. never tried to control David or Harry. In part this revealed the
"space" that existed between father and sons: "whatever he was going to do
he did, and that was that." In part it indicated the lessons that he and Mary
Agnes had taught their children about self-sufficiency and tolerance (even
in selecting one's faith and scattering family members religiously).89 Surely,
C.L. sometimes wished that his sons were more southern, if not Confeder-
ate, and more respectful of his racial and vigilante ideas. Yet he understood
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that David and Harry—much more than Charles, who emulated him—
manifested his most important characteristic: individualism.
Given his own indomitable belief in being "a voice not an echo" and a
wearer of one's own chain mail, C.L. raised his sons to be themselves, "not a
small edition of someone else"—even of himself.90 He expected them to be
duty-bound, well-educated, politically connected, and proud Blantons, but
he expected even more that they be individualists. If he "took one hitch" and
his sons thought "it wasn't the right hitch," then he taught them to take an-
other hitch. To some a crackpot, to others a sage, C.L. had a reputation that
rested, ironically, on the individuality that produced both bombastic col-
umns and independent-thinking sons who loved their father without feel-
ing intimidated by him.91
Father's and sons' perspectives went deeper, of course. C.L.'s and David's
reactions to the lynching represented much more than generational differ-
ences within their family. They acted, respectively, as traditionalist and mod-
ernist in a society undergoing change—ultimately, a reshaping of social,
economic, and political structures—during an era of great transition. Each
represented more than himself, just as Wright's death symbolized more than
a singular act of bloodshed. They faced off over an incident that defined the
struggle for Sikeston's future, and pitted the Pole Cat against "the Best Ele-
ments."
That phrase, which the Pole Cat upgraded from "better element" and
tinged with sarcasm, came from the press statement David made when he
reevaluated his initial opinion that Sikestonians appeared "well satisfied" with
the lynching; in order to parry criticism, he readily corrected himself to re-
port that after "sober reflection . . . the better element came forward" with
"names of mob leaders."92 That elite class then presented its resolution to
the city council, expressing "horror" for Wright's crime but "willingness" to
bring the lynchers to justice. On the same day, February 5, that Ralph E.
Bailey Sr. delivered the resolution to Governor Donnell with the message
that local official, civic, and commercial groups disapproved of vigilante law,
Clint H. Denman published "We Stand to Defend." He too distinguished
"good people" from "misguided men" who "brought shame and disgrace
upon us all" and made law-abiding Sikestonians bow "their heads in humili-
ation."93
The Pole Cat counterattacked instantly. A Sikeston citizen "going along
with his head bowed," he editorialized on February 10, did so "not for shame
about the lynching" but because he was wondering how to pay his income
taxes. In fact, he knew of no one in town who expressed humiliation (as
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opposed to regret), and the notion of "a blot on the city" was just "rubbish."
Moreover, by agitating for the punishment of those who had protected their
homes, he opined that the "best" element led "bad negroes" to believe them-
selves as good as whites and, however unwittingly, encouraged them to "run
amuck." The Pole Cat claimed membership in the element that believed in
"protecting our women from either white or black brutes" and wondered
what the best element would do if one of its women were attacked: "sit back
and let the law take its course, or ... call on the worse element."94 Nor could
he later resist identifying those who had recommended Cleo Wright's pa-
role as "the real parties responsible for the lynching," suggesting that the FBI
talk to them. Knowing as his readers knew that mayor, councilman, city at-
torney, and other prominent Sikestonians were among the references, he
again tweaked the best element.95
The Pole Cat struck again the day after Denman's March 12 editorial,
"The Grand Jury Report," which began, "Friends of law and order will be
disappointed" with the lack of indictments. Against the Herald publisher's
criticism of the judge's instructions, the witnesses' memory lapse, and the
jurors' failure, the Pole Cat praised the grand jury. He believed the verdict a
shock to Denman and other "best elements," who along with St. Louis blacks
should keep "their mouths shut if they don't want to start a real race war."96
Perhaps having gotten wind of Denman's confidential suggestion that Gov-
ernor Donnell press the case further lest the guilty "go unpunished," the Pole
Cat scorched those "best elements" that were "still bellyaching" because the
jurors—themselves "best element" members—"failed to force indictment
even if there was little or no evidence."97
More than anyone else in the Bootheel, the Pole Cat defended its south-
ern, plantation heritage, and he did so as a neo-Radical. Like turn-of-the-
century white supremacists, he feared black freedom in a regional order that
deemed people of color incapable of improvement and therefore requiring
white supervision.98 He presented himself as a vigilant Confederate, alert to
criminality, particularly sexual assault, and mindful of distinctions between
and within the races. In spite of promising retribution to rapists black or
white, neither of whom was fit "for the dogs to use as a post," he advanced
long-held psychosexual concerns about "black brutes"; he differentiated the
"mean negro" and St. Louis blacks from the "influential men" in Sunset (who
supposedly wanted the incident forgotten), just as he distinguished between
right-thinking white townspeople and the "best element."99 He believed, too,
the Radical claim that following legal procedures in assaults on "our women
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folks"—as advocated by the best element—was "too slow"; such heinous acts
required "swift justice."100
In addition, the Pole Cat embraced the localism of his southern fore-
bears. He considered it "the highest form of liberty," one that dovetailed with
controlling black society and shaping white destiny.101 Consequently, like
antebellum planters and early twentieth-century Radicals, he viewed out-
side interference, particularly from neoabolitionists and federal representa-
tives such as Fannie Cook and Jacob Lashly, as threats akin to the centralism
that the South had cast aside in the wake of Reconstruction.102 He embraced
nineteenth-century traditionalism complete with its provincial outlook, eco-
nomic unity, and sociopolitical hierarchy wherein "family ties and face-to-
face relationships provide [d] structure and cohesion" in a continuous,
little-changing, circular passage of time.103 In his tradition-bound world the
Pole Cat served as a living representative of the past, "armed with ancient
precedents and cloaked in the authority of ancestral ways." In his southern
world he expressed, one critic said, "spicy, irresponsible, and ungrammati-
cal , . . . often vulgar or slanderous" comments that represented the attitude
of most readers.104 Portraying his world in an H.L. Mencken style (minus
its elitism), the Pole Cat proved formidable as well as entertaining.105
His son possessed a more modern outlook, albeit one that retained
southern remnants. For example, David considered St. Louis Argus's Harmon
"vicious in her attitude" yet never used racial epithets to describe her or any
other black person.106 He preferred local investigators and state assistance,
in keeping with localism and states' rights, and questioned what could be
gained by bringing in outsiders; still, he drew from the reports and testimony
of FBI agents in the state grand jury proceeding.107 He judged Wright's death
wrong, and even Denman believed him "disappointed that some indict-
ments" never came forward.108 Moreover, he cooperated in the federal case
against local lawmen. Neither hot-blooded nor compulsive like his father,
who needed to speak out or "blow up," David never identified himself as a
southerner, much less a rabble rouser.109 His stance, like Denman's, fell be-
tween the Pole Cat's "traditional personality" and that of a national "char-
acter."110
David seemed a neo-Progressive who sought order and assumed that
achieving it required acceptance of the region's racial orthodoxy, itself de-
fined by Radicals and kept in place by neo-Radicals like his father.111 But
unlike turn-of-the-century Progressives, much less the Pole Cat, who so pre-
cisely and so publicly defined themselves, David engaged in no such self-
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identity. Rather, he embraced some basic principles, which his father spurned,
that characterized modernization: cosmopolitan outlook, diversified
economy, and sociopolitical egalitarianism. Over time, these concepts would
break personal ties and foster instability in a future-minded "race against
death for achievement."112
Interestingly, both David and his father accepted certain aspects of mod-
ernization. Both, of course, realized and welcomed its economic potential.
The elder Blanton had started the Standard as a four-page weekly in 1913
and upgraded it to a several-page semiweekly in 1927 as advertisements and
subscriptions increased with prosperity, and World War II provided the com-
mercial impetus for the paper to become a daily in 1947.113 But the Pole Cat
never grappled with the sociopolitical aspects of modernization that so
threatened his world. Modern life swirled about his desk "but never quite
touched him." As one employee later recalled, "The pearl gray derby, the
checkered sweater-vest, the items written in long hand, all were part of the
old way which until the end he praised as the best way."114
While much the same could have been said about the Pole Cat's racial
attitudes and endorsement of vigilante law, the opposite was true of his son.
David ventured beyond the economics of a modern society and pressed into
the southern culture that Progressives found unyielding. In the narrow con-
struct of legal procedure, he stepped beyond Progressives but not as far as
the New Deal judicial activists who challenged all provincialism; he con-
cerned himself more with Cleo Wright's life—keeping the mob at bay—than
with his civil rights, the subject of the federal attorneys who sought to in-
dict Kendall and Wallace for violating Reconstruction Era statutes damned
by the Pole Cat.115 In short, father and son both sought order, but only David
demanded justice. By doing so in court he challenged C.L.'s, his own, and
Sikeston's racial orthodoxy.
Notably, if indirectly, David set in legal motion Max Weber's concept of
cultural modernity. His father believed in the unified values of knowledge,
justice, and beauty; David understood the division of those principles into
spheres of science, law, and art. C.L. regarded traditional values as bulwarks
for white supremacy; his son realized their modern separation and revalua-
tion as potentially beneficial to the establishment of democratic institutions
that would challenge, or even right, past injustices—as would have been the
case had he succeeded in convicting the lynchers.116
Basically, each Blanton responded to the revolutionary change brought
by war, which Wright's attack and death punctuated. David projected an
accommodationist position, endeavoring to blend past, present, and future
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imagery; he looked inward to "self-realization and personal autonomy," made
easy by his youthful independence and educational sojourns, more than
outward to an equally important sense of "group commitment." Perhaps he
sought to rescue himself from aspects of his upbringing, most notably his
father's unreconstructed lessons. In efforts to protect Wright and punish his
killers, David found "a sense of moral and psychological integrity" and thus
a way to the future without turning his back completely on his own or his
father's past and present.117
The Pole Cat, for his part, responded to the movement of history by find-
ing refuge in his heritage. He emerged a restorationist, embodying "a sense
of organic connection with the past" and ascribing "contemporary impuri-
ties" to outsiders: FBI agents and black journalists who wanted to prosecute
townsmen for protecting their women. Given the enormity of the evil threat-
ening his world, the Pole Cat found it necessary to impugn and chide those
"best elements," as well. Predictably, he revealed the paradox inherent in the
views of individuals facing historical dislocation; he played on his Confed-
erate blood and martial spirit as symbols to rally American patriotism to
the very war that unleashed forces jeopardizing the southern past he so
wanted preserved.118
In spite of important variations, the elder Blanton and his youngest son
represented others of their age groups, sociopolitical bearing, and racial heri-
tage. David spoke for Denman, Bailey, and the civic-commercial elites gen-
erally, who felt dishonored by the lynching and censured—in actuality,
overwhelmed—by outside forces; they, too, sought integrity by purifying
themselves without discarding completely the town's collective past.119
Denman lamented the presence of reporters in Sikeston for the third time
in five years; as with the 1937 flood and 1939 roadside demonstration, they
wrote "highly-colored stories" that sometimes "amounted to caricatures of
the real facts." He castigated the lynchers for misrepresenting the town and
placing "a blot upon us which will take years to erase." And despite the Pole
Cat's ridicule of his accommodationism, Denman continued to voice his
shame, label mob members "disgraceful," and defend the town's "law-abid-
ing people."120 His efforts and those of the councilmen and businessmen who
through Bailey trumpeted their opposition to the lynching from the state
capitol revealed among most elites signs of cultural and psychological ac-
commodation.121
Others, by contrast, expressed C.L.'s restoration. The Pole Cat marched
before a band that included his former cub reporter and present editor of
the Charleston Enterprise-Courier. Art Wallhausen seemed even more "bel-
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ligerently fanatical" in wanting to shore up the area's traditional society.122
The day after Wright's lynching he suggested that Donnell keep his "guber-
natorial nose in the affairs of State" and leave "us to handle our Negro prob-
lem." Sounding like the Pole Cat himself, he concluded, "Let your wife or
daughter be . . . attack[ed] by some sex maniac, and then take official ac-
tion." Like overzealous restorationists elsewhere, he actually promoted his-
torical change, for the governor fired back that Missouri operated under law
and that he intended to enforce it via a "thorough investigation," grand jury
proceeding, and—if that was successful—"prompt trial" of those respon-
sible for "the disgraceful happening."123
Scarcely deterred, Wallhausen flailed away at outsiders throughout the
state grand jury proceeding. He chided the "Great Uplift Movement" of
Mayor Becker, Congressman Dyer, Fannie Cook, and Rabbi Ferdinand M.
Isserman for ignoring "the fact that Cleo Wright first perpetrated a most
heinous crime," noting that had he done so in their city, he would have in-
cited a race riot on the scale of that in East St. Louis in 1917. He announced
a personal boycott of firms associated with their efforts, as well as St. Louis
editors, and anticipated future dealings only "with folks of our social, eco-
nomic, and moral equal." Individuals who placed themselves on the "level
of the Negro" and condoned "the rape of white women and the mutilation
of peace officers" should be left to themselves. Facetiously, he hoped that they
agreed with the state grand jury decision: after nearly half the town had faced
criticism and after nearly everybody had entered the case—though some-
one "overlooked the Boy Scouts and the Lone Ranger"—the county's finest
residents had found no one guilty; "Justice had been done."124
Even more than his renowned mentor, the Charleston editor attacked
Fannie Cook as the region's perennial nemesis. In 1941, for example,
Wallhausen ran what she called "vituperative articles" ridiculing her Post-
Dispatch stories on Bootheel sharecroppers: she had "even found a woman
working in an FSA settlement house near Morehouse barefoot!" He won-
dered what the St. Louis author and Washington University English instruc-
tor would say now that the so-called downtrodden were purchasing new
automobiles and gambling away "folding money" in the wartime boom.125
In the wake of the YMCA antilynching meeting a year later, he knew that
"Dear Old Fannie" relished the "atmosphere" and reveled in the Great Up-
lift Movement. He hoped her lot would not be that of Grace Sturgeon, for
that might change the viewpoint of "our Fannie," which "would never, never
do." And following the state grand jury verdict, he hoped, with equal sar-
casm, that "our Friend" was satisfied with its outcome.126
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In fact, Wallhausen and others, including Grace Sturgeon, exaggerated
the tiny role that Fannie Cook played in the protest. She never visited
Sikeston to investigate the lynching; though asked to by the St. Louis NAACP,
she declined because of illness, leaving the task to the Tompkinses. She never
visited the General Hospital, spoke with Sturgeon's mother, or wrote Post-
Dispatch stories questioning Sturgeon's character (as Grace contended years
later). She did appear at the YMCA meeting and, for all of three minutes,
delivered "a mild babble of civil-liberties banalities!"127 Ironically, Fannie
Cook benefited from the Sikeston tragedy, which revived the popularity of
her novel, Bootheel Doctor; her inadvertent celebrity required her presence
at autograph parties.128 She also retained her membership in the Commit-
tee for the Rehabilitation of the Sharecropper, which doubtless placed her
among Wallhausen's postlynching list of "misdirected nitwits" seeking "to
bring about immediate settlement of deeply rooted racial differences."129
Essentially, though, she served as a phantom enemy reinforcing the siege
mentality of Wallhausen, C.L. Blanton, and others who envisioned the
North—including St. Louis—as "an emotional idea" rather than a geographic
entity.130
Even most of the townspeople who opposed the lynching found them-
selves united in fending off outside censure. No one publicly promoted a
complete transformation of society. Restorationists and accommodationists
debated the ethics of lynching, sometimes heatedly and always with convic-
tion, but no transformationist entered their dialogue. Those looking to the
past stood firm, while accommodationists, like those in periods of histori-
cal movement elsewhere, found sustaining their position difficult. Like their
counterparts in the post—Civil War South, they lacked "a complete, clear ide-
ology" of order and decision-making: that "ultimate" past of the resto-
rationist or future of the transformationist so necessary for personal and
public harmony.131 Thus, neither David E. Blanton nor Clint H. Denman
considered the southern heritage completely evil or Sikeston in need of fun-
damental remaking; consequently, they agreed with the Pole Cat and
Wallhausen on bolstering the color line.
Predictably, the elder Blanton and Denman publicized the issue from
diverse and occasionally contentious perspectives. Soon after the lynching
the Pole Cat published the letter of an anonymous correspondent who would
protect white women by forcing all blacks to carry police-issued passes af-
ter dark and, except for domestics, live in a designated area. In short order
the Pole Cat proposed a setting curfew for "negro men" and cleaning out
"negro roosts in the alleys," sending all their inhabitants to Sunset Addition
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or "out of town."132 Thereafter, he periodically took potshots at gambling
"dives around town" and reprinted Wallhausen's complaints about white men
seeking favors from "dusky" women and white high school students frequent-
ing a "Negro dance hall" in nearby Charleston.133
Nonetheless, the Pole Cat left to Denman the organization of drives to
enforce segregated housing and curb crime among both races. One of the
Herald editor's initial comments admitted partial guilt for the lynching: most
significantly, beyond failing to protect Wright, Sikestonians had blurred "the
line which must always separate the white and black races from each other."
A major problem, he said, was that "a few paltry rent dollars" bought blacks—
other than servants—living space in white backyard cabins, resulting in lax
enforcement of housing laws that relegated blacks to "their own part of
town."134
As he had in organizing civic-commercial opposition to the lynching,
Denman used his newspaper and political contacts to support drives against
gambling joints and prostitution haunts soon after the state grand jury pro-
ceeding. He criticized local police for ignoring vice and joined forces with
Maj. R.C. Rockwood of the Missouri Institute of Aeronautics, who com-
plained of venereal disease among cadets.135 As a result of their efforts and
threatened action by the U.S. Army, the city council created a four-man
board—including David E. Blanton—to combat the problem.136 The county
prosecutor and local lawmen ran white streetwalkers out of town and raided
several black and white bootlegging and gambling operations. The Pole Cat,
for his part, could not resist needling Denman; if a "best element" like him-
self personally knew where young girls met for immoral purposes, he should
file a complaint and give the police "something to act on."137 Blanton then
fell silent, no doubt because he in fact supported the drives.
In association with the lynching furor, and again with the Herald edi-
tor in their midst, council members also moved on the alley rentals. Picking
up the issue in June and questioning the economic and political feasibility
of enforcing a segregation ordinance, they focused on sanitation—outdoor
toilets, overcrowding, garbage—as a way to rid the cabins of blacks. They
condemned some buildings in southeast Sikeston, perhaps coincidentally the
quadrant in which Grace Sturgeon lived, but refrained from evacuating all
blacks from the alleys.138
Nor did race relations show signs of change in the foreseeable future,
despite David E. Blanton's effort to impose judicial modernity on lynchers
and townsfolk. As no other incident arose during the remainder of World
War II to accentuate the divisions between accommodationists and resto-
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rationists, Blanton retreated to the provincialism of his father. He ran for
reelection; even though he had enlisted for military service and knew he
would not serve out the term, he wanted to know whether voters approved
of his administration. In August he won the Democratic nomination for a
third term as county prosecutor, overcoming Eugene Munger of Benton and
John S. Skensenkothen of Kelso. Three months later he defeated Republi-
can Roger A. Bailey, a fellow accommodationist who also had sought pun-
ishment for lynchers (though largely on behalf of commercial-civic elite
concerns). David won handily over the son of Ralph E. Bailey, receiving 3,686
of 5,624 ballots cast.139 Significantly, no restorationist sought his office, and
during the campaign, no one, publicly or by rumor, mentioned his role in
the lynching case. His record was impressive—614 convictions in 1941,
double that of the previous year—and his popularity was genuine.140
Blanton's reelection forced supporters to consider their own view of the
lynching, yet hardly represented an endorsement of his role in pressing the
state grand jury. Those who opposed the lynching backed him, but so did
many in the mob who, nine months after their act of murder, enjoyed free-
dom and rationalized that as a public official David had had to do his job.
Others probably supported him out of deference to their favorite town crier,
the Pole Cat.141
In December 1942 David Blanton entered the U.S. Navy and served as a
stateside legal officer for three years, mostly at Camp Bradford in Norfolk,
Virginia. After the war he returned home to its victorious aftermath. Then
on January 8,1948, he and brother Harry stood over the deathbed of their
father, holding his hands and hearing his goodbye. As loving sons, and far
removed from the lynching controversy of yesteryear, they experienced a
deep personal loss that also marked the end of an era in Blanton and Sikeston
history.142
Born during the Civil War, C.L. Blanton had carried the Confederate
flag throughout his life and waved it most vigorously over the body of Cleo
Wright, accentuating the traditional southern heritage that surely explained
the dynamics of that killing. David, instead, experienced a wider vision of
society and strayed far enough from his father's South to serve as a link with
the modernity that the war heightened. In sum, the lynching joined father
and son, southern past and national context, in a wrenching personal and—
for townspeople—collective experience that simultaneously reached deep
into the past and brushed against the future. Like Wright and his lynchers,
the Blanton Clan played roles in a well-known ritualistic act of violence
which, in this instance, came uniquely from Missouri.
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Cleo Wright's "spirit in smoke ascended to high heaven" and, in some ways,
replicated the previous 3,842 deaths by lynching that had occurred nation-
wide between 1889 and 1941.'His killing followed well-established patterns
of racial violence that reached back to southern and mountain heritages. Yet
like those bloodlettings his murder, though not "mysterious," was "unique,"
wrought by social factors and "distinctive conditions" particular to Sikeston.
Rather than exemplifying an unchanging "holistic cultural and historical
perspective" peculiar to the South or the border states, his slaying verified
the evolutionary nature of lynch law.2 It also revealed the impact of outsid-
ers, modernization (if not modernity), and war on lynchers and their com-
munity.
On January 25,1942, racial violence laid bare the clash between tradi-
tional beliefs and modern tendencies in Sikeston. Whites, including David
E. Blanton, considered Wright one of those "bad negroes" who periodically
terrified the Bootheel.3 So did the white newsmen who, like their counter-
parts elsewhere, distorted his life to fit "conventional portraits of black crimi-
nals."4 In fact, unlike most mob victims, Wright possessed both atypical and
stereotypical characteristics: neither complete stranger nor lone fugitive,
neither vagrant nor feebleminded, he was regarded before the lynching as a
quiet, baseball-playing, married oil mill worker; only in the wake of his as-
saults did he emerge publicly—and for the first time—as "an incorrigible
criminal" recognized solely for previous thefts.5 Hess Perrigan's calling
Wright by his first name as he walked toward Sunset indicated that he rec-
ognized the man immediately as a member of the community rather than
an outlaw in its midst; indeed, before joining the police force, the night mar-
shal had been Wright's supervisor at the Sikeston Cotton Oil Mill.6
On the night he entered Grace Sturgeon's home, Wright certainly ap-
peared one-dimensional, but his life to that moment hardly seemed fatalis-
tic. Raised as Ricelor C. Watson in a stable, loving home by parents who
encouraged him to achieve yet cautioned him about society's racism, he had
sought to integrate their beliefs on his own terms. His experiences away from
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home, especially in the navy, exposed him to unforgiving whites who dashed
his aspirations. Back in Pine Bluff, Ricelor lost his job; coming under brother
Wylie's influence, he stole; on the run, he faced anew the "concrete reality"
of being black in a white world. However overbearing Alonzo's parenting or
conditional Albert's love, he fared worse beyond the home: he and his dreams
died in one violent rage—ultimate manifestation of several months, perhaps
years, of "surrendered identity."7
Ricelor did not yield easily. Unlike many black victims purported to have
been unaware of the dangers inherent in racial, particularly sexual encoun-
ters, he well understood the risks.8 In fact, he learned of sexual taboos early
and apparently never defied them before coming to Sikeston. As Cleo Wright,
he struggled to deliver on his parents' legacy but collapsed under the weight
of negative self-images in a town atmosphere, even though it provided more
chance in some areas than the countryside from which he had sought free-
dom originally.9 From 1937 to 1942 he drifted further from, while trying to
hold on to, his origins, his family members and their values. Surreptitiously,
he engaged in a love affair with a married white woman. Later, despite his
marriage to Ardella, he stole again and, despite her pregnancy, snapped near
the end of his parole. Unfulfilled as husband or father-to-be, Wright expe-
rienced an identity crisis—"an inescapable turning point"—and evolved
from dreamer to rapist. Finally, becoming his enemies' worst nightmare, he
slashed at Grace's whiteness more than her gender, manifesting a "sexual
expression of power and anger."10
Ironically, Wright's attack revealed emotional liberation, sexual preoc-
cupation, and personal protest similar to those of his lynchers." In short,
Wright beckoned his own destroyers, and they complied, mirror images of
his emotional weakness and insecurity.12 Unlike black male contemporar-
ies, including Wylie, he could neither wear the mark of oppression nor dis-
place it cathartically.13 Like all rapists and would-be rapists, his psychological
transformation originated in a conflicting upbringing; like black rapists and
would-be rapists, it stemmed in larger measure from specific socioeconomic,
racist pressures.
Also stereotypically, but in contrast to Wright, Sturgeon seemed an "ide-
alization of women" in a traditional society, the southern beauty to his black
beast.14 Pleasant-looking, polite, and proper, she fought back, defending her
honor and, symbolically, white supremacy and patriarchy. These actions
endeared her to the lynchers, who sympathized without reinventing her as
"a member of one of the very best families in the community"—the way
their hill country forebears depicted every white victim of an alleged black
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rapist.15 And Sturgeon, unlike numerous southern women who had cried
rape falsely—lovers, publicity seekers, or neurotics—did not appear to be
anything other than the random target of a stranger. Also unlike bona fide
victims of racial assaults in the modern South, she kept her marriage intact;
she never lost respect for herself or for Sarge, nor he for her.16 Still, Grace's
ordeal fostered white female fears and white male efforts at protection, which
in turn reinforced traditional gender roles.17
Significantly, the lynchers reflected both links and breaks with past of-
fenders. Those in Sikeston included riffraff or troublemakers, like southern
mob members elsewhere. They were led from above, albeit by entrepreneur
Nigel J., salesman Ted C, and flight instructor Preston H. rather than by
landed gentry or rich businessmen.18 Men on the make imposing commu-
nal values, the shock troopers and rear guardsmen also resembled frontier
vigilantes.19 Though apparently older and more economically and socially
established than the young working- and lower-class turn-of-the-century
lynchers, those in Sikeston also included "growing lads" and vengeance seek-
ers—such as, respectively, Steve N. and Ted C.—who equated reputation and
heroics with killing blacks.20 They also numbered an occasional inebriate (for
example, Kirk V.), whose drunkenness fulfilled cultural expectations in the
southern tradition, and one or two individuals recognized as immoral (such
as Lou O.), who resembled their counterparts in earlier "swampeast" mobs.21
But misfits aside, the mob represented a cross section of townspeople equiva-
lent to the plain folk—landholding farmers and herders—of previous eras,
rather than rabble rousers or the poor white southerners normally accused
of rope-and-faggot justice. Like culprits of yesteryear, lynchers in Sikeston
were identified wrongly by both face-saving elites and dismayed outsiders.22
Despite the class differences, Sikeston spectators also resembled earlier
lynching witnesses. Neither Grace's relatives nor others tortured Wright ac-
cording to southern ritual—possibly because of his decimated condition and
the influence of urban civilization—yet they provided familial sanction and
community approval by witnessing his execution, especially since many
onlookers knew the Sturgeon clan.23 A female friend of Grace felt no "twinge
of sympathy" for Wright, seeing beyond his corpse to the bloodshed on
Kathleen Avenue. Nor did anyone else feel "the least bit humane," she em-
phasized, because "there was nothing humane about a woman standing in a
pool of blood" clutching her exposed entrails. Typical of both sexes, she
deemed Wright's death "swift justice." And some parents wanted to teach
their children this lesson of lynch law by exposing them to unforgettable
carnage.24
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Sikeston lynchers and spectators alike "understood perfectly" the logic
of their actions, as had southern white mobs dating back to Reconstruction.25
Faceless before the law yet visible communitywide, their unity bore a col-
lective morality that reached beyond Wright's corpse: their public killing
before a mass audience and in full view of Sunset residents was a "school-
ing" for all who dared challenge racial hierarchy.26 It drew surprising oppo-
sition from local white elites, whose counterparts in another place and time
had said little and rarely sought prosecution.
The responses of black residents sprang from their southern, largely delta
background yet were shaped in part by individual instinct and town setting.27
Those who fled did not affect the future demography of blacks in Sikeston
(a population replenished by subsequent birthrates and inmigration).28
Those who guarded their homes and community lacked experience in col-
lective self-defense.29 Those who complained about the mob played on their
gender and status before white elites. Those who addressed the governor or
formed a local chapter of the NAACP exhibited municipal influences, but
Rev. J.B. Ross's flight and the NAACP chapter's inactivity acknowledged the
racial limitations of living in Sikeston.30 In effect, blacks feared for their lives,
yet protected themselves and their honor in ways that both broke with and
bore remnants of the past. They knew that whites varied: lynchers such as
Richard D. were just "nasty," and peaceful whites of Dr. T.C. McClure's repu-
tation were "good as gold."31 Courageously, some Sunset residents stood firm,
but they lacked the long-term consciousness, know-how, and infrastructure
necessary to sustain their protest or turn it into "mass political action."32
Whatever the object lessons for blacks, lynchers killed Wright for pre-
cise reasons. In the sweeping terms that marked most lynchings, they erupted
because he evoked their fears and assaulted Sikeston's color line; in the spe-
cific terms that characterized this bloodletting, they destroyed him for hav-
ing attacked Sturgeon and Perrigan. They cast Wright as rapist and rogue in
the late-nineteenth-century image of "Negro as beast."33 They believed
Wright "lust mad" and invoked, as had self-styled executioners of other eras,
an "elastic concept" of the most hideous of sexual transgressions.34 Lynch-
ers, in short, embraced "the rape complex": linking race, sex, and civiliza-
tion, they associated Wright's attack on Sturgeon—an unprotected, married,
white mother—with an attack on all white women and on white Sikeston
itself.35 Perhaps, as is suspected of lynchers generally, some projected their
own passions and transgressions onto Wright and, through ritual, drama-
tized their white, male power over black men and white women—themselves
acknowledging the hierarchy and calling for destruction of the beast.36
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Still, they did not castrate Wright, a ritual symbolizing the permanent
eradication of evil. They lived, like southern executioners, in a state that for-
bade miscegenation, indicating longstanding fears of black sexuality and
providing rationalization for lynch law.37 And sexual phobia affected mob
members, for rape was their cry, a black man their target, and "the idea of
castration" immanent in their actions.38 That they did not emasculate Wright
evinced his beaten condition, the pressure of approaching lawmen, and the
influence of place and time. Perhaps, too, the absence of younger, draft-age
participants and individuals suffering from "sexual perversion" limited the
level of "primitive brutality."39
Those Sikestonians who claimed that a white man would have been
punished no less severely than Wright disregarded a fact of mob killings.40
Eight of the last nine lynchings in Missouri since the Great War had involved
black youths accused of assaulting white females, but white mobs killed no
alleged white rapists.41 Indeed, shortly after Wright's death at least two white
males in the area received court-determined sentences rather than rope-and
faggot-justice: Otis Morris, a thirty-five-year-old ex-convict extended his case
for nearly a year—from April 1941 to February 1942—and won a change of
venue before receiving four years in prison for the statutory rape of a four-
teen-year-old girl in Oran; a second offender was permitted to change his
plea from not guilty of attempting to rape a twelve-year-old girl in Vanduser
to guilty of felonious assault. When compared with Wright's fate, even given
the vicious brutality of his crime, their treatment by Judge J.C. McDowell
and prosecutor David E. Blanton revealed white society's prejudices.42
Obviously, "race hatred" magnified interracial crimes involving black
offenders and white victims, especially when the infractions were major and
sexual. Conversely, local whites never addressed the issue of white men at-
tacking black females, historically unprotected from sexual assault (by ei-
ther race).43 Black St. Louis area residents noted that nothing was done to
white men who committed crimes against "our women"; on the rare occa-
sion that a white rapist faced prosecution, they contended, his conviction
proved most difficult, if not elusive.44
But Wright stirred more than Sikeston's psychosexual fears. Coming on
the heels of the Sturgeon assault, his equally savage attack on Night Mar-
shal Perrigan unleashed—in the words of the city attorney—"the vicious-
ness" of everyone in the area. Wright, in other words, committed two gross
violations of race rule, triggering a southern "ceremony of exorcism."45 In
the face of fallen sexual and legal boundaries, most whites hardly seemed to
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distinguish between social control and repressive justice in their act of ret-
ribution.46
Wright also challenged "white masculine values." Growing up in a tra-
ditional, hierarchical, and economically unvaried community, Sikeston men
lived in an "honor-bound" society that produced, as it had in the Old South,
extremes of behavior: noblesse oblige and violence. They were taught to pre-
serve personal status and protect family integrity in "absolute and indivis-
ible" terms, meshing individual and community mores where necessary. For
them, honor dovetailed with masculinity, often necessitated violence, and,
in defense against black incursions, elicited "heroic activity."47 Although the
need for order in a town the size of Sikeston had softened the honor code
over the previous century, wartime patriotism and, especially, Wright's bru-
tality reassociated it with killing.48 Lynchers spoke openly of their duty to
take the life of a would-be rapist for having attacked the wife of a soldier
"off defending the United States."49 Many knew Sergeant Sturgeon person-
ally; World War I veterans understood his sacrifice; and townsfolk generally
identified him as the heart of Company K, whose history evoked pride in
them. "Join the Guard and go with the boys you know," boasted truthful re-
cruiters.50
Small wonder lynchers combined individual "psychic compensation"
and "community honor." Like late nineteenth-century mob members inca-
pable of supporting their families in the midst of economic depression,
Sikeston men unable, unwilling, or not yet called to serve abroad discov-
ered their self-worth in the protection of womenfolk.51 Possibly some of
them—such as Yancey T., who soon joined the air school as an instructor—
experienced guilt or frustration at neither being in uniform nor protecting
the homefront adequately.52 That lynchers struck under the watchful eyes
of uniformed cadets seemed more than symbolic. Unlike those of the 1890s,
then, these executioners emerged as "patriots" in national rather than merely
regional or provincial terms.53 Local and statewide apologists equated
Wright's violence with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and, by inference,
lynchers with men in the armed forces. Both crimes made "American blood
boil for revenge," and the executioners—troopers in combat—took steps to
make it difficult for "negroes, or Japs to molest them or their families" fur-
ther.54
These steps required entering into communitas: a bond "over and above
any formal social bonds."55 Many whites had adopted southern paternalism
and rigid race relations, which generated intimacy and, in the face of seri-
172 The Lynching of Cleo Wright
ous transgressions, intensely hostile reprisal; they believed with the Pole Cat
that insults required an "old fashioned duel." Therefore, when word spread
of Sturgeon's and Perrigan's cutting, townsmen, emulating hundreds of prior
lynchers, deliberately expressed "community will" by ritualistically extermi-
nating Wright and cleansing themselves of his perfidy.56
Clearly, as one man wrote the governor, lynchers believed themselves "a
group of men who said, 'I am my brother's keeper.'" They considered their
actions right and honorable, even righteous, and "ethically compatible" with
the common law of their ancestors.57 This was why lynchers wore no masks,
spectators refused to identify them, and the Sturgeons left Wright's fate in
their hands.58 Even citizens who opposed vigilantism deemed the arrest of
mob members "a great shame"; ministers seeking reconciliation for the town
condemned none of them, partly in deference to the community will; and
cadets verified the impact of communitas on outsiders by offering their blood
for Grace's transfusions.59
Townsfolk who struck down Wright were also lashing out, knowingly
or not, at change wrought by modernization. It had been in their midst since
the 1920s, unleashed by the regional shift to cotton cultivation and acceler-
ated by the economic depression that brought federal relief but challenged
social cohesion, political autonomy, and community stability. Though it is
difficult to measure the cumulative effect of volatile race-related events dur-
ing the late 1930s and early 1940s—including pro-Japanese rallies, labor
strikes, and government-sponsored black farm worker settlements—
Sikestonians struggled with modern intrusions.60 More recently, they had
complained of cocky blacks and their petty thefts, transgressions that Wright
escalated to a frightening level.61 Facing that ultimate defiance in an increas-
ingly egalitarian society, lynchers needed both beast and scapegoat.62 They
drew on the repetition of thought and deed over time to kill Wright in pub-
lic ceremony: a contradictory event in the long transition from traditional
to modern.63 Accordingly, Nigel J. countered the county prosecutor's admo-
nition at City Hall—"Why in hell don't you go home where you belong?"64—
by expressing ancestral concepts of communitas and duty, just as apologists
and opponents closed ranks in the aftermath of violence to display "a siege
mentality" toward outside critics.65
Those who killed Wright or condoned his death did so because of their
inability to preserve the old racial order while benefiting economically and
technologically from the new one; they wanted only what they considered
the best of each world. Thus mob members and their supporters sought a
return to normal social relations yet looked forward to economic modern-
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ization. They soon shopped in a new Walgreen's, an enlarged J.C. Penney's,
and a remodeled Ward's Grocery Store. They laid plans for a regional health
facility to replace the small hospital where Sturgeon and Perrigan had re-
covered; indeed, lynchers and apologists joined their opponents in dona-
tions for the modern edifice.66 Even more portentous was the purchase of
the Missouri Institute of Aeronautics by the federal government, thereby
increasing its military presence in the area. Surely the townspeople realized
that prosperity and centralization would also bring the very race changes
they considered so threatening.
Yet Sikestonians probably never thought of their violence as unique or
compared it with lynchings nationwide. Like the others, it occurred because
a black man had crossed—or appeared to cross—"the invisible but real" so-
cioeconomic and political boundaries established by whites; for this he was
labeled an alien to be exterminated during changing times. Like the others,
it symbolized the most vicious form of control over all black residents and
mirrored in several sociopsychological and physical ways an archetypal
southern lynching.67
Sikeston lynchers formed a mass mob, since 1880 the "most spectacu-
lar" and "most common" type of southern mob in several states. They used
technology—telephones and automobiles—to transform traditional blood-
shed into "a peculiarly modern ritual," as had lynchers since the last decade
of the nineteenth century. They drew sizable numbers, obtained widespread
support, and swiftly killed someone charged with dastardly crimes. Well or-
ganized, they overpowered lawmen, ritualized Wright's degradation (sym-
bolically that of all blacks), and displayed his corpse for both races to
contemplate. Their ranks, though dominated by men, attracted women and
children, and their apologists boasted of protecting white womanhood.68
In exhibiting these mass mob characteristics, Sikeston lynchers differed
from other types of mobs. Unlike secret terrorists, who operated widely in
border states, imposed secrecy, and rarely murdered, they held little in com-
mon with the planter backlash to Southern Tenant Farmers Union activi-
ties in Caruthersville. Unlike vengeful private mobs seeking retribution for
crimes against themselves that failed to spark community action, they ad-
vanced and gave legitimacy to community punishment. Unlike quasi-legal
posses who hunted and often killed alleged lawbreakers, they bore no offi-
cial sanction.
Yet Sikeston lynchers also displayed specific aspects of private mobs and
posses, indicating the limits of specific rope-and-faggot typology. They iden-
tified closely with the injury of Grace Sturgeon because of relationships with
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her husband, and they received the assistance of at least one policeman, as
did private mob members elsewhere. They also benefited from the effort of
townspeople to forget the entire affair quickly, again paralleling the after-
math of bloodshed involving a private mob. And they struck with the swift-
ness of the posses that tended to focus on heinous crimes of rape and murder,
involved huge numbers of people, and promoted a sense of honor as self-
appointed if not deputized protectors of the community.
Sikestonians also broke with important aspects of other mass mobs.
They neither killed an innocent suspect nor fabricated his crime in order to
justify his death for lesser racial challenges. Representing a minority of lynch-
ings that turned on charges of real or imagined rape, Wright's death rein-
forced among whites the legitimacy of their action and the belief in black
beasts. That lynchers were identified and brought before the law also made
them different from past mass mobs, yet as friends, neighbors, and citizens
recognizing the status of Grace Sturgeon, they verified contemporary and
historical perceptions. Her family members were less than prominent among
the lynchers, however, while a handful of malcontents, Kirk V. for one, played
major roles in the execution. Still, despite threats to raze Sunset, their vio-
lence began and ended with Wright.
Sikestonians differed from members of mass mobs in additional ways
because of region, epoch, Wright's condition, and the urban context. They
did not torture, shoot, or hang him but limited their ritualized murder to
dragging and burning. Knowing of his earlier admission of guilt, they sought
no confession, and they wasted no time on prayer or collecting souvenirs
from the pyre—activities corresponding to those of legal executions. Pho-
tos were taken of the corpse, some even for profit, but no one placed a warn-
ing sign on Wright's charred body.
The Sikeston event provided insights into lynchings throughout the
state, which totaled eighty-five for the period 1889-1942 and eventually mir-
rored the South's emphasis on black victims (Table 1 in the Appendix).
Whereas southern mobs killed disproportionate numbers of blacks as early
as 1889 and reached their peak in the 1890s "like some giant volcanic erup-
tion,"69 Missourians executed transgressors from both races in near equal
numbers in that period: twenty blacks (47.6 percent) versus twenty-two
whites (52.4 percent). Over the next forty-three years, however, they lynched
thirty-eight blacks and only five whites, most of both races having been shot,
hanged, or burned during the first decade (Table 2A). They charged 28.6
percent of their black victims with rape-murder, rape, or attempted rape and
40.0 percent with murder during the twentieth century, when southern
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counterparts destroyed slightly smaller percentages for those offenses
(see Table 3).
That Missourians lagged behind the course of southern violence revealed
an overlap of timelines and environments: their frontier society extended
into the 1890s to mete out justice across racial boundaries, while their ob-
session with blacks grew out of that decade and increased with town devel-
opment and staple crop cultivation. In some cases they killed for what began
as a sex offense and escalated to assault or murder. Had Wright's transgres-
sion been recorded as an attempted rape of Sturgeon rather than assault,
the proportion of rape-related lynchings in the state would have been
greater—suggesting that the percentage of alleged sex crimes may have been
higher in all states and that the rape complex, however conjured up, was more
real in the minds of many lynchers than estimated by lynching critics.
This was the case in Sikeston. And, while the state followed the overall
southern pattern of more rape-related lynchings in the nineteenth century
and more murder-related killing in the twentieth, its rape-related rate of 45
percent loomed above the 40.7 percent recorded in the South before 1900.70
Surprisingly, Missouri's rate was even more disproportionate between 1920
and 1942: of nine black deaths in those twenty-three years, six (66.7 per-
cent, the highest percentage for any era) were for rape. Real or imagined
sexual transgressions held the attention of Missourians more than of south-
ern lynchers, perhaps reflecting the impact of tradition on urban life (Table
2B-C).
Moreover, Missouri mobs in some instances paralleled and in others
broke with trends in other border states and the southern socioeconomic
anomaly of Virginia. Like them, they struck in an "ebb and flow" pattern of
bloodshed that most affected certain counties (see map of Missouri Lynch-
ings by County).71 They committed at least one lynching in 40 of 114 coun-
ties, 17 above and 23 below the Missouri River, which flows across the upper
third of the state. Lynchings clustered along the northern side of the river
in the west and, especially, in a diagonal swath from the center of the state
to the Mississippi River above St. Louis; they also concentrated in the south-
west Ozark Mountains and in the southeast lowlands, especially in the
Bootheel counties fronting the Mississippi. Although executions occurred
in all three areas during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, lynchers in
the north claimed more lives before 1900, southwesterners during the next
decade, and southeasterners after that. Wright's life, then, was taken in a place
and at a time consistent with the larger pattern of extralegal killings in the
state (Table 4).
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Missouri Lynchings
by County, 1889 - 1942
Southwest
Ozarks
(shaded)
Cleo Wright's death
(Sikeston)
: \ Southeast
Lowlands
taded)
1889 - 1899 • black o white
1900 - 1909 • black ° white*
1910 - 1919 * black* white*
1920 - 1942 • black* no white
usa multiple lynching
* Four deaths occurred at unknown
locations and are not indicated:
2 black (1919, 1920) and
2 white (1901, 1919).
There were 85 total lynchings
between 1889 and 1942:
58 black and 27 white.
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Map recreated by Donna Gilbreath from a map compiled by Jason M. Davis
Source: Missouri Spatial Data Information Service
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Mobs appeared more often in some counties than others. They struck
more than once in nine northern and nine southern counties; only in Pike
above the Missouri River, compared with seven counties below it, did they
kill more than one victim in the same incident. Those who claimed the most
black as opposed to white lives surfaced in the Missouri and Mississippi val-
ley counties of Howard and Pike, the Ozark counties of Lawrence and
Greene, and the Bootheel counties of Mississippi, New Madrid, and Pemiscot.
Again like border state and Virginia lynchings, those in Missouri represented
the convergence of tradition with labor relations and shifting or (particu-
larly in towns) rapid socioeconomic developments that fostered racial vio-
lence.72
Missouri lynch mobs emanated from three areas boasting core popula-
tions of southern and mountain people; in fact, one such area, comprising
six central and two eastern counties above the Missouri River, was known
collectively as "Little Dixie."73 "It's the heart of Missouri, blooded of three,
Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee," remarked a poet who also described the
region that begot C.L. Blanton as "old Jeff Davis a-blowin' on his horn."74
Each county featured Democratic politics, in part because of pro-slavery
sentiment during the Civil War. Howard and Pike also claimed the area's larg-
est number of black lynchings—four each.75 Mob members of Lawrence and
Greene Counties in the southwest took the most lives in a single lynching,
three apiece. They drew from similar heritages, though more of the original
settlers brought Republican Party politics from eastern Tennessee and, by
the turn of the century, resided in mining areas and farmlands adjoining
commercial centers such as Pierce City and Springfield. Southeast Mis-
souri, however, recorded the most black deaths in a single county, six in
Pemiscot, and the most multiple lynchings in the state. The culture and
politics of the lowlands people were akin to those of Little Dixie, their
southernness, labor competition, and racial violence having been reinvigo-
rated by the presence of white planters and black sharecroppers.76 And three
of the last eight known lynchings in the state—all after World War I—oc-
curred in the Bootheel, culminating with the death of Cleo Wright (Table
4A).77
Those who killed Wright revealed the influence of urban life on their
violence. Different from their counterparts in southern and border states,
Missourians lynched in a surprisingly large number of small towns and vari-
ous sized cities.78 Of fifty-eight black lynchings, twenty-three, or nearly 40
percent, occurred in locales that ranged from 2,500 persons (in minor civil
entities, according to census bureau definition) to 80,935 residents (St. Jo-
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seph). In contrast, they executed only eight whites in cities (almost 30 per-
cent of the white total), though none in a city larger than Hannibal (12,857)
(Table 5A). That they murdered most whites in the 1890s and in country-
side settings indicates that white lynching tended to be a more rural phe-
nomenon.
It is also revealing that they killed a greater percentage of blacks in ur-
ban settings in each successive lynching period, advancing from 20 percent
in the 1890s to nearly 67 percent between 1920 and 1942 (Table 5B).79 Their
violence, after spilling into small towns of under 5,000 residents, threatened
to become full-blown pogroms or communal riots in larger, more imper-
sonal communities where traditional beliefs were grafted to modern settings;
there, lawmen and judges handled most white and black transgressors yet
proved ineffective in the face of large-scale white fear of black assertiveness
and socioeconomic competition. Lynchers could turn into rioters as they
did in Joplin (1906) and threatened to do in Sikeston (1942), revealing
a direct line of rural to urban violence that has been previously over-
looked.
In Missouri and elsewhere, white inhabitants of cities threatened by
growing numbers and loss of personalism, increasingly viewed blacks as in-
distinguishable one from another, and thus targeted them as a homogeneous
group rather than individual rogues. For example, in Atlanta (1906) crowds
excited over press accounts of alleged violations of white women by black
men lashed out indiscriminately and tormented, mutilated, and strung up
some black victims; and a Springfield, Illinois, mob (1908), frustrated by its
failure to lynch an alleged murderer and an accused rapist who were sur-
reptitiously escorted to safety by police, ignited a race riot that included the
beating, cutting, and hanging of two black men, again in archetypal lynch-
ing fashion. Significantly, countryside and town lynchings evolved into ur-
ban riots South and North, in which preserving racial lines required acts of
communal bloodshed: white on black combat in the streets.80
Wright's killers burst forth in this evolving urban pattern, though his
death occurred in a larger city than had most black lynchings. They joined
other Bootheel vigilantes who had intimidated and murdered black work-
ers since their labor feuds with proprietors during turn-of-the-century log-
ging days; they joined other postwar mobs who struck in towns, shockingly
so in southwest Missouri during the early 1900s. Sikestonians, then, evinced
the "culturally inherited blueprint for summary justice" that was present in
most other lynchings statewide and bore mass mob characteristics: rumor,
crowd formation, dragging, burning, ritual, and site selection. And they
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manifested the reaction of whites in other lynching towns statewide who
questioned their ability to control blacks, particularly during periods of dis-
ruptive change. But unlike city dwellers in Virginia, who were outmaneu-
vered by authorities, they succeeded.81
In some specific ways, mob members in Sikeston replicated the blood-
shed in southwest Missouri towns. Those in Pierce City (1901), Joplin (1903),
and Springfield (1906) experienced unpredictable though not identical
provocation: population changes in Pierce City and Joplin; political com-
petition in Joplin and Springfield; and in all these municipalities, criminal
activity or racial intimacy that was blamed on black degeneracy (Table 6).82
Lynchers killed swiftly and ritualistically but did not mutilate blacks alleged
to have raped white women or, in Joplin, murdered a police officer; they
meant to intimidate black residents—though not as directly as Pierce City
and Joplin mobs that entered the black community, attacked its residents,
and burned their homes. And, except in Pierce City, they faced prosecution—
which, despite the efforts of official counterparts to Forrest C. Donnell and
David E. Blanton, proved a mockery.83
Sikestonians also shared most of these traits with lynchers in the north
central town of Columbia, in Little Dixie's Boone County. There a mob killed
James T. Scott in 1923, when perceived black prosperity, population changes,
and sexual offenses involving both races triggered the bloodshed one week
after his arrest for the attempted rape of a white teenager.84
In additional important ways, Sikeston lynchers paralleled the mobs in
these towns. They wore no masks; they included no women or youngsters,
though both were part of the crowd that gave them anonymity, encourage-
ment, and legitimacy; the groups contained some younger, lower-class, and
dissident individuals, even outsiders from nearby locales, yet the leaders and
most active participants constituted a cross section of townspeople. Like-
wise, those few officially accused of involvement in other towns (where
sketchy data is suggestive), proved to be residents of longstanding in their
thirties and forties, whose occupations ranged from working-class laborers
to skilled bricklayers to businessmen, ward heelers, and former officials; sons
of prominent citizens also appeared among the activists in Springfield and
Columbia. Particulars influenced each mob: for instance, the presence of ex-
policemen, their relatives, and friends in Springfield, where a patrolman's
wife had given birth to a child fathered by her black lover in 1904. Sikes-
tonians and their peers in Pierce City, Joplin, Springfield, and Columbia,
nonetheless, belied the contention that riffraff alone imposed lynch law. And
although no arrests occurred and hence no question of bail arose in Sikeston,
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lynchers had their bail bonds paid by "solid citizens" in Springfield and by
the "elite" in Columbia.85
However self-serving their actions or predictable their decisions, towns-
people more than country residents moved to prosecute mob members. In
all these communities except Pierce City, small numbers of citizens pressed
for courtroom justice. Some in Joplin risked their lives in a losing tug-of-
war with lynchers for control of the rope around Thomas Gilyard's neck;
others in Springfield prevented the mob from spilling into the black neigh-
borhoods. Motivated by indignation and apparently, in Springfield, by party
politics, prosecutors went after lynchers. And in the Columbia case a grand
jury hearing resulted because of outside public pressures, gubernatorial poli-
tics, and institutional reputations—especially those of the National Guard,
which failed to prevent the murder, and of the University of Missouri, upon
whose grounds it occurred. Nonetheless, only laborer Sam Mitchell of Joplin
was convicted of a crime, and that verdict was overturned in a second trial.
All executioners were freed by respectable citizens serving on grand or trial
juries.
As in Sikeston, whites in towns wrecked by mob violence exhibited some
disagreement over the lynching. They represented diverse views of white
supremacy and race rule, further evidence linking lynchings and riots in an
urban context, yet they overwhelmingly shied from convicting anyone for
the murder of an alleged black rapist or cop killer. Opposing lynch law dif-
fered from protecting neighbors, acquaintances, and themselves in racist
and—in the case of Pierce City and portions of Columbia—close-knit so-
cieties.86 Even in Springfield all lynchers went free, despite a sizable popula-
tion characterized by economic, political, and social diversification.
Ironically, in both that city and Columbia seventeen years later, the grand
jurors were farmers, representatives of society's traditional past; had they
been drawn from more modern segments of the population, the outcome
might have been different. Their clash of values with progressive attorneys
notwithstanding, those seeking justice were small in number and silenced
by the majority and their own commitment to a segregated society—which
gave outsiders the mistaken impression that every white resident condoned
bloodshed.
Sikeston lynchers killed more than a suspicious young male fairly new
to the area. They stressed his prison record, of course, the only characteris-
tic that fit the supposed criminal-prone profile of lynch victims through-
out the South. In truth, however, they murdered, as had other mobs in
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Missouri towns, a familiar individual—one who, after five years of residency,
was regarded by many whites as part of the community.87 Nor was their vic-
tim a cotton worker needing discipline, which explains why his death—oc-
curring in the winter—did not fit the May-September seasonal pattern of
most southern lynchings. Only one of the victims in these five towns, Scott
of Columbia, was killed in the summer, and none were agricultural labor-
ers.88
In fact, only Gilyard, a twenty-three-year-old transient from Mississippi
who arrived in Joplin forty-eight hours before his April death, appeared to
be a complete stranger. Also in April, Pierce City residents lynched William
Godley, thirty-two, married, and employed as a laborer. They knew that he
had come from Kentucky several years earlier and had lived in the area with
his parents and other kin for some time; they knew, too, that he had a prison
record but, after serving seven and a half years for an alleged rape, had been
paroled for "orderly and peaceable" conduct. Like the Sikestonians who
vouched for Cleo Wright's early release, they never feared him until the failed
rape-murder of a landowner's twenty-four-year-old daughter triggered his
execution. In contrast, Springfieldians lynched upright, productive citizens,
none of whom lived on the edge of society. Horace Duncan, twenty, and Fred
Coker, twenty-one, had grown up in Springfield, lived with family members,
were steadily employed laborers, and had no criminal records. Nevertheless,
in reverse stereotype, white townsfolk took the lives of these "clean cut, hard-
working and responsible" youths for the alleged rape of a recently arrived
white woman of dubious character who had left her farmer husband in
nearby Fair Play.89 This too occurred in April. Columbians killed an equally
respectable resident in August: James T. Scott, thirty-five, a decorated World
War I veteran and widower who had left three children with Chicago rela-
tives several years earlier. Despite his identity as a janitor for the University
of Missouri who had married a local schoolteacher, owned a car, attended
church, lived in a middle-class neighborhood, and had apparently never
committed a crime before, they hanged him for allegedly attempting to rape
a professor's teenage daughter.
Invariably, one black man served as well as another. Among these vic-
tims only Cleo Wright confessed to his crime (and appears to have been
guilty); the others professed their innocence and were accused without sup-
porting evidence. Godley was arrested in Pierce City because of his past;
Gilyard was found wounded at the crime scene in Joplin where a police of-
ficer died from gun shots; Duncan and Coker were at work at the time the
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estranged wife—who failed to identify them—claimed to have been raped
in Springfield; Scott died because the Columbia teenager, and she alone, iden-
tified him as her assailant. That black victims stood accused no matter how
skimpy the evidence was all that mattered to white townspeople who, like
their southern cousins rural and urban, sought immediate racial backlash
and example setting rather than justice.
Transgressors, whether Godley in 1901 or Wright forty-one years later,
exposed the racial and sexual tension within a city, which necessitated their
public execution by white residents attempting to uphold society in spite of
its "conflicts and contradictions." "Black beasts" enabled everyday residents
to project and channel their fears easily and singularly, much as New En-
glanders had done with female witches when colonial life was fraught with
anxiety.90 Single women then, like southern blacks later, were social and eco-
nomic dependents in a society of interpersonal obligations that bred resent-
ment; race and gender marked inherent strains, and public executions
brought temporary relief without permanent resolution (which required
revamping entire social orders).91
Sensing this, blacks in every municipality responded to the cruel object
lesson in near-identical acts of survival: they deserted Pierce City, Joplin, and
Springfield in sizable numbers. But their lives had been threatened even be-
fore the mob violence, as whites—particularly in Springfield—struggled with
challenges to segregation and race etiquette; their experience replicated on
a much smaller scale that of southern cities such as Atlanta, where the lynch-
ing-pogrom connection occurred in 1906.92 Hence, those who remained lost
socioeconomic and political leverage, which in Springfield had been mean-
ingful. Blacks in Columbia and Sikeston also fled, albeit more temporarily.
They enjoyed a greater stake in their communities and, in Sikeston, the pro-
tection of white paternalism and personalism, which was greatly reduced if
not lacking altogether in the more modern context of larger southwestern
cities such as Joplin and Springfield.
In several instances blacks also prepared for race war. Pierce City blacks
exchanged shots with white lynchers-turned-rioters who entered their neigh-
borhood, killed two inhabitants, and torched several homes. Those in
Sikeston and Springfield armed themselves; in the latter city dynamite was
provided by a white employer. Few blacks anywhere spoke out in the after-
math, but leaders who did, most notably the ministers J. Lyle Caston of Co-
lumbia and J.B. Ross of Sikeston, were warned or run out of town. A handful
of ordinary citizens and even three prisoners demonstrated courage by bear-
ing witness against lynchers in Pierce City and Springfield. As in Sikeston,
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however, protest came largely from outside—the NAACP pressured the gov-
ernor to prosecute lynchers in Columbia as well as Sikeston—and without
much success.
Many lawmen should have faced prosecution for failing to protect lynch-
ing victims. Police in Pierce City made no effort to resist the mob, and some
in Springfield joined it; sheriffs in Columbia and Springfield failed to pre-
pare adequately for the lynchers, considered themselves helpless, and aban-
doned their prisoners easily. Only in Joplin did officers force mob members
to push them aside. Missouri guardsmen proved no more effective in Pierce
City: when the mayor decided against using them, lynchers broke into the
armory to obtain rifles and ammunition. In Columbia, militiamen ignored
Governor Arthur Hyde's mobilization call—which the NAACP requested—
and, as agitated citizens, augmented the very crowd that he had ordered bro-
ken up. Some mayors and lesser officials in Pierce City, Joplin, and Columbia
sought to dissuade the mob themselves or, after the lynching, requested the
militia to restore peace. None acted with the heroism and determination of
County Prosecutor Blanton and Trooper Dace, who nonetheless could not
save Wright without firing into the crowd and igniting a full-fledged riot.
Sikeston lawmen, more than those in other urban settings, might have
prevented Wright's lynching by a more expressive use of controlled and con-
strained force, following the example of Blanton, Dace, John Tandy, and
Vincent Boisaubin.93 If Police Chief Kendall had called in Roy Beck, Grover
Lewis, and Walter Hughes and if Assistant Police Chief Harold Wallace had
remained in City Hall, their numbers—including teenager Jack Johnson—
would have totaled ten instead of six and made their chance of turning back
the mob certainly possible. Had they held the lynchers at bay for five more
minutes, Trooper Jim Greim, Trooper John Morris, and Constable Bob Reed
would have brought the number of protectors to thirteen and turned the
possibility of success into a probability. Had Sheriff Hobbs and deputy Jim
Robert come immediately when summoned, they would have raised the force
to fifteen and the prospects of Wright's safety to very probable. By noon,
other reinforcements such as Trooper Morley G. Swingle and FBI Agent A.E.
Jones would have dashed all opportunity for a lynching.94
Numbers alone, of course, would not have saved Wright, for lacking the
outlook of Blanton and the troopers, local and county lawmen were unable
to suppress racial attitudes, personal rivalries, and provincial loyalties. Oth-
erwise, they could have shielded Wright, if necessary brandishing their weap-
ons; thirteen determined protectors, eleven of them experienced law officers,
might have dissuaded the mob until reinforcements arrived to quell the
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lynching threat. In fact, using firm action, Hobbs had twice prevented mob
violence elsewhere in the county, and Dace, Tandy, and Boisaubin would do
so four months later in Wyatt.95 That Blanton and Dace sought to prevent
violence while Kendall, Wallace, and Hobbs beckoned it revealed that in
lynchings, as in riots, law enforcers participate in and influence the outcome
of collective behavior.96 Whereas Kendall and Wallace permitted Wright's
death, state troopers, auxiliary police, and FBI agents prevented a subsequent
racial pogrom in Sunset. Prosecutor and troopers represented the promise
of justice in a modern context; policemen and sheriff verified the meaning
of law and order for a traditional society.97
Their actions notwithstanding, Cleo Wright's guilt set him apart from
the other victims and gave legitimacy to all previous state lynchings. In other
ways too his death differed from those in other towns. Sikeston lynchers acted
in an unsettling socioeconomic period that affected the larger area; their
striking back at the savagery of Wright's attacks on a white woman and a
police officer was somewhat similar to but more single-minded than the
actions of Columbia whites fearful of sex offenses crossing racial lines. In
contrast, mob members in Pierce City, Joplin, and Springfield, with previ-
ous assaults and sexual transgressions heavy on their minds, turned on per-
petrators of past crimes whom they considered secondary offenders: Pete
Hampton in Pierce City and Will Allen in Springfield, suspected of having
murdered, respectively, a marshal and a Confederate veteran. They also tar-
geted the black communities of Pierce City and Joplin. Sikestonians neither
sought out yesterday's offenders nor attacked black residents en masse, in
part because of the lack of a real or perceived crime wave, the stronger pres-
ence of lawmen at the execution, and the fear of black retaliation afterward.
The heritage of racial personalism and paternalism, which Columbia shared
to a lesser extent but Ozark cities not at all, also proved important in pro-
tecting Sunset residents. Cleo Wright stood alone rather than for all black
townsmen—a point made by the Pole Cat himself.
Nor did Sikeston's mob seem influenced by a recent lynching nearby, as
white residents in both Joplin and Springfield appeared to be. Pierce City's
violence pushed racial fears and black refugees into Joplin, which repeated
the experience and passed it along to Springfield. Coming so close in time
and setting, the three bloodlettings—unique in themselves—seemed a chain
reaction, much like the clustering and contagious effect of later race riots;
they evinced another weld between lynchings and other forms of collective
violence in municipal settings, which modernizing influences—especially
"hot," quick television messages of racial confrontation—would accentuate.98
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And unlike the lynchers in the Ozarks and Little Dixie, those in Sikeston
needed no coaxing from sensational editors. Once having acted, however,
they faced the greatest barrage of outside pressure and the most sincere le-
gal challenge of all urban lynchers. In this context, Donnell, Blanton, and
Dace emerged heroic and historical.
Although municipal mobs killed for reasons of alleged black degeneracy
rather than labor conflicts emanating from an agrarian economy beyond
city limits, only Sikeston residents lynched in an era of wartime change.
Clearly, lynchers experienced different levels of urbanization and, accord-
ingly, different reasons for their rampage. Pierce City residents entered the
twentieth century having lost considerable population—black and white—
and census bureau status as a civil entity. They also faced a rise in crime,
supposedly committed by transients, and a downturn in economics due to
area crop failures during the summer of 1901. In contrast to these retrogres-
sive developments, Joplin citizens benefited from enormous growth (161.7
percent) over the 1890s but reeled under the imagined competition of blacks,
who, though their numbers had more than doubled by 1900, constituted less
than 3 percent of the population. Springfieldians that year and Columbians
twenty years later, in turn, enjoyed modest population increases yet mani-
fested sexual fears despite the fact that their black populations, remained
constant and lost significant numbers, respectively. In truth, lynchers in each
of the expanding municipalities made scapegoats of blacks for socioeco-
nomic disruptions wrought by urbanization. Unsettled by the shift from a
traditional to a modern society, whites lashed out at historical aliens (Table
6).
Neither Sikeston nor these other cities matched the pattern of the most
lynch-prone areas of the South, where low population density (number of
people per square mile) combined with high rates of black population
growth. None except Columbia were located in counties characterized by
low population densities, and only Joplin and Sikeston experienced high rates
of black population growth. In general, they recorded the reverse of state or
southern lynchings—rural or urban—before 1930 (Table 6)." Sikeston,
moreover, combined traditional and modern lynching patterns, high popu-
lation density with high black population growth, revealing the makings of
both the communal and—with the formation of ghettos and heightened
black awareness—the commodity riots that converged on Detroit the year
after Wright's lynching.
Sikestonians, of course, inhabited one of the medium-sized Missouri
municipalities that experienced a twentieth-century lynching, much larger
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than Pierce City (2,151) and much smaller than Joplin (26,023) or Spring-
field (23,267). They numbered 7,944, comparable to Columbians (10,392)
though with a smaller black population at the time of the lynching (Table
6). In the following decade, however, they and the residents of Joplin and
Columbia experienced actual increases in the number of blacks, while those
of Pierce City and Springfield lost population—though attributing the per-
manent decline of their black populations solely to the bloodshed disregards
the racial emigration that began in the 1890s. As significantly, Sikeston led
all these municipalities in the number (599) and percentage (59.7 percent)
of new black residents, and Scott County alone posted similar gains. These
figures indicate that Wright's killing did not dissuade blacks from living per-
manently in either the city or the county, as had been the trend in south-
west Missouri. In fact, Sikeston's black population grew faster than its
county's, thereby continuing the trend of black urbanization begun before
Wright's death.100
Confronting a racial order uniquely accentuated by outside forces,
Sikeston occupied a space between agrarian towns the size of Pierce City—
on the "fringes of urban life"—where race relations were blurred, and much
bigger commercial entities such as Joplin or Springfield, where the poten-
tial for racial competition and possible challenge to Jim Crow loomed
large.101 Its citizens encountered Cleo Wright in this uncertain middle ground
and reckoned, simultaneously, with his rage and global conflict. Moreover,
the war produced in Sikeston circumstances very different from those in all
other Missouri towns or cities where lynchings occurred, regardless of chro-
nology, demography, social order, or economic characteristics. It profoundly
accentuated Wright's personal anxiety, Sturgeon's vulnerability, and the mob's
sense of honor and community, while glorifying traditional violence in a
modern context. Most notable in that respect, it forced the federal govern-
ment to act.
8 Postmortem
Unforeseen by the tradition-bound killers of Cleo Wright was the long-range
significance of their act for constitutional law, one of the most far-reaching
sources of modernization. Their ancient blood rite amid global war provoked
an unprecedented contemporary, legal response that advanced intermittently
into the postwar era toward federal intervention in racially motivated vio-
lence. More than reviving earlier concepts of honor and bloodshed, they
dragged forward a judicial activism that had begun in the wake of an earlier
world war to challenge abuse of black citizens and by the late 1960s reached
far beyond Sikeston to envelop the deep South and the entire nation.1
Legal efforts growing out of Wright's lynching revealed the shift in race-
related cases begun by the NAACP, liberal lawyers, and federal judges dur-
ing the Progressive Era. Their counterattack rested upon the Civil War
constitutional amendments and came before the Supreme Court of Chief
Justice Edward Douglass White (1919-21). Most notably, they succeeded in
using the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to strike down peonage and
"grandfather clauses," respectively, and the Fourteenth Amendment to point
up the rights of black citizens affected by residential segregation and sepa-
rate-but-equal accommodations. Though hardly dismantling "the legal
structure of racism," they held out hope and set precedent for the more fun-
damental changes of the Great Depression. An improved and increasingly
black-dominated NAACP legal staff, a law profession reconsidering its val-
ues, and a tolerant Supreme Court brought about a constitutional revolu-
tion in civil rights during an era of great change. Their endeavors—which
took root in 1937 as Hugo L. Black's appointment created an activist ma-
jority on the bench—challenged discrimination in jury selection, voting
rights, and state-supported higher education.2
On the eve of World War II, however, the NAACP and liberal attorneys
had yet to seek legal footing for the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in lynching cases. Since the association's inception in 1909, its
leaders had sought federal legislation rather than judicial redress to stem mob
violence. They knew that Supreme Court decisions had held that lynchings
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were not in themselves a federal offense (United States v. Harris, 1882) and
that individuals were exempt from violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Hodges v. United States, 1906). They knew, too, that neither previous presi-
dents nor the Justice Department had supported the earlier legal battles for
racial equality.3 Surprisingly, then, as the NAACP carried on its crusade for
congressional action, Wright's murder raised the possibility of broadening
the executive branch's commitment to civil rights and, consequently, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause.
Sikeston scarcely seemed the place for a constitutional revolution, par-
ticularly one that would expand federal authority and protect black citizens.
In fact, after the U.S. Justice Department failed to secure indictments against
local lawmen for their role in Wright's death, Attorney General Francis Biddle
closed the case. By year's end, however, he had heard of much public dissat-
isfaction with the proceedings and "several intimations" for another grand
jury; of Jacob M. Lashly's hesitance—from the beginning—to accept the
theory developed by Civil Rights Section (CRS) attorneys; of "United States
v. Walter Kendall, et al." as still "the best case for Federal jurisdiction in the
lynching field": should it not be reopened through the office of United States
Attorney Harry C. Blanton? Biddle said no.4 Perhaps he considered the poli-
tics of reopening Wright's murder case too risky, or prejudice in the region
too overwhelming. Having tested federal power and lost, he seemed disin-
clined to appear unreasonable by challenging states' rights further. More-
over, the case load facing his department was mounting as national security
investigations alone doubled during the 1942-43 fiscal year.5 Perhaps, too,
President Roosevelt, never intending to go beyond the semblance of pro-
tecting black civil rights, instructed him to avoid alienating the white ma-
jority needed to fight the war abroad.
More likely, Biddle sought a new, stronger case from among subsequent
lynchings in Texas and Mississippi; and Roosevelt, who backed away from
firm government action in the face of riots the following year, probably pre-
ferred dealing with racial violence through CRS initiatives rather than United
States Army patrols. In this way the president endeavored to protect demo-
cratic rights, thereby stemming Axis propaganda, placating blacks and lib-
erals, but alienating politically powerful unreconstructed racists as little as
possible.6 Indeed, the lynching of Willie Vinson in Texarkana on July 13—
two weeks before the federal grand jury issued its report on Wright's mur-
der—doubtless prompted Roosevelt's order that the Justice Department
inquire into all black deaths suspected to be the result of lynching. Small
wonder that NAACP executive secretary Walter White, who probably learned
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of the directive from conversations with top officials in the Justice Depart-
ment, privately confided that "some real results" came from the Sikeston af-
fair.7
And they did, largely through the efforts of Biddle, CRS lawyers, and
their postwar successors. The "dreaded certainty" of Justice Department of-
ficials that other lynchings would occur and further blot the nation's war
effort probably influenced Roosevelt's order and proved prophetic, for three
black Mississippians were hanged within a span of seven days in October.
Given the talk of pressing those cases, one of which involved a jailer and
contained strong evidence for prosecution, Biddle decided against reopen-
ing the Wright case. He promised "relentless prosecution" and tested CRS
theory anew, failing in one grand jury and succeeding in another when ju-
rors—for the first time in forty years—indicted the lawman involved and
four others. In federal court, however, the jury acquitted the defendants,
despite the confession of one.8
Undaunted, Biddle continued the investigation and, where feasible, the
prosecution of lynching cases. Of five lynchings that occurred during the
remaining two and a half years of his attorney generalship, he advanced be-
yond grand juries twice. CRS attorneys obtained no convictions, but in
Screws v. United States (1945) they opened the door to "the potentialities"
of Section 52 as "an anti-lynching measure." Slightly more than one year af-
ter Wright's death, they had investigated the brutal killing of Robert Hall by
three Georgia police officers who handcuffed him and beat him senseless
with a blackjack. Following the conviction of Sheriff M. Claude Screws and
his henchmen by the United States District Court for violation of Section
52, a divided Supreme Court ordered new trials for the defendants.9 Accord-
ing to the Court's majority opinion, the district judge had failed to instruct
the jury properly on the question of the lawmen's willful intent to deprive
Hall of his constitutional rights to life and trial "by a court rather than by
ordeal"; hence, the Court limited Section 52's application to state officials
acting "under color of law" to divest a citizen of a specific federal right and
turned its constitutionality on "the requirement of 'wilfulness.'" Neverthe-
less, CRS lawyers demonstrated the legitimacy of Section 52 despite its vague-
ness, prosecuted—for the first time before the Supreme Court—a state
official for violating personal constitutional rights, and reinforced the con-
cept of "government by injunction" in lynching cases. More significantly for
future policy, Justice Department attorneys positioned themselves for ulti-
mate victory.10
Although U.S. Attorney General Tom C. Clark, Biddle's successor, ad-
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vanced CRS efforts to revitalize the Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruc-
tion statutes, the overwhelming precedent sought in the Wright case still lay
in the future. More lynchings, some involving the gruesome murders of black
veterans, marked the immediate postwar period and triggered enormous
protest from blacks and liberals. Confronted by political problems reminis-
cent of those that had determined Roosevelt's response to Wright's lynch-
ing, Harry S Truman created the President's Committee on Civil Rights,
which ultimately evaluated CRS efforts.11 Publicly, it considered the CRS
record "remarkable" though characterized by serious problems, such as the
difficulty of prosecuting cases under the Reconstruction statutes and rely-
ing on the FBI for its investigation; privately, it sharply criticized both
Justice Department agencies, accusing the bureau of "superficial and unin-
telligent work."12 However fair that appraisal may have been for the CRS's
eight-year history, it hardly did justice to the largely competent handling of
the Sikeston case by CRS attorneys and FBI agents endeavoring to set pre-
cedent in a racist, wartime society.
Internal conflicts, changing priorities, and strict constructionism slowed
Justice Department endeavors for another generation. Seeking positive re-
lations with local lawmen and a favorable image with the public, J. Edgar
Hoover resisted FBI investigations in civil rights cases; facing a conservative
Congress and a Communist threat, President Truman became increasingly
occupied with the Cold War; continuing to advance liberal tenets but not
projecting overwhelming endorsement of full civil rights, the Supreme Court
moved cautiously against only the most obvious forms of discrimination
and, in Williams v. United States (1951), held to the limited interpretations
of Sections 51 and 52. Into the 1950s and early 1960s, the Supreme Court
of Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the crushing legal blow to segrega-
tion, Congress enacted relatively tame yet symbolically significant civil rights
laws, and Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy engaged
in gradualistic, voluntary, and, if necessary, executive action.13 Yet from 1947
to 1964, no branch of government gave priority to Biddle's and his attor-
neys' efforts to provide blacks—and, later, white civil rights workers—pro-
tection under Sections 51 and 52. Even the Justice Department, which
elevated the CRS unit to division status in 1957, concentrated its resources
on race discrimination and, ironically, reversed its wartime emphasis.14
The resurrection and final success of Biddle's and his staff's strategy in
the Wright lynching came in a rush in 1964, when four civil rights workers
were murdered in the South. Presidential and Justice Department thinking
changed dramatically as the deaths of James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and
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Michael Schwerner in Mississippi and of Lemuel Penn in Georgia triggered
public reaction. FBI agents investigated the killings, Civil Rights Division
attorneys prosecuted the defendants, and the Supreme Court gave "new vi-
tality" to Sections 51 and 52. In United States v. Price (1966), liberal justices
reversed the decision of a lower court and ordered new trials for three Mis-
sissippi lawmen accused of willfully depriving Chaney, Goodman, and
Schwerner of due process as guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; in United States v. Guest (1966), the high court's judicial activists de-
clared Klansmen guilty of conspiring to deny Penn his constitutional rights
as assured by both the due process and the equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In essence, the Warren Court upheld and expanded
the CRS's original legal theory, placing "prosecutorial discretion" of both
sections in the hands of federal attorneys where crimes entailed state involve-
ment or, conversely, state indifference.15 Going further, it declared in Guest
that Congress could enact laws "punishing all conspiracies—with or with-
out state action—that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." Al-
though the Biddle and CRS strategy in Wright's and subsequent cases
demonstrated the constitutional difficulties involved in applying Sections
51 and 52, black protest, judicial activism, and changing times proved the
strategy's worth twenty years later.16
In sum, Biddle and CRS attorneys were a small part of the larger con-
stitutional revolution that challenged local legal tradition and, by inference,
concepts of white supremacy.17 Their commitment acquired urgency as the
war for democracy abroad brought into question "perversions of democ-
racy at home." Their concerns—and Roosevelt's—were limited to specific
minorities and specific rights: the violation of African American civil rights
jeopardized the nation's image, but the abrogation of Japanese American civil
liberties—for largely political considerations—supposedly bolstered the
nation's security. Democratic Party politics and war exigencies limited Jus-
tice Department action further, largely to the most flagrant violence. Per-
haps Biddle and his staff realized, as had the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice White, that lynching, like peonage, was "a hidden, shameful part" of
southern racism with few public supporters even among southerners.18 They
played a much less active and cooperative role in the NAACP's successful
challenge of white primaries in Smith v. Allwright (1944), for they feared
alienating southern Democrats—particularly members of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, with whom the department "had to get along." Nonethe-
less, Biddle's and his lawyers' efforts in the Wright case were genuine, and
although they fell short during the war and gave the impression that "the
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system hung on," they laid down judicial arguments that would help "un-
dermine the entire structure.""
Nowhere nearly as momentous or immediate as the "judicial shock
waves" set in motion by Smith and later cases, Biddle's investigation of
Wright's death signified the transition of the Justice Department's role in
civil rights: instead of sitting on their law books, Justice Department law-
yers interpreted them.20 To be sure, in 1942 Biddle's and his ranking assis-
tants' perspectives were limited to countering enemy propaganda and to
deterring racial violence. In the process, however, they brought the federal
government more directly into the protection of blacks and the struggle for
racial equality than at anytime since Reconstruction. Black and liberal con-
temporaries applauded their efforts, no doubt unaware that Roosevelt's or-
der for future investigations was made informally or that James E. Person's
lynching in Illinois in late 1942—legally a weaker case than that of Wright—
was pressed relentlessly because Biddle and CRS officials wanted to dem-
onstrate their regional evenhandedness.21 In that strategy of commitment
and expediency lay both the New Deal foundations and the future protec-
tion of black constitutional rights.
Like untold numbers of black citizens, Cleo Wright was denied due pro-
cess, mutilated, and murdered. The taking of his life and the political dimen-
sions of his case symbolized the expendability of black society in the eyes of
white lynchers and their government. Unlike his brethren, however, Wright
did not die in vain; his death helped set in motion the federal power needed
to secure for African Americans the most basic of unalienable rights. Per-
haps it was the realization that it would take many more black lives and sev-
eral more decades to deliver on the promise of personal safety that triggered
in Wright the phrase he uttered while mortally wounded in the basement
of a segregated hospital: "Oh, God!"
Or it might have been, as Grace Sturgeon wished to believe, confessional
remorse for a diabolical act that unleashed violence and tragedy all along
the color line of a city in socioeconomic transition. Wright's savage attack
combined racial grievance with an explosive ambivalence toward people and
things white, a living-out of the crudest of trickster tales that sought to in-
vert black-white power relationships; it emanated from a traditional soci-
ety that demanded his own destruction yet occurred in a place and at a time
when modernists were struggling to rid themselves of the most blatant forms
of backwardness.22 The lynchers and their supporters, including the Pole Cat,
rallied to control their "home ground" and level the social earthquake trig-
gered by Wright. Unlike other southerners who struck at specific conflicts,
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they uttered a death cry as far-reaching as his own.23 Perhaps not even David
E. Blanton, who genuinely challenged the mob's right to stand its ground,
understood that Wright's lynching signaled the beginning of the end of one
kind of racial repression.24 Though it seemed much like any of the eighty-
five executions of black men in Missouri, it alone bore lasting historical sig-
nificance. Postmortem indeed!
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Table 1. Lynching Victims in Missouri, 1889-1942
LD
SE
SW
O
u
Region:
Little Dixie
Lowlands
Ozarks
Other
Unknown
Y
X
U
Setting:
Rural
Urban
Unknown
Crime:
M
R
O
U
Category (Alleged):
Murder
Rape/Rape Murder
Other
Unknown
Date Race Name County
Region/
Setting Crime
01/21/89 B Henry Thomas Mercer O/Y M
05/07/89 W Corberbros. Moniteau O/Y M
W Corberbros. Moniteau O/Y M
W Corberbros. Moniteau O/Y M
06/21/89 B Alfred Grizzard Moniteau O/Y O gambling
08/03/89 B Benjamin Smith Macon O/Y R
09/12/89 W John Davis Greene SW/Y M
09/17/89 B George Burke Boone LD/X R
11/17/89 W Joseph Gebhart Dunklin SE/Y O safecracking
09/03/90 B Thomas Smith Butler O/Y M
01/20/91 B OlliTruxton Howard LD/Y R
01/22/92 W Robt. Helper Vernon O/X M
02/12/92 W Lewis Gordon Carroll O/X R
02/14/92 W John F. Bright Taney SW/Y M
04/27/92 B David Sims Dunklin SE/Y U
02/18/93 B John Hughes Randolph LD/X O insulting white
09/16/93 W Redmond Burke Caldwell O/Y O wife beating
01/17/94 B JohnBuckner St. Louis O/Y R
06/29/94 B Ulysses Haydon Barry SW/Y M
07/02/94 B Joseph Johnson Callaway LD/Y R
11/05/94 W (unknown man) St. Clair O/Y U
(Continued on next page)
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Date
02/17/95
08/15/95
10/11/95
06/27/96
06/30/96
07/27/96
09/04/96
12/06/96
05/22/97
07/10/97
11/18/97
06/06/98
06/30/98
08/11/98
11/29/98
07/23/99
01/01/99
11/16/99
04/28/00
05/04/00
01/03/01
03/02/01
07/26/01
08/19/01
02/17/02
03/26/02
05/25/02
07/17/02
08/12/02
01/21/03
04/15/03
05/03/03
:ontinued
Race
W
B
B
W
W
W
W
w
w
w
w
B
W
B
B
B
W
B
B
B
W
B
B
B
B
W
B
B
B
B
B
W
W
B
B
B
B
Name
George Tracy
Emmett Divens
Wm. Henderson
James Cocking
Ceil Wayland
M. Crawford
Thomas Larkin
Jessie Winner
James Nelson
John Mitchell
Jack Coffman
Erastus Brown
Silas P. Fargo
Curtin Young
Sam Young
Henry Williams
Benjamin Jones
(unknown man)
Frank Embree
Thomas Hayden
Wm. Huff
Mundee
Chowagee
Henry Darley
Nelson Simpson
Arthur McNeal
John Mack
Wm. Godley
French Goldley
Peter Hampton
Louis Wright
Oliver Wright
Abraham
Witherups
Joshua Anderson
Henry Gates
Andy Clark
Thomas Gilyard
D. Malone
County
Caldwell
Callaway
C. Girardeau
Macon
Marion
Moniteau
Jefferson
Lafayette
Lafayette
Wright
Wright
Franklin
Clay
Pike
Pike
Macon
Clay
New Madrid
Howard
Howard
Stoddard
Platte
Clay
Butler
Ray
Unknown
Lawrence
Lawrence
Lawrence
New Madrid
Randolph
Monroe
Lafayette
Lafayette
Wayne
Jasper
Pemiscot
Region/
Setting
O/Y
LD/X
O/Y
O/Y
O/X
O/Y
O/Y
O/X
O/X
O/Y
O/Y
O/Y
O/X
LD/Y
LD/Y
O/X
O/X
SE/Y
LD/Y
LD/Y
SE/Y
O/Y
O/Y
SE/Y
O/X
u/u
SW/Y
SW/Y
SW/Y
SE/Y
LD/Y
LD/Y
O/X
O/X
O/Y
sw/x
SE/Y
195
Crime
M
M
R
M
R
R
R
M
M
O larceny
O larceny
R
O arson
M
M
R
M
M
R
M
M
M
R
O prejudice
M
U
M
O prejudice
M
O assault
U
M
M
M
M
M
O prejudice
(Continued on next page)
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Table 1-—continued
Date
05/12/05
04/14/06
08/01/09
05/30/10
07/03/10
10/11/11
03/19/14
02/21/15
09/01/15
01/03/16
04/03/16
00/00/19
00/00/19
00/00/20
08/00/21
04/29/23
12/18/24
08/07/25
10/00/27
01/12/31
11/29/33
01/25/42
Race
B
B
B
B
B
W
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
W
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
Name
W.J. Mooneyhon
Robt. Pettigrew
Harry Duncan
Fred Coker
Wm. Allen
George Johnson
(unknown man)
Robert Coleman
Sam Field
A.B. Richardson
Benjamin Woods
Dallas Shields
W.F. Williams
Rudd Lane
Samuel Sykes
Fayette Chandler
(unknown man)
(unknown man)
(unknown man)
Roy Hammons
James T. Scott
Roosevelt Grigsby
Walter Mitchell
Will Sherrod
Raymond Gunn
Lloyd Warner
Cleo Wright
County
Pemiscot
Mississippi
Greene
Greene
Greene
Platte
New Madrid
Mississippi
Mississippi
Pemiscot
Pemiscot
Howard
Bates
Pike
Pemiscot
St. Charles
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Pike
Boone
Mississippi
Clay
Pemiscot
Nodaway
Buchanan
Scott
Region/
Setting
SE/Y
SE/Y
SW/X
SW/X
SW/X
O/Y
SE/Y
SE/X
SE/X
SE/X
SE/X
LD/X
O/U
LD/X
SE/Y
O/X
u/u
u/u
u/u
LD/Y
LD/X
SE/X
O/X
SE/Y
O/X
O/X
SE/X
Crime
O prejudice
O kidnapping
R
R
M
M
O assault
M
M
O robbery
R
M
M
O theft
O assault
M
U
U
U
R
R
R
R
R
M
R
O assault
Sources: Comparison and correction of NAACP, Thirty Years ofLynchingin the United
States, 1889-1918 (rpt; New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 80-82; Monroe N.
Work, ed., Negro Year Book: An Annual Encyclopedia of the Negro, 1925-1926 (Tuskegee,
Ala.: Tuskegee Institute, 1928), 400-402; Walter White, Rope and Faggot. A Biography of
Judge Lynch (rpt.; New York: Arno, 1969), 256; Jessie Daniel Ames, The Changing Charac-
ter of Lynching: Review of Lynching, 1932-1941 (rpt.; New York: AMS Press, 1973), 45-46;
Sikeston Standard, 30 Jan. 1942,8; Burton L. Purrington and Judith A Brooks, "Adapta-
tion, Repression, Resistance, and Flight: African Americans in Southwest Missouri, 1865-
1920" (meeting of American Society for Ethnohistory, Chicago, 4 Nov. 1989), 6 and table
2; Michael J. Pfeifer,"The Ritual of Lynching: Extralegal Justice in Missouri, 1890-1942,"
Gateway Heritage 13 (Winter 1993): 22-33. See also, for all tables, U.S. Census Reports,
Population, 1880-1950.
Appendix 197
Table 2. Lynching Victims by Race and Alleged Crime, Missouri, 1889-1942
Black
White
Total
Murder
Rape
Other
Unknown
1889-1899
N
20
22
42
Blk
8
9
2
1
o/o
47.6
52.4
%
40.0
45.0
10.0
5.0
A.
1900-1909
N %
18 81.8
4 18.2
22
Race
1910-1919 1920-1942
N
11
1
12
B. Crime
1889-1899
Wh
12
4
5
1
% Total
54.5 20
18.2 13
22.7 7
4.5 2
%
47.6
30.9
16.2
4.8
%
91.7
8.3
Blk %
8 44.4
3 16.7
6 33.3
1 5.6
N %
9 100
0 0
9
1900-1909
Wh %
3 75
0
0
1 25
Total
N
58
27
85
Total
11
3
6
2
o/o
68.2
31.8
%
50.0
13.6
27.3
9.1
Total 20 22 42 18 22
Murder
Rape
Other
Unknown
Total
Murder
Rape
Other
Unknown
Total
Blk
5
1
4
1
11
Blk
22
19
13
4
58
1910-1919
% '
45.4
9.1
36.4
9.1
%
37.9
32.8
22.4
6.9
Sources: See Table 1.
Wh '
0
0
0
1
1
Ibtal %
5 41.7
1 8.3
4 33.3
2 16.7
12
Blk
1
6
1
1
9
C. Race and Crime
1889-1942
Wh
15
4
5
3
27
% Blk/Wh
55.6
14.8
18.5
11.1
37
23
18
7
85
%
11.1
66.7
11.1
11.1
%
43.5
27.1
21.2
8.2
1920-1942
Wh
0
0
0
0
0
Total
1
6
1
1
9
%
11.1
66.7
11.1
11.1
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Table 3. Comparative Lynching Statistics, Missouri and the South,
1900-1942
Alleged Crime
Murder
Rape/Rape Murder
Other
Totalb
Missouri
N
14
10
11
35C
%
40.0
28.6
31.4
South'
N
498
337
481
l,316d
%
37.8
25.6
36.6
Sources: Calculated from Jessie Daniel Ames, The Changing Character of Lynching;
Jessie P. Guzman, ed., The Negro Year Book; and Stewart E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck, A
Festival of Violence.
"Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and
South Carolina, and Tennessee.
bExcludes "Unknown."
'All male victims.
•Includes 73 females and 24 victims whose gender is not known.
Table 4. Lynching Locations, Missouri, 1889-1942
Little
Dixie
SWOzarks
SE Low-
lands
Other
Unknown
Total
Black
White
Total
1889-1899
N
9
3
4
26
0
42
%
21.4
7.1
9.5
62.0
1889-1899
N
9
0
9
%
100.0
A. All Areas
1900-1909
N
2
7
5
7
1
22
%
9.1
31.8
22.7
31.8
4.5
1910-1919
N %
2 16.7
0
6 50.0
2 16.7
2 16.7
12
B. Little Dixie
1900-1909
N
1
1
2
%
50.0
50.0
1910-1919
N %
2 100.0
0
2
1920-1942
N
2
0
3
3
1
9
%
22.2
33.3
33.3
11.1
1920-1942
N
2 1
0
2
%
00.0
Total
N
15
10
18
38
4
85
%
17.6
11.8
21.2
44.7
4.7
Total
N
14
1
15
%
93.3
6.7
(Continued on next page)
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Table 4—cont.
Black
White
Total
Black
White
Total
Black
White
Total
Above
Black
White
Total
Below
Black
White
Total
Unknown
Black
White
Total
1889-1899
N
1
2
3
2
2
4
8
18
26
%
33.3
66.7
50.0
50.0
30.8
69.2
C. SWOzarks
1900-1909
N %
7 100.0
0
7
1910-1919
N %
0
0
0
D. SE Lowlands
5 100.0
0
5
E.(
5 71.4
2 28.6
7
6 100.0
0
6
Dther
2 100.0
0
2
1920-1942
N %
0
0
0
3 100.0
0
3
3 100.0
0
3
F. In Relation to Missouri River
1889-1899 1900-1909
(N =
12
7
19
8
15
23
0
0
0
42)
(45.2%)
(54.8%)
(AT = 22)
4
2
6 (27.3%)
14
1
15 (68.2%)
0
1
1 (4.5%)
1910-1919 1
(AT =12)
3
0
3 (25.0%)
7
0
7 (58.3%)
1
1
2 (16.7%)
1920-1942
Total
N
8
2
10
16
2
18
18
20
38
Total
(N=9) (N=85)
5
0
5 (55.6%)
3
0
3 (33.3%)
1
0
1 (11.1%)
24
9
%
80.0
20.0
88.9
11.1
47.4
52.6
33 (38.8%)
32
16
48(56
2
2
.5%)
4 (4.7%)
Sources: See Table 1.
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Table 5. Urbanization of Lynching, Missouri, 1889-1942
Pop.
Range
2,500-
5,001-
10,001-
20,001-
25,001-
50,001-
80,001-
N
Rural
Urban
Unknown
JV
Rural
Urban
Unknw
N
Rural
Urban
Unknown
A. Urban Lynchings,
BLACK
N=23 %
13 56.5
4 17.4
1 4.3
3 13.0
1 4.3
0
1 4.3
E
1889-1899
BLACK WHITE
= 20
16
4
0
% N=22 %
80.0 15 68.2
20.0 7 31.8
0
1910-1919
BLACK WHITE
= 11
2
7
2
% N= 1 %
18.2 0
63.6 0
18.2 1 100.0
1889-1942
BLACK WHITE
= 58
32
23
3
% AT =27 %
55.2 17 63.0
39.7 8 29.6
5.1 2 7.4
1889-1942
WHITE
N =
6
1
1
0
0
0
0
8 %
75.0
12.5
12.5
!. Rural v. Urban
TOTAL
N=42 % J
31 73.8
11 26.2
0
TOTAL
AT =12 %
3 25.0
7 58.3
2 16.7
TOTAL
N=85 %
49 57.6
31 36.5
5 5.9
BLACK
V= 18 %
12 66.7
6 33.3
0
BLACK
N=9 %
2 22.2
6 66.7
1 11.1
TOTAL
AT=31
19
5
2
3
1
0
1
1900-1909
WHITE
AT=4 %
2 50.0
1 25.0
1 25.0
1920-1942
WHITE
N=0 %
0
0
0
%
61.3
16.1
6.5
9.7
3.2
3.2
TOTAL
N=:
14
7
1
22 %
63.6
31.9
4.5
TOTAL
N =
2
6
1
9 %
22.2
66.7
11.1
Sources: Federal Census, 1890-1950; see also Table 1.
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Table 6. Lynchings in Selected Towns and Counties, Missouri, 1890-1950
Location Pop.a % Change Blk Blk % Change Density
Before After Pop./% Before After County State
Sikeston 7,944 +40.0 +46.5 1,003/ +123.9 +59.7
(1942) 12.6
Scott 30,377 +21.8 +8.1 2,261/ +43.7 +21.7 72.5 54.6
7.4
Pierce City
(1901)
Lawrence
Joplin
(1903)
Jasper
Sprgfld
(1906)
Greene
Columbia
(1923)
Boone
2,151
31,662
26,023
84,018
23,267
52,713
10,392
29,672
-14.3
+20.7
+ 161.7
+66.4
+6.5
+8.4
+7.6
-2.8
-16.0
-16.0
+20.1
+6.7
+51.3
+21.1
+44.0
+4.5
175/
8.1
283/
.9
733/
2.8
1,428/
1.7
2,268/
9.7
3,298/
6.3
1,919/
18.5
3,471/
11.7
-14.6
-22.3
+113.7
+56.4
+.4
+ 1.7
-14.6
-7.1
NA
-67.8
+9.3
-4.2
-12.0
-20.4
+ 19.9
-5.1
51.7
132.9
78.9
43.1
45.2
45.2
45.2
49.5
Source: Federal Census, 1890-1950.
'Population is the last census figure prior to the lynching.
bPercent change from one census to the next (i.e., Sikeston "before" from 1930 to
1940; "after" from 1940 to 1950).
'Density is the average number of people per square mile.
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Nov. 1991; S, 22 Nov. 1991; T, 9 June 1988; U, 7 June 1988.
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complex, 118-19,121,169-70; reason
for, 118-21,169-73,184,186; and resi-
dence, 114-15; and revenge, 115,168;
rumor about, 36,66, 73-75; and roles,
111-12,114-16,168; significance of, ix-
x, 1,3,37,51,165,166,187-89,192-93;
spectators at, 19,109,110,112,114,
117,168; and state grand jury, 53-56,
65,111-12,116, 123, 126, 147-49,162;
and Sturgeon family, 119-20,171,174;
and visual evidence, 52-53,109,112,
174, 220 n 98; mentioned, 27,36,164
—response to: of black residents to, 24-
29,32,33,36,37,70, 73,121,122,125,
158,169,182,186,245 n 28; of civic-
commercial elites, 32-34,118,122,
157-58,161,163-65; of clerics, 26-27,
28,30-31,117; of white residents, 18-
19, 27,29-30,31-32, 35,46, 51-52, 70-
71,117-19
Wyatt, Mo., 184
Young Men's and Young Women's
Hebrew Association, 45


